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SWITCH 1 if a client changed auditors between the prior (t-1) and current (t) year, 0 
otherwise. 
∆AF  Year-to-year change in the natural log of audit fees (in dollars). 
LNAF   Natural log of audit fees clients paid to auditors. 
LOG(MATCHFY_SUM_AUDFEES) 
FI (fee increase) An indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in audit fees in the period t-1 to t is 
greater than zero, and zero otherwise. 
AQ |DACC|, |DACCd| and RESTATE 
|DACC| The absolute value of abnormal accruals based on the performance-adjusted 
modified Jones model (Kothari et al. 2005). 
|DACCd| The absolute value of abnormal accruals based on Dechow and Dichev (2002); 
RESTATE 
1 if the client subsequently restates the current-year financial statements due to a 
non-clerical error, 0 otherwise. The sample includes only "Big R" restatements in 
which the audit opinion also is revised to disclose the restatement. 
Test Variables 
 
POST 1 for the 3-year period following the public disclosure of the ethical violation 
through issuance of the PCAOB disciplinary order, 0 otherwise. 
SANC_CY 1 if the affiliated firm of the sanctioned partner served as auditor in the current 
fiscal year, 0 otherwise. 
SANC_PY 1 if the affiliated firm of the sanctioned partner served as auditor in the prior 
fiscal year, 0 otherwise. 




ABNRML_FEE Abnormal audit fees calculated based on the residual of the audit fee model (2) 
estimated with no change and without the main and interactive test variables.  
AUDIT_FEE Natural log of annual audit fees paid to the company's auditor.  
LOG(MATCHFY_SUM_AUDFEES) 





 T5=sale/at;                                                                                                                    
BANKRUPTCY = (1.2*T1 + 1.4*T2 + 3.3*T3+0.6*T4 + 0.999*T5); 
BUSY 1 if firm fiscal year is December 31, 0 otherwise.  
CASH Total cash divided by total assets. (CHE/AT) 
CATA Ratio of current assets to total assets. (ACT/AT) 






CLIENT_INFLUENCE Ratio of the client's annual fees for all services to the sum of annual fees for all 
clients. 
EFFORT Audit fees deflated by the square root of total assets. 
(MATCHFY_SUM_AUDFEES/sqrt(AT) 
FOREIGN 1 if foreign operations, as indicated by foreign currency adjustments to income, 0 
otherwise; (PIFO) 
GC 1 if a client receives a going concern opinion, 0 otherwise. 
GROWTH Beginning Assets + Ending Assets scaled by Ending Assets                                         
(AT-LAG(AT)/LAG(AT) 
ICW 1 if a firm has an internal control material weakness over financial reporting, 0 
otherwise 
INTANG 1 if a firm has intangible assets, 0 otherwise. 
INVAR Inventory plus receivables divided by total assets. (INVT + RECTR)/AT 
LAG_ACCRUALS Lagged total accruals. LAG((IB-OANCF)/AT)) 
LEVEL3 1 if a firm has Level 3 valued assets and/or liabilities, 0 otherwise. 
LEVERAGE (LEV) Ratio of debt to total assets. (DLTT + DLC)/AT 
LIQUID Total current assets divided by total current liabilities (ACT/LCT) 
LIT An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s SIC code is within one of the 
following SIC groups: 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, or 
7370–7374, and 0 otherwise. 
LOSS 1 if net income less than 0, and 0 otherwise. 
M_A 1 if the client was involved in a merger or acquisition in the current or preceding 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
MB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. (MKVALT/BKVLPS) 
MODOP 1 if the firm received a modified audit opinion for anything other than going 
concern, and 0 otherwise. 
NON_AUDITFEE Natural log of annual nonaudit fees paid to the company's auditor. 
LOG(MATCHFY_SUM_NONAUD) 
QUICK Ratio of current assets (excluding inventories) to current liabilities.                         
(CHE + RECT)/LCT 
ROA Income before interest and taxes, divided by total assets. (IB/LAG(AT)) 
SEG Natural log of the number of business segments. 
SHORT 1 if auditor tenure is three years or less, and 0 otherwise. 
SIZE Natural log of total assets (in millions of $). LOG(AT) 














This paper examines whether ethical violations committed by an audit partner and the 
public release of the resulting PCAOB disciplinary order affects the associated audit firms’ 
switching risk, audit fees and audit quality relative to other comparable audit firms. I examine 
the effects of ethical violations on audit firms affiliated with a sanctioned auditor (also referred 
to as affiliated audit firm or sanctioned auditor) at the city (office), MSA, state, regional, and 
national (firm) level in order to determine if there is a spill-over effect. My findings suggest that 
at no level in my analysis did the public disclosure of the PCAOB sanction have a significant 
effect on sanctioned auditors losing or gaining clients. Furthermore, results indicate that there is 
no significant association between having a certified public accountant (CPA) serve on the audit 
committee and an affiliated audit firm’s ability to retain clients or attract new clients. In regards 
to audit fees, findings suggest that audit fees were affected by the PCAOB sanction in that 
sanctioned auditors experienced audit fee growth after the sanction was made public. This result 
is consistent across all samples for all tests with the exception of the state and national (firm) 
samples. Again, there appears to be no significant association between having a CPA serve on 
the audit committee and audit fee growth rates. Finally, in the audit quality tests of discretionary 
accruals, there is no evidence to suggest that the sanctioned auditor’s audit quality was different 
from that of other non-sanctioned audit firms during the three-year window either before or after 
the sanction. However, the results of the audit quality test using restatements indicate that after 
the sanction was made public, restatements increased at the regional and national (firm) level for 
sanctioned firms vs. non-sanctioned firms. At the city (office), MSA and state level there appears 
to be no effect on restatements as a result of the public disclosure of the PCAOB sanction. 
Consequently, it is difficult to infer that higher restatements at the regional and national (firm) 






In this paper, I examine whether ethical violations committed by audit partners and the 
resulting PCAOB disciplinary orders affect the associated audit firms’ switching risks1, audit 
fees and audit quality relative to other comparable audit firms over a three-year period following 
the date the ethical violation was made public through the release of the PCAOB disciplinary 
order. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 mandated a number of reforms aimed at 
improving corporate governance and accountability, one of which was the creation of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB’s mission is to “oversee the 
audits of public companies in order to protect the interests of investors” (PCAOB 2016a).  To 
accomplish its mission, the PCAOB has the ability to set standards, conduct inspections of audit 
firms and discipline those auditors and/or audit firms that commit serious audit deficiencies 
(PCAOB 2016a). 
Since 2005, the PCAOB has sanctioned a number of audit firms and auditors, including 
audit partners who improperly backdated, added, altered, and created audit work papers 
subsequent to the documentation completion date.2 Sanctions levied against audit partners 
involved in this type of violation include monetary fines as well as disbarment from being an 
associated person of a registered audit firm. In four separate PCAOB disciplinary orders, audit 
                                                 
1 Defined as in Boone et al (2015) as “an increased risk of losing an existing client and a decrease in the likelihood 
of attracting a new client.” 
2 According to Auditing Standard No. 3(15), the documentation completion date occurs not more than 45 days after 
1) the audit report release date or 2) the date the fieldwork was substantially complete or 3) the date the engagement 
ceased (PCAOB 2016c). Auditing Standard No. 3(16) states that “any (audit) documentation added must indicate the 
date the information was added, the name of the person who prepared the additional documentation, and the reason 
for adding it” (PCAOB 2016c). Furthermore, PCAOB Rule 4600 requires that an “associated person of a registered 
audit firm shall cooperate with the Board in the performance of any Board inspection” and “not provide misleading 





partners altered audit work papers and/or directed others to alter audit work papers in advance of 
a PCAOB or firm quality control inspection. These developments led the PCAOB to issue Staff 
Audit Practice Alert No. 14 which emphasizes that improperly altering audit documentation 
related to a PCAOB inspection or investigation is a violation of PCAOB rules and can result in 
severe disciplinary actions against the offending parties (PCAOB 2016e). Improper alteration of 
audit documentation undermines the integrity of the PCAOB’s inspection process and impedes 
the PCAOB’s efforts to improve the audit process (PCAOB 2016e). Staff Audit Practice Alert 
No. 14 makes clear that altering audit documentation is inconsistent with an auditor’s 
professional duty to act with integrity and encourages those in leadership positions to reinforce 
the importance of compliance with Auditing Standards (PCAOB 2016e). 
According to Taylor et al. (2003), what stakeholders truly seek is auditor reliability. 
Auditor reliability depends on auditor integrity and expertise rather than auditor independence 
and should be the profession’s “cornerstone” for protecting public interest. Integrity is an 
essential and necessary component of reliability and without auditor integrity there cannot be 
auditor reliability. It is important to note that PCAOB enforcement actions due to ethical issues 
are significantly different from those due to audit failures. According to PCAOB board member 
Jay Hanson, the PCAOB uses the term “audit failure” to identify cases in which the auditing firm 
failed to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence to support its audit opinion (Tysiac 2014). 
Enforcement actions due to ethical issues suggest a lack of integrity by the audit partner and are 
not necessarily indicative of an audit failure, although both may ultimately damage an audit 
firm’s reputation. 
Economic theory (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) suggests that the public 





auditor’s reputation for audit quality resulting in increased auditor dismissals, an inability to 
attract new clients and decreased audit fees.3 Because ethical violations committed by audit 
partners may taint the reputation of the affiliated office and the firm as a whole, I examine the 
effects of this type of violation at the city (office), MSA, state, regional4 and national (firm) 
levels.5 If an ethical violation and the resulting PCAOB disciplinary order imposes real costs to 
audit firms, I expect to find higher likelihood of auditor dismissals, an inability to attract new 
clients and lower audit fees. Furthermore, after an ethical violation has occurred, the audit firm 
may attempt to improve audit quality to compensate for any reputational damage. Therefore, I 
also examine if there are significant changes to audit quality following the public release of the 
PCAOB disciplinary order. 
There are several reasons why clients may not switch auditors nor demand lower audit 
fees following the public disclosure of a PCAOB disciplinary order. Clients may not be aware of 
the ethical violation and the resulting PCAOB disciplinary order against the audit partner. While 
it is true that sanctions by the PCAOB against audit partners are made public and may be 
reported in some news outlets, all PCAOB sanctions remain private until after the PCAOB has 
completed its investigation and made its final decision (PCAOB 2016e, Rule 5203). By the time 
clients become aware of the violation, the audit firm may have assured clients that the offending 
                                                 
3 The basic idea behind Klein and Leffler (1981) is that a firms’ incentive to provide high quality is the desire to 
continue making sales. Further, based on past experiences and a firm’s reputation, consumers will continue to 
patronize a firm. Shapiro (1983) developed a model that explored the implications of firm-specific reputation and 
posited that a firm has a good reputation if consumers believe it provides high quality products and the firm’s 
decision to provide high quality products contributes to the firm’s good reputation. 
4 Regional is defined as offices in the same state the violation occurred in as well as adjacent states.  
5 Prior research finds that local audit office effects are important in explaining auditor attributes including client 
dependence (Reynolds and Francis 2000), industry expertise (Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005) and audit 
quality in general (Francis and Yu 2009; Chaney and Philipich 2002; Nelson et al. 2008). According to Skinner and 
Srinivasan (2012), this suggests that there is a local office effect as well as an overall audit firm effect. If 
reputational or ethical problems are confined to a particular practice office, then there may be less concern about 
these issues by clients of other offices of the audit firm. On the other hand, the ethical violations committed by a 
partner at one office may be perceived to be pervasive throughout the firm and clients of other offices and the firm 





partner has left the firm or has been properly disciplined, and the firm has taken steps to assure 
that this type of violation will not reoccur. As a result, clients may feel that the ethical violation 
has been remedied and may feel comfortable with the assurance provided by their audit firm. 
Consequently, they may not switch to a different auditor. Additionally, there are real and 
transactional costs involved in the decision to switch auditors and those costs may be considered 
too high (Skinner and Srinivasan 2012). On the other hand, clients may feel they did not get what 
they paid for if the audit partner has been found to have altered the audit working papers after the 
fact. Furthermore, clients may feel that the actions of an unethical audit partner are associated 
with the audit firm’s “tone at the top” and as a result may feel they have not received a quality 
audit at a fair price. This reaction may ultimately lead to a switch in audit firms or a demand for 
lower audit fees as compensation for the perceived inadequate work performed on the original 
audit. Further, an audit firm may react to a PCAOB disciplinary order against one of its audit 
partners by reducing audit fees to retain clients. On the other hand, it may increase audit fees to 
improve training and ultimately the quality of the audit or in an attempt to compensate for any 
future PCAOB monetary sanctions.  Furthermore, audit firms may find it necessary to raise audit 
fees to compensate for increases in professional liability insurance following PCAOB sanctions 
against an affiliated audit partner and/or the audit firm itself. 
To examine the consequences of ethical violations, I examine the changes in the affiliated 
firm’s switching risk over a six-year period – the pre-sanction period, which includes two years 
before and the year of the public disclosure of the sanction and the post-sanction period, which 
includes three years after the year of the disclosure. I examine the effect of the sanction at the 
city (office), MSA, state, regional and national (firm) levels. My results indicate that in the post-





losing or gaining clients as compared to other non-sanctioned auditors during the same time 
period. However, in the test associated with client gains, at the city (office), MSA, and state 
level, the coefficients on the sanction variable are negative and significant indicating that in the 
pre-sanction period the likelihood of a client switching to a sanctioned auditor as compared to a 
non-sanctioned auditor was significantly less. This result does not hold at the regional or national 
(firm) levels.  Furthermore, there appears to be no significant effect on auditor switches 
associated with having a CPA on the audit committee. 
Next, I analyze the effect of the PCAOB sanction on audit fees. In these tests, I find that 
audit fee growth rates for sanctioned auditors, relative to non-sanctioned auditors increased in the 
post-sanction period. This result is consistent at the city (office), MSA, state, and regional levels. 
At the national (firm) level, only the Fee Increase analysis indicates an association between the 
PCAOB sanction and an increase in audit fees for sanctioned auditors as compared to non-
sanctioned auditors. Consequently, since this result does not hold for the other two tests, it is 
difficult to conclude that there is an association between the PCAOB sanction and an increase in 
audit fees at the national (firm) level.  In addition, it appears there is no significant effect on audit 
fees associated with having a CPA on the audit committee. 
I also examine audit quality using absolute abnormal accruals and the likelihood of 
subsequent restatements over the same six-year period. Tests using absolute abnormal accruals 
indicate no significant difference in audit quality between sanctioned and non-sanctioned audit 
firms. However, according to the restatements analysis, there are higher restatements at the 
regional and national (firm) levels for sanctioned audit firms as compared to non-sanctioned 
audit firms in the post-sanction period. However, this result is not consistent at the city (office), 





associated with the public disclosure of the PCAOB sanction. Furthermore, analysis shows that 
restatements are higher for sanctioned firms than for non-sanctioned firms (the coefficient on the 
sanction variable is positive and significant), but only in the pre-sanction period at the city 
(office), MSA, and state levels. There is no change in the post-sanction period at the city (office), 
MSA or state levels suggesting that the sanctioned firms had poorer audit quality than non-
sanctioned firms in the pre-sanction period. However, it appears that the public disclosure had no 
effect in the post-sanction period. These results are not consistent with the discretionary accruals 
analysis. Consequently, there does not appear to be support for a change in audit quality after the 
public disclosure of the PCAOB sanction. 
This study contributes to our understanding of the cost imposed by PCAOB regulations 
and oversight on annually inspected audit firms whose audit partners have committed ethical 
violations.  Given that partners tend to recruit personnel similar to themselves, the ethics of the 
partner are important for setting the right tone of the organization (Burton et al. 2016). There is 
minimal research regarding auditor ethics. Consequently, to the best of my knowledge, this is the 
first paper to empirically analyze the costs associated with a failure of auditor integrity. 
A monitoring mechanism is one of the motivations for auditors to provide high quality 
audits. Whether a monitoring system or a disciplinary system effectively improves audit quality 
continues to be an important research topic. Consequently, this study also contributes to existing 
literature on the effects of the PCAOB inspection and enforcement program on audit firms and 
their clients. The results may be used by the PCAOB to assess whether the inspection process, 
the public release of the PCAOB’s findings and the resulting sanctions and fines are motivation 
enough for audit partners and/or audit firms to improve their ethical standards and the quality of 





analysis examines whether an ethical violation committed by an audit partner affects a firm’s 
reputation and results in economic losses. My study adds to the literature examining whether 
reputation matters and helps to increase understanding of whether auditor integrity makes a 
difference to those that depend on the information contained in the audited financial statements. 
My study and Boone et al. (2015) are related in that both analyze the actual costs to audit 
firms associated with the public disclosure of a PCAOB disciplinary order. Boone et al. (2015) 
studied the first-ever PCAOB censure of a Big 4 firm following a significant audit failure. 
However, they acknowledge that their study many not be generalizable to other PCAOB 
censures that precede or follow the Deloitte & Touche LLP (Deloitte) censure (Boone et al. 
2015). Consequently, my analysis extends Boone et al. (2015) on the effects of the disclosure of 
a PCAOB disciplinary order. However, our studies differ in a very important aspect. 
Specifically, my analysis examines the effects of an ethical violation committed by an audit 
partner rather than the effects of an overall audit failure of a Big 4 audit firm. In the scenario I 
examine, the modification of audit documentation after the audit is complete is a failure of 
auditor integrity and not an indicator of nor a precursor to the failure of the overall audit. My 
analysis explores whether auditors need to act with integrity to maintain their reputation.  
Weber et al. (2008) studied the stock and audit market effects associated with an 
accounting scandal involving a public company (ComROAD AG) and KPMG in Germany.6  
They used this event to explore whether an auditor’s reputation helps to ensure audit quality and 
found an increase in KPMG’s client losses in the year of the ComROAD scandal, as well as 
significant negative abnormal returns of 3% for KPMG’s clients around events pertaining to the 
scandal. Weber et al. (2008) provide support for the rationale that reputation matters. While the 
                                                 
6 In the ComROAD scandal, ComROAD created fictional sales and KPMG did not realize until two years after they 





analysis conducted by Weber et al. (2008) and Boone et al. (2015) indicate negative 
repercussions when an audit firm’s reputation has been damaged, neither of them analyze the 
effects on an audit firm’s reputation when an audit partner commits an ethical violation related to 
an audit. Weber et al. (2008) and Boone et al. (2015) both focus on a significant failure of the 
overall audit and on auditor competence. My analysis focuses on the failure of auditor integrity. 
Furthermore, Weber et al. (2008) used Germany as the backdrop for their analysis because of the 
substantial protection from shareholder legal liability provided to auditors in Germany. Lennox 
(1999) and Khurana and Raman (2004), suggest that litigation exposure, not reputation concerns, 
drives audit quality in the United Kingdom and the United States. In the United States, because 
of the stricter legal regime, it is more difficult to determine if auditor reputation is the force 
behind auditors acting with integrity or if the threat of legal action is the incentive or both. My 
analysis differs from Weber et al. (2008) in that I use data related to ethical violations and 
PCAOB disciplinary orders against audit partners of firms located in the United States where 
there is a stricter legal regime than in Germany. Weber et al. (2008) used German data in an 
attempt to isolate the effects of auditor reputational damage from the threat of legal action. In the 
scenario that I use, the threat of legal action should be minimal, if there is any at all, since the 
PCAOB disciplinary order is not for an audit failure, but for a documentation failure.  
As stated in Abernathy et al. (2013), understanding the effects of the PCAOB are 
important to research because of the PCAOB’s authority and oversight over the audit profession. 
This authority can ultimately affect many faucets of an audit including the pricing of audits, the 
auditor/client relationship, the consequences of audit failure, and the public’s confidence in the 
auditing profession (Abernathy et al. 2013). While Boone et al. (2015) demonstrates that 





there are minimal actual costs to auditors when partners commit ethical violations. Boone et al. 
(2015) and Weber et al. (2008) show that investors, clients and audit committees value auditor 
competence whereas my study shows they do not appear to value auditor ethics. 
This paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 provides a background of prior research on 
the PCAOB inspection and enforcement process, ethics in auditing, auditor switching, audit 
quality, audit pricing and audit committee composition. It also contains my hypotheses 
development. Section 3 provides information regarding the sample and data. Section 4 presents 
the research methodology, Section 5 presents the results of analysis and the final section 

































2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Background 
2.1.1 The PCAOB Enforcement Process 
The PCAOB, a private-sector, nonprofit corporation, was organized to oversee 
accounting professionals who provide independent audit reports for publicly traded companies 
(SEC 2013). This organization performs its work through four program areas:  registration, 
inspections, standards, and enforcement. When violations are discovered, the PCAOB has the 
power to impose the appropriate disciplinary actions against the offending accounting firms 
and/or associated individuals. 
The PCAOB enforcement program is overseen by the PCAOB’s Department of 
Enforcement and Investigations. Information suggesting potential violations comes from a 
variety of sources including PCAOB inspections, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), public information from sources such as newspapers and restatements, the audit firm 
itself and from tips provided by informants (Gaetano 2014). PCAOB enforcement proceedings 
occur when the PCAOB believes a serious violation has been committed. 
According to the PCAOB Bylaws and Rules, investigations may be informal inquiries in 
which investigators request documents and conduct interviews or formal investigations in which 
there is sworn testimony, subpoenas and legal transcripts (PCAOB 2016e). Informal inquiries 
and formal investigations are confidential unless other agencies such as the SEC, the U.S. 
Attorney General and other regulators are asked to become involved (PCAOB 2016e, Rule 
5108). Disciplinary proceedings commence if it appears that, as a result of an investigation, a 
hearing is justified in order to determine whether a registered public accounting firm, or an 
associated person of the firm, has committed any act in violation of SOX, PCAOB standards and 





professional standards (PCAOB 2016e, Rule 5200(a)). As in Figure 1 of Gilbertson and Herron 
(2009, p. A17), a diagram of the PCAOB inspection and enforcement programs is presented in 










Figure 1. PCAOB Inspection and Enforcement Programs 
        Gilberson and Herron (2009) 
If the PCAOB institutes a disciplinary proceeding, the auditor or audit firm has the choice 
of either settling the case or litigating it with the PCAOB’s enforcement staff. If the firm or 
associated persons choose to settle a case prior to a formal hearing, they forfeit certain privileges 
and formal proceedings while neither admitting nor denying any allegations. If the choice is 
made to litigate, then a hearing is scheduled. As required by SOX, all proceedings remain private 
unless both the PCAOB and the respondent consent otherwise (PCAOB 2016e, Rule 5203). At 
the conclusion of a disciplinary proceeding – whether settled or adjudicated, the PCAOB 
publishes the resulting disciplinary order. Disciplinary orders are available on the PCAOB’s 
website and describe violations in great detail including the names of the parties involved, the 
































If an audit firm or associated person of the audit firm is found to have violated any 
PCAOB rules, regulations or standards, the PCAOB has the power to impose disciplinary 
sanctions ranging from censure and/or fines to revocation of registration (PCAOB 2016e, Rule 
5300(a)). Revocations can be temporary or permanent and may restrict the firm and/or 
individual(s) from auditing issuers (PCAOB 2016e, Rule 5300(a)). The sanctions administered 
by the PCAOB depend more on the egregiousness of the violation committed rather than whether 
the violation was related to an ethical violation or a complete audit failure. Both types of 
violations, ethical infractions and audit failures, have resulted in monetary penalties and 
disbarment of audit partners for various lengths of time. However, if it has been determined that 
the firm’s policies and/or procedures are at fault then the firm itself is sanctioned, as well as the 
individuals involved. Firm sanctions have occurred in audit failures as well as general PCAOB 
violations.7  
For this study, I analyze audit partners that violated AS3 (15 and 16 and PCAOB Rule 
4006. AS3 (15) requires that the audit documentation completion date be not more than 45 days 
from the audit report release date or the date the fieldwork was substantially complete or the date 
the engagement ceased (PCAOB 2004). AS3 (16) requires that if documentation is added, the 
date the documents were added, the name of the responsible person and the reason why must be 
included (PCAOB 2004). PCAOB Rule 4006, Duty to Cooperate with Inspectors, requires that 
"[e]very registered public accounting firm, and every associated person of a registered public 
accounting firm…cooperate with the Board in the performance of any Board inspection." The 
duty to cooperate includes an obligation not to provide improperly altered documents or 
misleading information in connection with the Board's inspection processes (PCAOB 2016e). 
                                                 
7 The PCAOB imposed a $2 million fine against Deloitte for permitting a former partner to perform activities as an 





To date, the PCAOB has issued 18 disciplinary orders for failure to cooperate with 
inspections, as well as 16 disciplinary orders for failure to cooperate with a PCAOB 
investigation (PCAOB 2016b). A majority of those disciplinary orders include improper audit 
documentation alteration and resulted in sanctions of individuals being barred from auditing 
issuers. According to Claudius Modesti, the PCAOB’s Director of Enforcement and 
Investigations, 
PCAOB Enforcement has zero tolerance for improper alteration of audit documentation 
in connection with a Board inspection or investigation. No patient would tolerate a health 
care provider falsifying records that potentially obscure a health issue. And investors, 
relying on audit opinions, should not have to tolerate auditors improperly altering their 
audit files risking that the actual quality of the audit is being obscured (PCAOB 2016g). 
 
In this study, I examine whether censures by the PCAOB for ethical violations by audit 
partners of Big 4 and Tier 2 firms impacts client retention, audit fees and audit quality. I analyze 
four disciplinary orders involving partners of Big 4 and Tier 2 audit firms that committed ethical 
violations. A description of each of the disciplinary orders follows. 
2.1.1.1 PCAOB Release No. 105-2007-008 
Stephen J. Nardi, CPA (Nardi), the Practice Office Assurance Director for the Philadelphia office 
of BDO USA, LLP (BDO) was the engagement partner on an audit that was subject to a quality 
control inspection by BDO partners from other offices of the firm. The “purposes of the QC 
inspections (performed by BDO) were to determine the quality of work performed, to assess 
compliance with PCAOB auditing standards, generally accepted accounting principles, and BDO 
policy, to correct any identified deviations, and to provide recommendation for improvement.” 
When Nardi was notified of the upcoming QC inspection, he directed staff in the Philadelphia 
office to review work papers for public audit engagements that he thought might be selected for 
the QC inspection. When Nardi subsequently learned that the audit selected for the QC 





Philadelphia office to review the client’s audit work papers. The staff member found missing 
initials and signatures, which indicated that a detailed review had not been performed. Nardi then 
directed the manager that had been on the audit and subsequently removed by Nardi to staff a 
different audit, to alter the work papers by backdating initials and signatures to dates preceding 
the March 16, 2005 issuance of BDO’s audit report. Nardi also initialed, signed and backdated 
the audit work papers. When BDO discovered Nardi’s activities, an investigation was launched 
and the PCAOB was notified. As a result of his actions, BDO asked Nardi to resign effective 
March 21, 2006. In addition, the PCAOB barred him from being an associated person of a 
registered public accounting firm for one year. The PCAOB disciplinary order against Nardi was 
settled on December 14, 2007. On February 12, 2010, the PCAOB issued an order granting 
Nardi termination of the bar against him which now allows him to associate with a registered 
public accounting firm. 
2.1.1.2 PCAOB Release No. 105-2011-005 
In March 2010, the PCAOB notified Ernst & Young’s (EY) Boston office that the Board’s 
Division of Registration and Inspection would inspect the audit of one of its issuer companies. 
Upon being notified of the impending PCAOB inspection, Peter C. O’Toole, CPA (O’Toole), the 
engagement partner for the selected audit, directed members of the audit engagement team to 
review the external working papers. Following the review, O’Toole directed two of the members 
of the audit engagement team to create, add, backdate and alter certain working papers in order 
to cover up the fact that some work on the audit had not been properly completed. As a result of 
his actions, O’Toole was barred from being an associated person of a registered public 
accounting firm for a minimum of three years. In addition, a civil monetary penalty in the 





2010. However, the PCAOB disciplinary order was not settled against O’Toole until August 1, 
2011. 
2.1.1.3 PCAOB Release No. 105-2012-008 
Three members of McGladrey & Pullen, LLP (McGladrey) (now known as RSM US LLP), 
created and replaced missing documentation in advance of a PCAOB inspection. The 
documentation included an engagement letter, a cash flow worksheet, and a fair-value memo. 
McGladrey discovered what had occurred and immediately notified the PCAOB. Consequently, 
according to the PCAOB disciplinary order settled on November 13, 2012, Dale A. Hotz, CPA 
(Hotz), the engagement partner at the firm’s Frederick, Maryland office was censured by the 
PCAOB and barred from being an associated person of a registered public accounting firm for 
two years. Jyothi N. Manohar, CPA (Manohar), a director at the firm’s Blue Bell, Pennsylvania 
office was also censured and suspended from being associated with a registered firm for one 
year. Michael J. Fadner, CPA (Fadner), also from the Blue Bell office, was censured by the 
PCAOB. McGladrey disciplined Hotz, Fadner and Manohar restricting them from serving on 
audit engagements. 
2.1.1.4 PCAOB Release No. 105-2013-007 
Nathan M. Suddeth, CPA (Suddeth) was the managing partner of the Pittsburgh, PA office of 
Deloitte and the engagement partner on an audit selected by the PCAOB for a routine inspection. 
In June of 2011, on the evening before the scheduled inspection, Suddeth created, backdated and 
added three memos to the original audit file. Upon learning of Suddeth’s conduct, Deloitte 
removed Suddeth from his role as Partner-in-Charge and from all direct audit responsibility for 
any public or private client and self-reported the matter to the PCAOB. The PCAOB censured 





two years. In June 2013, Suddeth retired from Deloitte and on September 10, 2013 the PCAOB 
issued the disciplinary order against Suddeth.  
2.1.2 Prior Research 
  Prior research on PCAOB disciplinary orders against auditors and/or audit firms can be 
categorized by market response, causes, consequences and the effects of disciplinary orders on 
auditor behavior (e.g., Boone et al. 2015; Dee et al. 2010; Gilbertson and Herron 2009; Messier 
et al. 2010). The focus of my analysis is on the effects of ethical violations and the consequences 
of the resulting PCAOB disciplinary orders on client and auditor behavior. While there is a 
significant amount of research on the effects of PCAOB inspection reports on clients, auditors 
and investors (e.g., Lennox and Pittman 2010; Dee et al. 2011; Gramling et al. 2011; Offermanns 
and Peek 2011; Abbott et al. 2013), to date, there is little research on the effect of PCAOB 
enforcement actions on auditor switching, audit fees, and audit quality.  
Gilbertson and Herron (2009) analyzed various client and auditor characteristics of PCAOB 
enforcement actions through 2008 and found that many of the disciplined auditors had longer 
PCAOB reviews and more audit deficiencies in their inspection reports. They also found that the 
disciplined auditors were often small, less financially sound firms with only a few audit partners. 
Dee et al. (2011) studied the events surrounding the 2007 PCAOB sanction against Deloitte and 
found that the market returns for Deloitte clients were significantly more negative than clients of 
the other three Big 4 accounting firms. Boone et al. (2015) found that the PCAOB enforcement 
action against Deloitte led to negative client responses in regards to client losses and reduced 
audit fees, but found no significant difference in audit quality between Deloitte and other Big 4 
audit firms. Huber (2013) posits that registered accounting firms pass on a sanction risk premium 





relating to the PCAOB inspection and enforcement process is provided in Appendix A of this 
document. 
2.1.3 Auditors and Ethics 
 Auditing is a profession in which conflict of interest is an ever-present issue. Auditors are 
compensated by their clients, while their primary focus is providing audited financial 
information to the public who depends on this information to make informed decisions. While 
engagement partners are responsible for the audit engagement and its performance, proper 
supervision of the work performed and for compliance with PCAOB standards, the managing 
partner provides leadership and has accountability for the operations of the office and/or firm. 
Regardless of their position, both the engagement and managing partner should lead by example 
exhibiting the highest standards in integrity and reliability.  
  Most people are familiar with the traditional view of the role of ethics in the auditing 
profession – the need for auditors with integrity and objectivity. But, to date there is little 
research on this topic. Most research focuses on auditor independence (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; 
Frankel et al. 2002; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Lennox 1999b;), audit failures (DeFond and 
Zhang 2014; Hilary and Lennox 2005; Lennox and Pittman 2010; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012) 
and audit quality (Palmrose et al. 2004; Kinney et al. 2004; Francis et al. 2013) in regards to 
financial reporting. Furthermore, archival research based on individual auditors’ personal 
characteristics is rare because in the United States the audit partner’s name is not disclosed in the 
audit report, and even if it was, personal characteristics of that partner would most likely not be 
publicly available. Regardless, the importance of top management’s attitudes and beliefs in 
creating and maintaining an ethical climate within an organization is reinforced throughout the 
general management research literature (Brown et al. 2005; Schminke et al. 2005) and the 





critical for the PCAOB to include assessments of the control environment and the ethical climate 
as part of their annual inspections of public accounting firms. They maintain that there is a need 
to consider the importance of character and ethics on the parts of the auditors and audit firms to 
ensure that “dishonest” behavior is neither encouraged nor tolerated (Kaplan et al. 2007). Bean 
(2004), Cunningham (2004), and Satava et al. (2006) all recommend that public accounting firms 
conduct periodic audits of their firm’s ethical climate. According to Bean (2004), an audit firm is 
only as good as the ethical traits of their least ethical managing partners and executives. 
According to Taylor et al. (2003), integrity, independence and expertise are the three 
underlying components of financial statement reliability. Prior literature has been unable to 
disentangle costs associated with auditor independence and expertise from auditor integrity. As 
Taylor et al. (2003) point out, criticism of Arthur Andersen in the Enron scandal focused mostly 
on the fact that Enron was a major client of the firm’s Houston office. The related audit failure 
focused on independence issues since total engagement fees of $52 million per year included $27 
million of non-audit fees (Taylor et al. 2003). Enron was a complex audit client demanding 
certain audit expertise and the paper-shredding incident perpetrated by Arthur Andersen is 
indicative of an issue with integrity rather than independence (Taylor et al. 2003). However, 
because of Arthur Andersen’s economic dependence on Enron, it has proven difficult, if not 
impossible, to separate the costs associated with the independence issues from the obvious 
integrity challenges. 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) highlighted the importance of 
leaders setting a “tone at the top” by establishing integrity as the very first principle of internal 
controls (COSO, 2013). According to Gerstein and Friedman (2016), if the executives and 





will work its way down to all employees. Those at the top serve as examples and inspiration for 
those that they supervise and train. Lennick and Kiel (2011) state: 
The integrity crises of the first decade of the 21st century have been devastating. But they 
have not yet convinced enough leaders of the importance of morally intelligent 
leadership. How many wake-up calls do leaders need to get the message that their 
ultimate success depends on moral leadership?  Will leaders get another chance to do the 
right thing?  Given the precarious nature of the global economy, we fear that this wake-
up call to choose integrity over greed might very well be our last … how can any leader 
afford to ignore the call to put moral values at the center of what they do? 
  
 Gentry (2013) believes that integrity is the most important character strength in 
predicting performance of top-level executives and Doty (2014) cites several studies that 
demonstrate that companies with integrity are significantly more profitable than those that lack 
it. Doty (2014) observes: 
Integrity – or lack thereof – remains a critical challenge for companies today. Every day, 
every leader faces opportunities or even pressure to side step the truth, fudge the 
numbers, play politics, or pass the buck on hard decisions. In the moment doing the right 
thing, or doing things right, always seems to cost more. 
 
Doty’s observations are validated by the PCAOB ethical violations that I analyze. In my 
opinion, the unethical acts committed by the audit partners were committed with their own self-
interest in mind and the price they paid (being disciplined by the PCAOB, losing their jobs and 
their CPA license) was most likely higher than if they would have just done the right thing from 
the beginning. As stated in the Staff Audit Practice Alert No. 14, 
The consequences of providing improperly altered audit documentation to PCAOB 
inspectors or investigators may in many cases be far more severe than would be the 
consequences of the PCAOB staff identifying the audit deficiency that the revisions to 
the documentation attempt to obscure (PCAOB 2016f). 
 
The ethical behavior of audit partners is paramount as they set the standard for those they train 
and supervise. Moreover, those individuals at the “top” ultimately set the tone of the ethical 





constructed. In an audit firm, the ethical climate is set at many levels including the firm level, the 
office level and the staff level. Many individuals in an audit firm are responsible for setting the 
right ethical tenor from the senior partner of the firm down to the senior associate of a specific 
office of the firm. 
The ethical culture of a firm positively affects ethical behavior of those employed at the firm 
(Kaptein 2011). Furthermore, accounting literature has found that auditors’ ethical decisions are 
influenced by the ethical culture of their audit firms (Sweeney et al. 2010). According to 
Deloitte’s 2015 transparency report, the firm’s senior leaders take leading roles in emphasizing 
the need to maintain a strong culture of ethical integrity and independence. In Deloitte’s 2016 
transparency report, Glenn Stastny, Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer for Deloitte, states that 
Trust and honesty are deeply rooted in Deloitte’s culture and essential to our continuing 
success. Our ability to rely on the professional judgments, skills, and integrity of one 
another is crucial to fulfilling our professional obligations to the public, our clients, and 
each other (Deloitte 2016). 
 
 A strong ethical climate may induce the right ethical response from an auditor, while a 
weak ethical climate may facilitate and reinforce any tendency an auditor may have to violate 
ethical standards. While the audit partner(s) that committed the ethical violation(s) suffered the 
repercussions of doing so, my research question addresses the effect that these ethical violations 
have on the affiliated firm’s reputation. Do the ethical violations committed by audit partners 
negatively affect the reputation of the affiliated audit office(s) and/or audit firm? 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Spillover Effect 
Prior research finds that local audit office effects are important in explaining auditor 
attributes including audit quality (Francis and Yu 2009; Chaney and Philipich 2002; Nelson et al. 
2008). According to Skinner and Srinivasan (2012), this suggests that there is a local office 





particular practice office, then there may be less concern about these issues by clients of other 
offices of the audit firm. On the other hand, there may be a spill-over effect in which the 
problems found at one office may be perceived to proliferate through the entire firm, especially if 
the violations are committed by those at the top. Consequently, in my analysis, I examine the 
effect of the ethical violations not only at the city (office) level, but also at the MSA, state, 
regional and national (firm) levels. 
2.2.2 Auditor Switching and Auditor Reputation 
 Deloitte supports the concept of the appropriate tone at the top and maintains that 
“reputation risks today are at least as great as strategic, operating and financial risks” and any 
rumor or hint of impropriety can damage or destroy corporate or brand reputations 
instantaneously (Deloitte 2014). There is a significant amount of research into the reasons cited 
for client-initiated auditor switching including opinion shopping, audit fees, audit firm 
characteristics, auditor solicitation, client characteristics, shareholder preferences and client 
satisfaction (Stefaniak et al. 2009). However, research on the effect of damaged reputations as it 
relates to auditor selection and client retention is somewhat limited (Swanquist and Whited 
2015). Furthermore, the research that is available on auditor switches and reputation focuses on 
damaged reputations brought about by infrequent and significant audit failures (Boone et al. 
2015; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Weber et al. 2008). 
 Theory suggests that auditors have an incentive to maintain reputational capital to attract 
and retain audit work (DeAngelo 1981). DeFond and Zhang (2014) assert that regulatory 
sanctions are likely to damage an auditor’s reputation ultimately impairing the audit firm’s 
ability to attract and retain clients. DeFond and Zhang’s (2014) assertion is supported by the 
Boone et al. (2015) study which shows that a PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte resulted 





ones. Nagy (2014) found that audit firms lose a significant amount of market share following the 
public disclosure of quality control issues indicating that the disclosure damages the auditors’ 
reputation. Buslepp and Victoravich (2014) find that clients of triennially inspected audit firms 
are more likely to change auditors after the release of a negative Part II report. 
While the research by Boone et al. (2015), Nagy (2014) and Buslepp and Victoravich 
(2014) consider some aspects of the effect of reputational damage on an audit firm, they do not 
consider the effect on auditor switches when there is damage to a firm’s reputation associated 
with an ethical violation committed by an audit partner rather than quality of the audit work. 
Furthermore, with the exception of Boone et al. (2015), the research cited above focuses 
primarily on triennially inspected audit firms, whereas my study focuses on annually inspected 
audit firms.  
 There are at least three factors that may deter an audit client from taking steps to switch 
auditors. First, there are significant costs associated with switching auditors including search 
costs in identifying and hiring a new audit firm (Boone et al. 2015; Skinner and Srinivasan 
2012). Second, the incumbent auditor possesses firm-specific knowledge and expertise about 
their client which is costly for a new auditor to acquire (DeAngelo 1981). Lastly, the supply of 
auditors may be constrained, especially if many companies are searching for new auditors at the 
same time (Kohlbeck et al. 2008; Ramnath and Weber 2008). How strongly clients feel about the 
unethical behavior of the partner of an audit firm will ultimately determine whether they are 
willing to accept the costs of switching auditors. 
The first type of economic loss that firms associated with a partner that has committed an 
ethical violation may experience is a decline in the demand for the firm’s audit services due to 





H1:  A lack of auditor integrity taints the reputation of the affiliated audit firm leading to a 
decreased ability to retain clients and/or attract new clients. 
 
2.2.3 Audit Fees and Auditor Reputation 
 Audit fee research contends that auditors incur costs to develop brand name reputations, 
including top-tier designation and recognition for industry specialization, to generate higher audit 
fees (premiums). Several studies find evidence that clients pay a premium for a Big N auditor 
with the presumption being that these auditors have the reputation of providing a higher quality 
audit. For example, Hay et al. (2006) contend that higher audit fees may be expected when an 
auditor has the reputation of being of superior quality. Furthermore, auditor industry 
specialization has also been found to be positively associated with audit fees (Craswell et al. 
1995; Ferguson et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Numan and 
Willekens 2012). While Craswell et al. (1995) find evidence of an industry-specific premium 
which is distinct from the Big N general brand name, Bae et al. (2016) conclude that the 
premium associated with industry specialists is not necessarily associated with reputation, but is 
evidence that industry specialists exert much more effort during the audit than do non-industry 
specialists. 
Just as auditors with reputations for superior quality and industry expertise can demand 
higher audit fees, those firms that experience damage to their reputation may expect a decrease in 
audit fees or an inability to raise audit fees. Boone et al. (2015) found that the PCAOB 
disciplinary order against Deloitte was associated with a decrease in Deloitte’s audit fee growth 
rates as compared to other Big 4 audit firms indicating that reputational damage to an audit firm 
results in a decrease of client’s willingness to pay audit fee premiums. However, the Boone et al. 
(2015) study investigates the impact of an audit failure (i.e., a competence failure) rather than the 





Firms affiliated with a partner that commits an ethical violation may experience a decline 
in audit fees and/or the inability to raise audit fees. The affiliated firm may reduce audit prices in 
order to retain audit clients or to attract new clients following the reputational damage resulting 
from the audit partner committing an ethical violation. On the other hand, audit firms may find it 
necessary to increase their audit effort to compensate for the perceived lack of quality (as a result 
of the ethical violation) resulting in an audit fee increase. Greater effort might be expected by an 
audit firm associated with a partner that has been found to have committed an ethical violation. 
Additionally, Stefaniak et al. (2017) notes that sanctions imposed by regulatory agencies 
contribute to higher audit fees. Brumfield et al. (1983) find that sanctions are costly to auditors 
both monetarily and in the loss of reputation. Huber (2013) suggests that auditors have a strong 
incentive to increase audit fees to compensate for losses due to sanctions and/or potential 
sanctions. However, most research has found a decrease in audit fees and/or an inability to raise 
audit fees as a result of reputational damage. 
As such, I propose the second hypothesis stated in the alternative form: 
H2:  A lack of auditor integrity taints the reputation of the affiliated firm leading to a decrease in 
audit fees and/or an inability to raise audit fees. 
 
2.2.4 CPA Member on Audit Committee  
 The primary purpose of an audit committee is to provide oversight of the financial 
reporting process, the audit process, the system of internal controls and compliance with laws 
and regulations (DeFond and Francis 2005). CPAs that serve on audit committees should have, at 
a minimum, knowledge of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), an understanding of 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and financial statements, experience in 
preparing, auditing, and analyzing complex financial data, knowledge of the bylaws and rules of 





Consequently, having a CPA serve on an audit committee may affect the reaction by the audit 
committee to an ethical violation committed by an audit partner.  
Research indicates that a company is more likely to have strong internal controls 
(Krishnan 2005), report earnings conservatively (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008) and are less 
likely to restate (Abbott et al. 2004) when at least one member of the audit committee possesses 
financial accounting expertise. In related research, Abbott et al. (2016) examined the propensity 
of a CPA audit committee member to dismiss a GAAP-deficient auditor that employs a dispute 
disclosure strategy.8 One of the reasons offered by Abbot et al. (2016) for why a CPA audit 
committee member (CPA-ACM) may be more prone to dismiss an auditor is that the CPA-ACM 
is likely to have a greater appreciation for authoritative bodies such as the AICPA, the FASB and 
the PCAOB. A second reason is that the CPA-ACM is uniquely qualified to understand and 
appreciate the circumstances surrounding the PCAOB’s findings as compared to the auditor’s 
version of events (Abbott et al. 2016). On the other hand, Abbott et al. (2016) offer two reasons 
why a CPA-ACM may not dismiss an auditor that utilizes a dispute disclosure strategy. The first 
reason is that the CPA-ACM may be susceptible to confirmation bias which Abbott et al. (2016) 
describe as “the tendency to search for, interpret, favor, and recall information in a way that 
confirms one’s preexisting beliefs or hypotheses, while giving disproportionately less 
consideration to alternative possibilities.”  As explained by Abbott et al. (2016), the CPA-ACM 
has been involved to some degree in the hiring or endorsement of the audit firm affiliated with 
the unethical auditor. Consequently, the CPA-ACM may be susceptible to justification and 
                                                 
8 Abbott et al. (2016) examine the auditor response to PCAOB inspection report findings. They describe the dispute 
disclosure strategy as one in which the auditor disputes the PCAOB findings in the inspection report. According to 
Abbott et al. (2016), the response of the auditor is that the audit was performed in accordance with PCAOB 
standards and that the “GAAP deficiency identified by the inspection team relates to a highly subjective area and 





defense of their original decision to retain the services of the auditor. The second reason is that 
the CPA-ACM may have experience with the review process and given this experience may 
discount what they believe to be a superficial review of an overall audit (Abbott et al. 2016). In 
addition, because a CPA-ACM may have extensive experience as an audit partner, they may 
sympathize with the predicament of the audit partner and attempt to mitigate the reaction of the 
audit committee. 
 Abbott et al. (2016) analyze the reaction of an audit committee with a CPA member to 
the auditor reaction of the public release of a PCAOB Part II report. They find that auditors that 
dispute PCAOB findings are less likely to be dismissed by their audit clients and this effect is 
magnified when there is a CPA on the audit committee. I analyze whether a CPA-ACM makes a 
difference in the audit committee reaction to an audit partner committing an ethical violation. 
Because the CPA-ACM’s reaction may go either way, I do not make a directional prediction for 
this analysis. This leads to the following hypothesis stated in the alternative form: 
H3:  An audit committee’s response (auditor dismissals and changes in audit fees) following an 
ethical violation varies based on whether one of the members of the audit committee is a 
CPA. 
 
2.2.5 Audit Quality and Auditor Reputation 
Auditors have reputational incentives to provide high audit quality because audit quality is 
valuable to clients and they are willing to pay a premium for it (Skinner and Srinivasan 2012). 
However, in the United States there is also a litigation incentive to provide high audit quality. 
Auditors are legally liable for audit failures so they have an incentive to provide high-quality 
audits to avoid litigation costs. As Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) point out, it is difficult to 
separate the effects of litigation incentives from those of reputational incentives in the United 






Weber et al. (2008) and Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) chose a setting to examine the importance 
of auditor reputation absent the confounding effects of litigation. Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) 
studied the case of ChuoAoyama, a former PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) affiliate in Japan, 
which was implicated in a major accounting fraud with a large Japanese cosmetics company 
called Kanebo. Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) find evidence that after the accounting fraud was 
discovered at Kanebo, ChuoAoyama lost a large number of clients to other auditors indicating 
the importance of auditor reputation. Weber et al. (2008), as discussed previously, used Germany 
as the backdrop for their analysis because of the substantial protection from shareholder legal 
liability provided to auditors in Germany. In the scenario that I analyze, there has been no audit 
failure so the audit firm should not be subject to any type of litigation issues. The audit partner 
committed the ethical violation and the research question is whether this violation ultimately 
affected the reputation of the firm. 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in London states that a high-quality auditor’s personal 
attributes must include expertise, experience, high ethical values, business knowledge, and 
integrity (FRC 2006). It stands to reason that the perceived ethical behavior of the auditor can 
affect the stakeholder’s perception of audit quality. Because audit quality is not directly 
observable and nor are the personal attributes of the auditor, users of financial information often 
must rely on external measures of quality, one of which is the audit firm’s reputation (Irani et al. 
2015). As Firth (1990) summarizes, “firms producing high quality audits have a significant 
investment in reputation and any deterioration in product and service quality will seriously erode 
their ‘reputational capital’.”  According to Irani et al. (2015) audit clients consider the quality of 
their auditor, as evidenced by the auditor’s reputation, as a signal of the quality of their financial 





the firm they are affiliated with, the firm may compensate by attempting to improve audit 
quality. 
Most prior literature finds mixed support for the importance of auditor reputation as a driver of 
audit quality (Lennox 1999a; Willenborg 1999; Khurana and Raman 2004). However, Skinner 
and Srinivasan (2012) and Weber et al. (2008) find evidence that audit quality and reputation are 
important in an economy where litigation threats do not provide auditors with incentives to 
deliver superior audit quality.  However, Boone et al. (2015) find no difference in audit quality 
between Deloitte and the other Big 4 after the public release of the PCAOB disciplinary order 
against Deloitte.  
 In order to tests whether there is an improvement in audit quality after the disclosure of 
an ethical violation committed by an audit partner, I use the two most common proxies of audit 
quality in accounting literature – restatements (Palmrose and Scholz 2004) and abnormal 
accruals (Francis et al. 1999). Both proxies are described in more detail in the paragraphs 
following. 
 A restatement occurs when a company revises previously reported audited financial 
information. The announcement of a restatement is most often made through a press release 
and/or on Form 8-k, although some restatements, called stealth restatements, are revealed in a 
periodic report without a prior disclosure. A “Big R” restatement occurs when the audit opinion 
is revised to disclose the restatement and reference is made to the financial statement footnote 
that describes the error and related correction (EY 2015). The financial restatement represents a 
breakdown in a company’s financial reporting and of the audit. Prior research has used financial 
restatements as a proxy for audit quality because restatements of previously audited financial 





2004). Stanley and DeZoort (2007) argue that financial restatements due to errors or fraud are in 
fact auditing failures and Larcker and Richardson (2004) argue that a restatement resulting from 
some form of earnings management is essentially an audit failure since the external auditor did 
not discover and/or prevent the deception. Both of the studies cited above indicate that the 
financial restatement is essentially an indicator of low audit quality. Financial restatements raise 
questions about the effectiveness, the independence, the level of expertise and the ability of the 
auditor to provide a high-quality audit service.  
Discretionary accruals are the most commonly used proxy for audit quality in archival 
research. According to DeFond and Zhang (2014), high quality auditors are believed to constrain 
opportunistic earnings management as evidenced by lower discretionary accruals. Krishnan 
(2003) argues that high-quality auditors are more likely to deter and detect questionable 
accounting practices and report material errors and irregularities than are low-quality auditors. 
Therefore, auditors that provide high-quality audit services have the expertise and ability to 
enhance the informativeness of discretionary accruals by constraining managers’ aggressive and 
opportunistic reporting of accruals (Krishnan 2003).  
The fourth hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, is as follows: 
H4:  A lack of auditor integrity taints the reputation of the affiliated audit firm leading to 
improvements in audit quality.  
















3. SAMPLE AND DATA 
As summarized in Table 1, Panel A, I use 15 samples to test my study’s hypotheses. My sample 
includes observations at the city (office), MSA, state, regional, and national (firm) levels. As 
shown in Table 1, Panel A, my initial samples begin with client-year observations from Audit 
Analytics with complete panel data for the years 2005-2016 applicable to each PCAOB sanction 
for each test. My tests require switch and audit fee data from Audit Analytics, financial statement 
data from Compustat and audit committee data from BoardEx. I exclude observations not in 
Compustat, observations without BoardEx data (except for the restatement samples), banking 
and financial services observations (SIC codes 6000 - 6999) and observations missing Compustat 
data relevant to each test. I require a minimum of six years of data per client.9 For the 
restatements analysis, the sample is limited to the sanctions associated with BDO and EY.10  
The metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) included in my samples are presented in Table 1, 
Panel B-1 through B-4. According to the Geographic Areas Reference Manual published by the 
United States Census Bureau, “an MSA consists of one or more counties that contain a city of 
50,000 or more inhabitants, or contain a Census Bureau-defined urbanized area and have a total 
population of at least 100,000 (75,000 in New England). Counties containing the principal 
concentration of population – the largest city and surrounding densely settled area – are 
components of the MSA” (US Census 1994). The MSAs in my sample are concentrated in the 
northeastern part of the Unites States. The locations of the offices affiliated with an audit partner 
                                                 
9A six-year time frame is used because engaging a new auditor is a serious decision. Clients must consider the 
substantial costs involved including search expenses, time spent explaining accounting methods to a new auditor, 
and potentially lower audit quality due to the steep learning curve in the early years of a new audit (Boone et al. 
2015). Consequently, as in Boone et al. (2015), I include three years after the sanction was made public in order to 
give the client sufficient time to make a decision to retain their auditor or engage a new one. 
10 Because it is necessary to allow at least two years for a restatement to become public, I am limited to using data 
associated with the BDO and EY sanctions since the Deloitte and McGladrey (RSM) sanction periods end in 2015 
and 2016, respectively and would bias results in supporting a reduction in restatements. See Table 1, Panel C for the 





that committed an ethical violation include Philadelphia, PA, Boston, MA, Frederick, MD, 
Bluebell, PA and Pittsburgh, PA. Years related to each sanction are depicted in Table 1, Panel C. 
Regional information, which includes the state the affiliated audit office resides in as well as 
surrounding states, is provided in Figure 2. Table 1, Panel C provides the periods of analysis for 





Table1. Sample Formation and Characteristics 
     
Panel A:  Sample Formation     
 CITY (office) 
   Audit Quality  
 Switch Audit Fee 
Discretionary 
Accruals Restatements 
Client-year observations from Audit Analytics with complete panel data 2005-2016 14,645 14,645 14,645 8,335 
Exclude observations not in Compustat -7,277 -7,277 -7,277 -6,085 
Exclude observations without BoardEx data -3,047 -3,047 -3,047 0 
Exclude banking and financial service firms -810 -810 -810 -296 
Exclude observations missing Compustat data -2,306 -2,269 -2,815 -1,084 
Sample used 1,205 1,242 696 870 
     
 MSA 
   Audit Quality  
 Switch Audit Fee 
Discretionary 
Accruals Restatements 
Client-year observations from Audit Analytics with complete panel data 2005-2016 18019 18019 18019 8622 
Exclude observations not in Compustat -8,549 -8,549 -8,549 -6,309 
Exclude observations without BoardEx data -3,554 -3,554 -3,554 0 
Exclude banking and financial service firms -1,246 -1,246 -1,246 -314 
Exclude observations missing Compustat data -2,908 -2,866 -3,625 -1,093 
Sample used 1,762 1,804 1,045 906 
          















     
 STATE 
   Audit Quality  
 Switch Audit Fee 
Discretionary 
Accruals Restatements 
Client-year observations from Audit Analytics with complete panel data 2005-2016 16,449 16,449 16,449 9,002 
Exclude observations not in Compustat -8,291 -8,291 -8,291 -6,488 
Exclude observations without BoardEx data -3,257 -3,257 -3,257 0 
Exclude banking and financial service firms -925 -925 -925 -356 
Exclude observations missing Compustat data -2,168 -2,118 -2,846 1,172 
Sample used 1,808 1,858 1,130 3,330 
     
 REGION 
   Audit Quality  
 Switch Audit Fee 
Discretionary 
Accruals Restatements 
Client-year observations from Audit Analytics with complete panel data 2005-2016 35,956 35,956 35,956 28,716 
Exclude observations not in Compustat -15,987 -15,987 -15,987 -20,352 
Exclude observations without BoardEx data -7,117 -7,117 -7,117 0 
Exclude banking and financial service firms -3,257 -3,257 -3,257 -1,863 
Exclude observations missing Compustat data -3,769 -3,572 -5,968 -3,333 
Sample used 5,826 6,023 3,627 3,168 
          











     





     
 NATIONAL (firm) 
   Audit Quality 
 Switch Audit Fee 
Discretionary 
Accruals Restatements 
Client-year observations from Audit Analytics with complete panel data 2005-2016 88,066 88,066 88,066 57,779 
Exclude observations not in Compustat -27,319 -27,319 -27,319 -12,659 
Exclude observations without BoardEx data -22,667 -22,667 -22,667 0 
Exclude banking and financial service firms -7,298 -7,298 -7,298 -9,763 
Exclude observations missing Compustat data -2,803 -1,517 -14,525 -15,840 
Sample used 27,979 29,265 16,257 19,517 
          
 
 
Panel B:  Distribution of clients by Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and by sample     
Panel B-1: Switch sample             


















Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 36 62.07% 75 36.95% 111 42.53% 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 10 17.24% 83 40.89% 93 35.63% 
Pittsburgh, PA 4 6.90% 9 4.43% 13 4.98% 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 3 5.17% 33 16.26% 36 13.79% 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 2 3.45% 0 0.00% 2 0.77% 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 1 1.72% 0 0.00% 1 0.38% 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 1 1.72% 0 0.00% 1 0.38% 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NY-PA 1 1.72% 1 0.49% 2 0.77% 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 0 0.00% 1 0.49% 1 0.38% 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 0 0.00% 1 0.49% 1 0.38% 
Total 58 100.00% 203 100.00% 261 100.00% 
The Metropolitan Statistical Area follows the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) definitions.   





Panel B-2: Audit Fee Sample             


















Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 37 63.79% 77 37.93% 114 43.68% 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 3 5.17% 33 16.26% 36 13.79% 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 10 17.24% 85 41.87% 95 36.40% 
Pittsburgh, PA 4 6.90% 9 4.43% 13 4.98% 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 1 1.72% 1 0.49% 2 0.77% 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 1 1.72% 0 0.00% 1 0.38% 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NY-PA 1 1.72% 1 0.49% 2 0.77% 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 0 0.00% 1 0.49% 1 0.38% 
Madison, WI 0 0.00% 1 0.49% 1 0.38% 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 0 0.00% 1 0.49% 1 0.38% 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 0 0.00% 1 0.49% 1 0.38% 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 2 3.45% 0 0.00% 2 0.77% 
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 1 1.72% 0 0.00% 1 0.38% 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1 1.72% 0 0.00% 1 0.38% 
Total 61 105.17% 210 103.45% 271 103.83% 
The Metropolitan Statistical Area follows the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) definitions.   
(Table 1 continued) 


















Panel B-3: Audit Quality Sample (discretionary accruals)             


















Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 27 46.55% 52 25.62% 79 30.27% 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 5 8.62% 45 22.17% 50 19.16% 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 1 1.72% 23 11.33% 24 9.20% 
Pittsburgh, PA 2 3.45% 8 3.94% 10 3.83% 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 0 0.00% 1 0.49% 1 0.38% 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 0 0.00% 1 0.49% 1 0.38% 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 2 3.45% 0 0.00% 2 0.77% 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 1 1.72% 0 0.00% 1 0.38% 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NY-PA 1 1.72% 0 0.00% 1 0.38% 
Total 39 67.24% 130 64.04% 169 64.75% 
The Metropolitan Statistical Area follows the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) definitions.   
       
Panel B-4: Audit Quality Sample (restatements)             


















Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH 29 50.00% 61 30.05% 90 34.48% 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 6 10.34% 55 27.09% 61 23.37% 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 2 3.45% 0 0.00% 2 0.77% 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 1 1.72% 0 0.00% 1 0.38% 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NY-PA 1 1.72% 1 0.49% 2 0.77% 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 1 1.72% 0 0.00% 1 0.38% 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 0 0.00% 1 0.49% 1 0.38% 
Total 40 68.97% 118 58.13% 158 60.54% 
The Metropolitan Statistical Area follows the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) definitions.   
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4. RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 Auditor Switches 
I use Krishnan (2005) and Boone et al.’s (2015) methodology to examine the effects of 
the audit partner’s ethical violation and the resulting PCAOB disciplinary order on auditor 
switches, audit fees and audit quality. I do the same analysis at the city (office), MSA, state, 
regional and national (firm) level for each test. While local clients of the audit firm where the 
ethical violation was committed may be aware of the violation(s) committed by the audit 
partner before the public release of the PCAOB disciplinary order, this most likely is not the case 
for the audit firm's clients located in other states and/or regions.  Therefore, in order to test the 
reaction of clients not located near the office where the ethical violation was committed, I test 
the reaction at the regional and national levels as well. For all tests, I use cluster-robust standard 
errors, clustered by auditor (Boone et al. 2015). To reduce the influence of outliers, I winsorize 
all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
The first hypothesis focuses on the propensity for clients to switch auditors following the 
discovery of the ethics violation and the subsequent disclosure to the public. Following Boone et 
al. (2015), switching activity is analyzed by comparing the rate of auditor change to or from the 
firm affiliated with the sanctioned partner relative to the rate of auditor change for audit firms not 
affiliated with the sanctioned partner over a 6-year period covering three years before (which 
includes the year of the public disclosure of the violation) and three years after the violation was 
made public. Boone et al. (2015) chose three years before and three years after the disciplinary 
order because of the substantial costs to clients of switching auditors. These tests will be 







SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_PYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_PYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                     β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + 
β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  
β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + 
                     β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t     (1a) 
 
SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + 
β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  
β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + 
β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t     (1b) 
 
SWITCH is equal to 1 if a client changed auditors between the prior (t-1) and current (t) 
year, 0 otherwise. SANC_PY is equal to 1 if the firm affiliated with the sanctioned partner was 
the auditor in the prior (t-1) year, and 0 otherwise; SANC_CY is equal to 1 if the firm affiliated 
with the sanctioned partner was the auditor in the current (t) year, and 0 otherwise; and POST is 
equal to 1 for the three years after the PCAOB disciplinary order date (to be determined for each 
disciplinary order).  
As in Boone et al. (2015), both models include industry dummy variables that allow the 
intercept to vary for each of the j two-digit SIC industry groups (β0j). The model also controls for 
year fixed effects. The variable SANC_PY (SANC_CY) measures the difference in the likelihood 
of the affiliated audit office losing (gaining) a client from that of other annually inspected 
auditors (Big 4 or 2nd tier) in the pre-sanction period. The variable POST captures the 
incremental likelihood in switching risk for auditors not affiliated with a partner that has 
committed an ethical violation in the post-sanction period, compared to the pre-sanction period.  
The variable SANC_PY*POST (SANC_CY*POST) captures the incremental likelihood of the 
affiliated firm losing (gaining) a client in the post-sanction period (compared to the pre-sanction 
period) relative to that of firms not affiliated with an audit partner that has committed an ethical 





coefficient on SANC_CY*POST is expected to be negative in Model (1b) if there is a negative 
reputational effect for the affiliated firm associated with the public release of the PCAOB 
disciplinary order.11   
In addition, the variable CPA_ACM is added to the analysis. CPA_ACM tests whether 
switching frequency differs between audit committees with a CPA versus audit committees with 
no CPA. CPA_ACM is coded 1 if a CPA served on the audit committee and 0 otherwise. 
To test H3, the interaction variable CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST 
(CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST) is added to the switching models (1a) and (1b). I make no 
prediction for the coefficient estimates pertaining to CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST 
(CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST). 
The control variables included in models (1a) and (1b) are designed to capture audit and 
financial risk factors and are listed and defined in Appendix B. Asset growth (GROWTH) is 
included because growth is indicative of a high audit risk environment (Stice 1991). DeFond and 
Subramanyam (1998) find that large negative discretionary accruals incentivize clients to dismiss 
their auditor in the hopes of finding one more agreeable to their agenda. Consequently, as in 
prior research, the absolute value of discretionary accruals (|DACC|) is used to proxy for a 
client’s accounting quality. Higher values of |DACC| imply lower accounting quality. Therefore, 
the probability of an auditor switch is positively associated with |DACC|.12 INVAR, inventories 
                                                 
11  Model (1a) analyzes the loss of clients after the disciplinary order while Model (1b) analyzes the gain of clients 
after the disciplinary order.  
12 |DACC| is the absolute value of the difference between total accruals and the fitted normal accruals estimated by 
using the following Jones (1991) model by fiscal year and two-digit industry SIC code: 
 TAit/Assetsi,t-1=δ(1/ Assetsi,t-1) + β1((ΔSALESit - ΔARit)/Assetsi,t-1) + β2(PPEit/Assetsi,t-1) + β2(IBit-1/Assetsi,t-1 + Ɛi,t, 
where: TA is total accruals using the indirect cash flow method (i.e., income before extraordinary items minus 
operating cash flows from continuing operations) as in Hribar and Collins (2002); ΔSALES is the change in total 
sales revenue; ΔAR is the change in accounts receivable; PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment; IB is income 
before discontinued operations and extraordinary items; i and t are company and year indicators, respectively. Asset 





and receivables, is included as a control variable because of the higher audit risk associated with 
higher values of inventories and receivables as a fraction of total assets (Dopuch et al. 1987; 
Krishnan 1994). The expectation is that the probability of an auditor switch will increase as 
INVAR increases. 
Clients may switch auditors if they are not satisfied with the opinion(s) they receive. 
Consequently, the variables for going concern opinions (GC), internal control weaknesses (ICW), 
and modified opinions (MODOP) are included in the models.13 Auditor TENURE is included 
because shorter tenure results in less client-specific knowledge and a greater likelihood of audit 
failure (Krishnan and Krishnan 1997). On the other hand, longer auditor tenure suggests auditor 
independence concerns. Consequently, there is no sign predicted for the TENURE variable. Less 
profitable companies (ROA and LOSS) and highly leveraged firms (LEVERAGE) are more 
financially risky. Therefore, I expect the probability of an auditor switch to decrease with ROA 
and to increase with LOSS and LEVERAGE. Less CASH on hand increases the likelihood of 
financial difficulty and the likelihood of an auditor switch (Landsman et al. 2009).  
DeAngelo (1981) suggests that the cost of switching auditors is higher for larger clients 
so SIZE is included as a control variable. As in Boone et al. (2015), the variable M_A is included 
because companies are more likely to switch auditors following a merger/acquisition. Annual 
change in size (ΔSIZE) and annual change in leverage (ΔLEV) are included as control variables 
because in prior research it has been noted that changes in agency costs preceding an auditor 
change may affect the decision to change auditors (DeFond 1991; Francis and Wilson 1988). 
                                                 
13 As in Boone et al. (2015), MODOP is measured based on the Compustat item variable AUOP, which contains a 
code that indicates the auditor’s opinion on a company’s financial statement. Code 0 = No opinion; Code 1 = 
unqualified opinion; Code 2 = Qualified opinion; Code 3 = No opinion; Code 4 = Unqualified with additional 
language; Code 5 = Adverse opinion. Therefore, an unqualified opinion with additional explanatory language would 
be considered a modified opinion – Code 4. As in Boone et al. (2015), this definition is the same as in Landsman et 





Abnormal audit fees (ABNRML_FEE) control for a client’s desire to pay lower audit fees (Boone 
et al. 2015). 
4.2 Audit Fees    
To test the effect of the ethical violation and the subsequent release of the PCAOB 
disciplinary order on audit fees, three models are estimated for the period three years before 
(which includes the year the PCAOB order was released to the public) and three years after the 
date of the PCAOB disciplinary order.  
∆AF = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
β1∆SIZE,t + β2∆FOREIGNi,t + β3∆GCi,t  +β4∆MODOPi,t   + β5∆LOSSi,t + 
β6∆ROAi,t + β7∆LEVi,t + β8∆SEGi,t + β9∆QUICKi,t  + β10∆CATAi,t  + 
β11∆ABNRML_FEEi,t-1   + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t      (2a) 
 
LNAF = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t  +δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  +  
β1SIZEi,t + β2M_Ai,t + β3FOREIGNi,t + β4SEGi,t + β5LEVEL3i,t +  
β6INTANGi,t  + β7INVARi,t + β8GCi,t + β9ICWi,t + β10ROAi,t +  
β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12LIT,t  + β13LOSSi,t + β14LIQUIDi,t  + 
β15 BUSYi,t  + β16TENUREi,t  + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t     (2b)  
 
FI =   β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
β1SIZEi,t + β2M_Ai,t + β3FOREIGNi,t + β4SEGi,t + β5LEVEL3i,t + β6INTANGi,t  + 
β7INVARi,t + β8GCi,t + β9ICWi,t + β10ROAi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12LITi,t  +  
β13LOSSi,t + β14LIQUIDi,t  + β15BUSYi,t  + β16TENUREi,t  +  
β17ABNRML_FEEi,t  + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t       (2c) 
  
As in Boone et al. (2015), ∆AF is defined as the natural log of change in audit fees in 
dollars relative to the previous year. LNAF is the natural log of audit fees and FI is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if audit fees increased from one year to the next and 0 otherwise (Johnson 
2015). The control variables included in the analysis are those used in audit fee research 
literature (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Simunic 1980; Johnson 2015; Boone et al. 2015), described in 
detail at the end of this section and listed and defined in level form in Appendix B of this paper. 





The variable SANC_CY captures the change in audit fees (∆AF) between the firm 
affiliated with the audit partner that committed the ethical violation and other annually inspected 
non-sanctioned audit firms in the pre-sanction period. The variable POST captures the change in 
audit fees (∆AF) for firms other than the sanctioned audit firms for the post-sanction period, 
compared to the pre-sanction period. SANC_CY *POST captures the incremental effect in change 
in audit fees (∆AF) for the sanctioned auditors in the post-sanction period (compared to the pre-
sanction period) relative to other annually inspected non-sanctioned auditors. If the ethical 
violation and subsequent PCAOB disciplinary order led to an audit fee reduction by the affiliated 
firm(s), then the coefficient on SANC_CY*POST is expected to be negative. However, if the 
sanctioned audit firm was able to pass on higher costs to clients, the coefficient would be 
positive. 
As in Boone et al. (2015), the control variables enter the ΔAF model in change form with 
the exception of prior-year abnormal audit fees (ABNRML_FEEt-1) which is included in level 
form. ABNRML_FEEt-1 controls for the effect of pricing pressure on audit fee growth rates. 
CPA_ACM is also included in the model and is coded 1 for firms with at least one audit 
committee member that is a CPA and 0 otherwise. CPA_ACM tests whether audit fees differ 
between audit committees with a CPA compared to audit committees without a CPA. To test H3, 
the interaction variables (CPA_ACM*POST) and (CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY) are included in 
all three audit fee models. CPA_ACM*POST tests whether having a CPA on the audit committee 
makes a difference in the post-violation period and CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY tests whether 
having a CPA on the audit committee makes a difference to the sanctioned auditors in the post-
violation period. I make no prediction for the outcome on the CPA_ACM variable or the 





 In the LNAF model, a significant negative/positive coefficient on SANC_CY*POST 
would support the second hypothesis that audit fees change after the disclosure of the ethical 
violation. A negative coefficient would indicate that the reputation of the audit firm has been 
damaged by the disclosure of the ethical violation and has adversely affected the ability of the 
audit firm to charge audit fee premiums. On the other hand, a positive coefficient may indicate 
that the audit firms are able to charge the clients for any extra effort made by the firm to improve 
its reputation or possibly to compensate for PCAOB sanction risk. 
A third iteration of the model above is estimated to determine if the post violation period 
is associated with increased audit fees. The dependent variable is Fee Increase (FI) - an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the change in audit fees in the period t-1 to t is greater than zero, and zero 
otherwise. A significant negative coefficient on SANC_CY*POST would support the idea that the 
audit firm has suffered reputational damage and could not increase audit fees as a result of the 
public disclosure of the PCAOB sanction. 
The control variables included in the audit fee models measure the influence of client size 
(SIZE), client complexity (SEG), liquidity (CATA), merger and acquisition activity (M_A), and 
foreign operations (FOREIGN). Client size (SIZE) is expected to have a positive relation to audit 
fees (Simunic 1980). Greater client financial risk and more audit effort should result in higher 
audit fees (Simunic 1980; Hackenbrack and Knechel 1997). To control for audit effort and risk, 
the amount of inventory and receivables (INVAR), the issuance of a going concern (GC) and 
modified opinions (MODOP), internal control weaknesses (ICW), return on assets (ROA), the 
quick ratio (QUICK), LEVERAGE, companies with high litigation risk (LIT), and companies 
with losses (LOSS) are included in the analysis (Johnstone and Bedard 2004; Choi et al. 2008; 





December year-ends), (BUSY) and the length of auditor tenure (TENURE). Finally, current year 
abnormal audit fees (ABNRML_FEE) are included in the FI model to control for the effect of 
pricing pressure on audit fee growth rates. 
4.3 Audit Quality 
To test H4, I use two proxies frequently used in audit quality research literature – 
abnormal accruals (Francis et al. 1999), and restatements (Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Francis 
and Michas 2013). To examine how an ethical violation committed by an audit partner and the 
subsequent PCAOB disciplinary order affects the affiliated audit clients’ level of discretionary 
accruals, I estimate the absolute value of abnormal accruals using two measures:  Kothari et al. 
(2005) performance adjusted discretionary accrual (|DACC|) and Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
accruals quality measure (|DACCd|). Additionally, I analyze audit quality by examining Big R 
restatements (RESTATE) due to failures in applying GAAP (Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Francis 
and Michas 2013). RESTATE is equal to 1 for observations where the client subsequently restates 
the current-year financial statements and the auditor modifies their opinion (Big R restatements), 
and 0 otherwise. 
AQ (|DACC|, |DACCd| or RESTATE) = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t +  
δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + β1CLIENT_INFLUENCEi,t + β2SHORTi,t +  
β3AUDIT_FEEi,t + β4NONAUDIT_FEEi,t + β5EFFORTi,t + β6SIZEi,t  + β7SEGi,t+  
β8LOSSi,t + β9GROWTHi,t + β10MBi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t +  β12FOREIGNi,t  + 
β13M_Ai,t +β14INVARi,t  + β15ROAi,t  + β16BANKRUPTCYi,t  + β17GCi,t  + β18ICWi,t + 
β19CFOi,t + β20LAG_ACCRUALSi + β21LITi,t + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t           (3) 
 
The dependent variable Audit Quality (AQ) represents |DACC|, |DACCd| or RESTATE. The 
control variables are a set of control variables used in prior studies described below and defined 
in Appendix B. These variables control for various auditor and client characteristics. All other 





The variable SANC_CY*POST captures the change in audit quality for the affiliated firm in the 
post-sanction period (compared to the pre-sanction period) relative to other annually inspected 
auditors. Under H4, I expect the coefficient on SANC_CY*POST to be negative if the ethical 
violation and the subsequent disclosure was followed by an improvement in audit quality.  
CLIENT_INFLUENCE is included as a control variable to capture the importance of a client to 
the local practice office as this variable can affect auditor objectivity and audit quality for that 
client. Kinney et al. (2004) argue that high levels of fees have the potential to create an economic 
bond that gives the client leverage over the auditor and may reduce the auditor’s objective and 
professional skepticism. Therefore, AUDIT_FEE and NONAUDIT_FEE are included as control 
variables and a positive sign is predicted for both. Prior research also suggests that greater audit 
effort can curb earnings management (Caramanis and Lennox 2008). Therefore, EFFORT, as 
measured by audit fees deflated by the square root of total assets, is included as a control variable 
and a negative sign is expected.  
Company and audit firm control variables related to discretionary accruals are included in the 
model (Simunic 1980; Francis et al. 2005; Reynolds and Francis 2000; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; 
Reichelt and Wang 2010; Bills et al. 2016). These variables include client size (SIZE), clients 
that report a loss (LOSS), clients that received going-concern opinions (GC), clients with internal 
control weaknesses (ICW); cash flows from operations (CFO), leverage (LEVERAGE), client 
inventory and receivables (INVAR), clients in higher litigation industries (LIT), operating 
performance (ROA), client complexity (M_A, FOREIGN, and SEG), and clients in distress 
(BANKRUPTCY). SHORT is included because Johnson et al. (2002) find that a short tenure of 
the auditor is related to a higher magnitude of discretionary accruals and hence, lower audit 





FOREIGN are included in the model to control for complexity which could increase auditor risk 
in conducting the audit. Larger clients (SIZE), clients with high lagged accruals 
(LAG_ACCRUALS) and clients with higher operating cash flows (CFO) are expected to have 
lower discretionary accruals, whereas clients with higher leverage (LEVERAGE), higher growth 
(GROWTH) and higher litigation risk (LIT) are expected to have higher discretionary accruals 
since riskier firms and growth firms may have greater incentives for earnings management 
(Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Francis and Yu 2009). Market-to-book ratio 
(MB) is included because of the fact that capital market pressure can influence earnings 
management behavior (Francis and Yu 2009). Clients with losses (LOSS), clients in distress 
(BANKRUPTCY) 14 and clients with high operating performance (ROA) are also expected to have 
higher absolute value discretionary accruals. 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides a descriptive analysis of changes in the sanctioned auditors’ client 
attrition rates during the pre- and post-sanction periods. There is a limitation to my study in that I 
do not have exact dates as to when clients first became aware that their audit firm was associated 
with an unethical audit partner sanctioned by the PCAOB. This is evident in the case of BDO in 
which the office affiliated with the audit partner that committed the ethical violation was 
essentially void of audit clients by the time the PCAOB sanction was made public. The ethical 
violation committed by the audit partner occurred in August of 2005. Referring to my city 
(office) sample, BDO had 13 clients in the Philadelphia office at the beginning of 2005, the year 
                                                 
14 The following equation from Altman (1968) is used to calculate this measure:  1.2*working capital/total assets + 
1.4*retained earnings/total assets + 3.3*earnings before interest and taxes/total assets + .6*book value of equity/total 





my sample starts for BDO. By the end of 2007 (Year 3 in Table 3), the year the sanction was 
disclosed, BDO had no clients at the Philadelphia office. They all switched to other auditors. In 
fact, BDO had no audit clients at the Philadelphia office until 2012. The ethical violation at 
Deloitte’s Pittsburgh office occurred in 2011 (Year 1 in Table 2) at which time the office lost 
three of its twelve clients. Another two clients switched in the year the violation was disclosed 
by the PCAOB (Year 3). Ernst & Young had 207 audit clients in their Boston office in 2009. 
They only lost a net of four in the year the violation occurred (2010) and gained a net of twenty-
two in the year the PCAOB disclosed the violation. There was also a net gain in 2012 followed 
by two years of net losses. McGladrey lost three clients the year the violation occurred (2010), 
but gained three clients in the year the violation was made public. They ended the sample period 
with a net gain of two. Overall, there was a net loss of forty-seven clients associated with 
sanctioned auditors over my analysis period. While there were net losses of clients associated 
with sanctioned auditors at all five levels of my analysis, according to my auditor switching risk 
tests, overall the losses were not statistically significant. 
Table 2. Attrition of Sanctioned Auditor’s Clients 
 
  Pre-Sanction Period Post-Sanction Period   
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Net 
 + - + - + - + - + - + - Effect 
City Sample              
BDO 3 6 0 6 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 -13 
Deloitte 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 3 -9 
E&Y 18 31 11 17 36 14 18 11 7 17 12 39 -27 
McGladrey 0 3 0 0 3 0 4 1 0 0 2 3 2 
Totals 21 43 11 23 39 20 22 13 8 18 14 45 -47 
              
MSA Sample              
BDO 3 6 0 6 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 -13 
Deloitte 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 3 -9 
E&Y 14 30 13 19 33 15 17 11 6 19 11 40 -40 
McGladrey 1 3 0 0 3 1 4 1 0 0 2 3 2 
Totals 18 42 13 25 36 22 21 13 7 20 13 46 -60 






  Pre-Sanction Period Post-Sanction Period   
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3  Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Net 
 + - + - + - + - + - + - Effect 
State Sample              
BDO 3 6 0 6 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 -13 
Deloitte 15 13 14 10 13 10 4 8 2 11 1 29 -32 
E&Y 18 31 11 17 36 14 18 11 7 18 12 41 -30 
McGladrey 1 3 1 0 2 0 4 1 0 0 2 3 3 
Totals 37 53 26 33 51 28 26 20 9 29 15 73 -72 
              
Region Sample              
BDO 37 16 14 14 8 26 5 16 4 13 7 6 -16 
Deloitte 22 184 26 26 19 27 10 20 23 35 6 88 -274 
E&Y 40 60 35 37 51 28 53 31 36 45 29 63 -20 
McGladrey 5 6 1 3 5 2 8 3 7 4 6 6 8 
Totals 104 266 76 80 83 83 76 70 70 97 48 163 -302 
              
National Sample              
BDO 84 49 47 51 32 49 21 50 23 45 21 32 -48 
Deloitte 87 174 107 122 120 117 105 94 78 154 28 547 -683 
E&Y 159 184 142 218 160 185 180 158 154 194 105 289 -328 
McGladrey 45 27 17 15 19 21 28 22 22 29 21 18 20 
Totals 375 434 313 406 331 372 334 324 277 422 175 886 -1039 
 
Years 1, 2 and 3 are included in the pre-sanction period with year 3 being the year the sanction occurred.  
Years 4, 5, and 6 are included in the post-sanction period.        
+' indicates clients gained each year and '-' indicates clients lost each year.      
 
 Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for all models and all samples used in the 
empirical analysis. Panel A tabulates the descriptive statistics for the switch models, Panel B for 
the audit fee models, Panel C for the discretionary accruals models and Panel D for the 
restatement models. For select samples and models, I report the mean, median and standard 
deviation amounts for variables for the total sample as well as the pre- and post- sanction periods 
and the sanctioned and non-sanctioned auditors.  For the city (office) samples, I also report the p-
value for the test of differences between the sanctioned and non-sanctioned auditors in the pre- 






Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:  Switch Sample      
Panel A-1:  City Sample           
Definitions:  Pre-Sanc period includes two years before and the year of the sanction.  Post-
Sanc period includes the three years after the sanction.  Sanc Auditor includes clients of firms 
affiliated with a sanctioned auditor and non-sanc auditor includes clients of those firms not 




















SWITCH Mean 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.031 0.040 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.175 0.196 
SANC_CY Mean 0.211 0.228 0.194 1.000 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.408 0.420 0.396 0.000 0.000 
SANC_PY Mean 0.221 0.241 0.201 0.984 0.017 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.415 0.428 0.401 0.125 0.129 
POST Mean 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.461 0.511 
 Median 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.500 
CPA_ACM Mean 0.449 0.447 0.451 0.496 0.436 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.501 0.496 
GROWTH Mean 0.098 0.118 0.079 0.118 0.093 
 Median 0.053 0.055 0.051 0.056 0.052 
 StdDev 0.339 0.370 0.304 0.342 0.338 
|DACC| Mean 0.068 0.073 0.063 0.079 0.065 
 Median 0.041 0.043 0.039 0.051 0.039 
  StdDev 0.087 0.095 0.079 0.099 0.084 
MODOP Mean 0.357 0.410 0.303 0.224 0.392 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.479 0.492 0.460 0.418 0.489 
CASH Mean 0.252 0.255 0.247 0.287 0.243 
 Median 0.164 0.167 0.160 0.190 0.159 
  StdDev 0.245 0.247 0.244 0.252 0.242 
 
 In Table 3, Panel A-1 (the city (office) sample for the switch model), the mean values of 
the client-year variables show an auditor switching rate of 3.8 percent. There is an 9.8 percent 
growth in assets (GROWTH), absolute abnormal accruals (ABSDACC) of 6.8 percent, and a 22.5 
percent investment of total assets in inventory and receivables (INVAR). Clients included in the 
sample experienced a 1.2 percent rate of going concern opinions (GC) with an increase from 1 





opinions in the post-sanction period. Sample clients also experienced 35.7 percent in modified 
audit opinions excluding going concern opinions (MODOP) and 6 percent in internal control 
weaknesses (ICW). The mean auditor tenure (TENURE) is 12.76 years. ROA for the sample is -
2.9 percent suggesting large losses during the sample years. Approximately 33 percent of client-
year observations in the city (office) sample experienced a net loss (LOSS). Clients were 
leveraged (LEVERAGE) at 17.8 percent and had cash holdings (CASH) of 25.2 percent. 
Sanctioned auditors (SANC_CY) provided audit services in 21.1 percent of the firm-years, and 50 
percent of the observations relate to the post-sanction period (POST). Furthermore, CPAs 
(CPA_ACM) served on the audit committee in approximately 45 percent of the client-year 
observations. All switch model statistics are consistent with those of Boone et al. (2015) with the 
exception of ABNRML_FEE. In my city (office) sample, ABNRML_FEE has a mean of 0.27 
percent and a median of 2.1 percent, while in Boone et al. (2015) the mean is 2.1 percent and the 
median is 0. The descriptive statistics in Table 3, Panel A also show that differences between the 
pre- and post-sanction periods and differences between the sanctioned and non-sanctioned 
auditors are, for most variables, not significant indicating there is not a significant difference 
between the sanctioned and non-sanctioned groups. MODOP is statistically different (p < 0.01) 
in the pre- and post-sanction periods as well as between the sanctioned and non-sanctioned 
auditors.  All other sample descriptive statistics for the switch model are consistent with the city 









(Table 3. Panel A-1 continued) 
(Table 3 continued) 




PERIOD/                
SANC 




PERIOD/                
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=117) 
Test     





PERIOD/                
NON-
SANC




PERIOD/                
NON-
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=486) 
Test 
Diff                       
p-value 
SWITCH Mean 0.022 0.043 0.3573 0.043 0.037 0.6392 
 Median 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.147 0.203  0.203 0.189  
SANC_CY Mean 1.000 1.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 
 Median 1.000 1.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
SANC_PY Mean 0.978 0.991 0.3801 0.024 0.010 0.1124 
 Median 1.000 1.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.147 0.092  0.152 0.101  
POST Mean 0.000 1.000 <.0001 0.000 1.000 <.0001 
 Median 0.000 1.000  0.000 1.000  
 StdDev 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
CPA_ACM Mean 0.511 0.479 0.6093 0.428 0.444 0.6087 
 Median 1.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.502 0.502  0.495 0.497  
GROWTH Mean 0.127 0.108 0.0940 0.115 0.072 0.1626 
 Median 0.046 0.067  0.058 0.042  
 StdDev 0.371 0.306  0.370 0.303  
|DACC| Mean 0.090 0.065 0.2371 0.068 0.062 0.5613 
 Median 0.054 0.046  0.041 0.038  
 StdDev 0.114 0.075  0.088 0.080  
INVAR Mean 0.242 0.234 0.5460 0.222 0.222 0.8900 
 Median 0.231 0.224  0.206 0.202  
 StdDev 0.165 0.167  0.142 0.145  
GC Mean 0.000 0.009 0.3194 0.002 0.025 0.0023 
 Median 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.000 0.092  0.046 0.155  
MODOP Mean 0.350 0.077 0.0003 0.428 0.358 <.0001 
 Median 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.479 0.268  0.495 0.480  
ICW Mean 0.073 0.060 0.8821 0.067 0.049 0.0733 
 Median 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.261 0.238  0.250 0.217  
TENURE Mean 11.774 12.231 0.4457 13.125 12.817 0.0160 
 Median 12.000 13.000  14.000 14.000  
 StdDev 4.174 4.211  3.654 3.884  
ROA Mean -0.059 -0.030 0.2367 -0.027 -0.021 0.4458 
 Median 0.033 0.033  0.036 0.038   
































PERIOD/                
SANC 




PERIOD/                
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=117) 
Test     





PERIOD/                
NON-
SANC




PERIOD/                
NON-
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=486) 
Test 
Diff                       
p-value 
LOSS Mean 0.423 0.368 0.4119 0.299 0.331 0.0121 
 Median 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.496 0.484  0.458 0.471  
LEVERAGE Mean 0.145 0.121 0.5661 0.188 0.191 0.5306 
 Median 0.079 0.080  0.151 0.140  
 StdDev 0.179 0.145  0.206 0.213  
∆LEV Mean -0.017 0.009 0.0179 0.000 0.007 0.1857 
 Median -0.005 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.085 0.087  0.078 0.084  
CASH Mean 0.280 0.297 0.9373 0.248 0.238 0.6776 
 Median 0.176 0.206  0.164 0.154  
 StdDev 0.247 0.257  0.247 0.237  
SIZE Mean 5.990 6.292 0.2684 6.418 6.556 0.4008 
 Median 5.845 6.096  6.260 6.429  
 StdDev 1.814 1.800  1.821 1.885  
∆SIZE Mean 0.108 0.054 0.0674 0.071 0.038 0.0302 
 Median 0.063 0.051  0.064 0.035  
 StdDev 0.248 0.221  0.225 0.246  
M_A Mean 0.197 0.342 0.0717 0.153 0.319 <.0001 
 Median 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.399 0.476  0.360 0.467  
ABNRML_FEE Mean -0.114 -0.067 0.0294 0.032 0.025 0.6742 
 Median -0.096 -0.032  0.033 0.042  
  StdDev 0.441 0.454   0.470 0.391   






Panel A-2: MSA and State Samples 





































SWITCH Mean 0.035 0.032 0.038 0.038 0.035 0.035 0.030 0.041 0.033 0.035 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.184 0.175 0.192 0.192 0.183 0.183 0.170 0.198 0.178 0.185 
SANC_CY Mean 0.149 0.165 0.133 1.000 0.000 0.170 0.167 0.173 1.000 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.356 0.372 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.376 0.374 0.378 0.000 0.000 
SANC_PY Mean 0.156 0.174 0.138 0.981 0.011 0.176 0.174 0.179 0.984 0.011 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.362 0.379 0.346 0.137 0.106 0.381 0.380 0.383 0.127 0.106 
POST Mean 0.516 0.000 1.000 0.462 0.526 0.445 0.000 1.000 0.453 0.444 
 Median 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.499 0.497 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.497 
CPA_ACM Mean 0.429 0.438 0.421 0.500 0.417 0.431 0.440 0.421 0.472 0.423 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.495 0.496 0.494 0.501 0.493 0.495 0.497 0.494 0.500 0.494 
GROWTH Mean 0.096 0.117 0.077 0.119 0.092 0.102 0.114 0.086 0.113 0.099 
 Median 0.052 0.055 0.047 0.058 0.051 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.061 0.053 
 StdDev 0.314 0.341 0.286 0.321 0.313 0.304 0.330 0.267 0.317 0.301 
|DACC| Mean 0.064 0.068 0.061 0.077 0.062 0.063 0.067 0.059 0.073 0.061 
 Median 0.038 0.041 0.035 0.051 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.035 0.045 0.036 
 StdDev 0.084 0.089 0.078 0.096 0.081 0.081 0.085 0.075 0.092 0.078 
MODOP Mean 0.288 0.357 0.224 0.221 0.300 0.331 0.389 0.258 0.199 0.358 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.453 0.479 0.417 0.416 0.458 0.471 0.488 0.438 0.400 0.480 
CASH Mean 0.232 0.239 0.226 0.294 0.221 0.218 0.214 0.224 0.266 0.209 
 Median 0.150 0.154 0.149 0.201 0.143 0.132 0.126 0.137 0.175 0.119 
  StdDev 0.235 0.241 0.230 0.250 0.231 0.232 0.233 0.232 0.250 0.228 






(Table 3. Panel A-4 continued) 
 



















SWITCH Mean 0.035 0.034 0.036 0.059 0.032 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.184 0.181 0.186 0.236 0.175 
SANC_CY Mean 0.119 0.115 0.122 1.000 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.324 0.319 0.327 0.000 0.000 
SANC_PY Mean 0.119 0.114 0.122 0.955 0.006 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.324 0.318 0.328 0.207 0.076 
POST Mean 0.568 0.000 1.000 0.582 0.567 
 Median 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.495 0.000 0.000 0.494 0.496 
CPA_ACM Mean 0.440 0.437 0.443 0.430 0.442 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.496 0.496 0.497 0.495 0.497 
GROWTH Mean 0.092 0.121 0.070 0.108 0.090 
 Median 0.044 0.057 0.035 0.044 0.044 
 StdDev 0.296 0.325 0.269 0.335 0.290 
|DACC| Mean 0.063 0.070 0.057 0.075 0.061 
 Median 0.038 0.043 0.035 0.045 0.038 
 StdDev 0.081 0.089 0.075 0.096 0.079 
MODOP Mean 0.347 0.389 0.314 0.231 0.362 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.476 0.488 0.464 0.422 0.481 
CASH Mean 0.182 0.190 0.176 0.226 0.176 
 Median 0.110 0.114 0.108 0.143 0.105 
  StdDev 0.199 0.207 0.193 0.228 0.194 
 




















SWITCH Mean 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.031 0.040 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.175 0.196 
SANC_CY Mean 0.211 0.228 0.194 1.000 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.408 0.420 0.396 0.000 0.000 
SANC_PY Mean 0.221 0.241 0.201 0.984 0.017 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.415 0.428 0.401 0.125 0.129 
POST Mean 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.461 0.511 
 Median 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 













































CPA_ACM Mean 0.449 0.447 0.451 0.496 0.436 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.501 0.496 
GROWTH Mean 0.098 0.118 0.079 0.118 0.093 
 Median 0.053 0.055 0.051 0.056 0.052 
 StdDev 0.339 0.370 0.304 0.342 0.338 
|DACC| Mean 0.068 0.073 0.063 0.079 0.065 
 Median 0.041 0.043 0.039 0.051 0.039 
 StdDev 0.087 0.095 0.079 0.099 0.084 
MODOP Mean 0.357 0.410 0.303 0.224 0.392 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.479 0.492 0.460 0.418 0.489 
CASH Mean 0.252 0.255 0.247 0.287 0.243 
 Median 0.164 0.167 0.160 0.190 0.159 
  StdDev 0.245 0.247 0.244 0.252 0.242 
 
 
Table 3, Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the audit fee samples. For the city 
(office) sample, Panel B-1, ∆AF shows a 3.1 percent growth in audit fees on clients. This growth 
is consistent for all other samples, with the exception of the national (firm) sample which shows 
a 5 percent growth in audit fees. The mean of all control variables measured in the audit fees 
change analysis (not shown in the table) are near zero with some exceptions. ∆SIZE displays a 
6.1 percent growth in assets; ∆QUICK displays a 2.6 percent decline in the quick ratio; ∆SEG 
shows a decline of 6.3 percent, ∆FOREIGN shows an increase of 1.3 percent; and ∆MODOP 
shows a decrease of 6 percent. Approximately, 45 percent of the clients have a CPA on the audit 
committee and 59 percent have foreign operations. Clients in the sample are more complex with 
28.5 percent having gone through a merger or acquisition, 85.2 percent have intangible assets, 
and 23.3 percent have level 3 fair valued assets and/or liabilities. The descriptive statistics for the 
city sample in Table 3, Panel B also show significant differences (p < 0.05) for the natural log of 
a firm’s annual audit fees for sanctioned auditors from the pre- to the post-sanction period for 





same time periods. There are also significant differences for FI and ∆AF for the pre- and post-
sanction periods for sanctioned auditors, as well as for the post-sanction period between 
sanctioned and non-sanctioned auditors. Again, all other sample descriptive statistic results are 





(Table 3 continued) 
Panel B: Audit Fee Sample 






















PERIOD/                
SANC 




PERIOD/                
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=121) 
Test     
Diff                       
p-
value 
LNAF Mean 14.015 13.959 14.071 13.838 14.062 13.717 13.978 0.0433 
 Median 14.003 13.948 14.048 13.857 14.086 13.718 14.005  
 StdDev 1.038 1.046 1.027 1.039 1.033 0.994 1.075  
FI Mean 0.541 0.493 0.589 0.630 0.517 0.489 0.793 <.0001 
 Median 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000  
 StdDev 0.499 0.500 0.492 0.484 0.500 0.502 0.407  
∆AF Mean 0.031 0.021 0.042 0.080 0.019 0.027 0.142 0.0002 
 Median 0.017 -0.002 0.034 0.049 0.010 -0.006 0.087  
 StdDev 0.237 0.262 0.209 0.252 0.232 0.262 0.225  
SANC_CY Mean 0.211 0.227 0.195 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.0000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000  
 StdDev 0.408 0.419 0.396 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
POST Mean 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.462 0.510 0.000 1.000 <.0001 
 Median 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000  
 StdDev 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.499 0.500 0.000 0.000  
CPA_ACM Mean 0.447 0.443 0.451 0.481 0.438 0.496 0.463 0.5885 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.497 0.497 0.498 0.501 0.496 0.502 0.501  
SIZE Mean 6.436 6.362 6.509 6.106 6.524 5.991 6.239 0.2870 
 Median 6.248 6.169 6.376 5.958 6.376 5.854 6.031  
 StdDev 1.880 1.855 1.904 1.870 1.874 1.867 1.873  
M_A Mean 0.285 0.227 0.343 0.298 0.282 0.255 0.347 0.1085 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
  StdDev 0.452 0.419 0.475 0.458 0.450 0.438 0.478   




























PERIOD/                
SANC 




PERIOD/                
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=121) 
Test     
Diff                       
p-
value 
FOREIGN Mean 0.593 0.580 0.605 0.595 0.592 0.582 0.612 0.6230 
 Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
 StdDev 0.492 0.494 0.489 0.492 0.492 0.495 0.489  
SEG Mean 1.504 1.593 1.415 1.326 1.552 1.425 1.211 0.0194 
 Median 1.099 1.099 1.099 1.099 1.099 1.099 1.099  
 StdDev 0.822 0.782 0.851 0.732 0.838 0.674 0.781  
LEVEL3 Mean 0.233 0.180 0.287 0.260 0.227 0.206 0.322 0.0339 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.423 0.385 0.453 0.439 0.419 0.406 0.469  
INTANG Mean 0.852 0.847 0.857 0.828 0.858 0.823 0.835 0.7976 
 Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
 StdDev 0.355 0.360 0.351 0.378 0.349 0.383 0.373  
INVAR Mean 0.220 0.221 0.218 0.226 0.218 0.231 0.219 0.5595 
 Median 0.204 0.205 0.201 0.223 0.199 0.229 0.219  
 StdDev 0.151 0.151 0.150 0.166 0.146 0.170 0.162  
GC Mean 0.016 0.006 0.026 0.019 0.015 0.021 0.017 0.7785 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.126 0.080 0.159 0.137 0.123 0.145 0.128  
ICW Mean 0.058 0.064 0.052 0.084 0.051 0.078 0.091 0.7103 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.234 0.246 0.221 0.278 0.220 0.269 0.289  
ROA Mean -0.034 -0.028 -0.040 -0.063 -0.026 -0.050 -0.079 0.3771 
 Median 0.035 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.035 0.024  
 StdDev 0.219 0.217 0.221 0.259 0.207 0.247 0.273  
LEVERAGE Mean 0.175 0.170 0.179 0.122 0.189 0.120 0.124 0.8249 
 Median 0.129 0.123 0.137 0.064 0.152 0.061 0.064  
  StdDev 0.187 0.185 0.188 0.149 0.193 0.141 0.158   



























PERIOD/                
SANC 




PERIOD/                
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=121) 
Test     
Diff                       
p-
value 
LIT Mean 0.417 0.414 0.420 0.427 0.414 0.411 0.446 0.5709 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.493 0.493 0.494 0.496 0.493 0.494 0.499  
LOSS Mean 0.343 0.311 0.375 0.393 0.330 0.376 0.413 0.5397 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.475 0.463 0.485 0.489 0.470 0.486 0.494  
LIQUID Mean 3.204 3.155 3.252 3.627 3.090 3.403 3.887 0.1902 
 Median 2.363 2.385 2.332 2.666 2.261 2.550 2.897  
 StdDev 2.770 2.665 2.872 2.936 2.714 2.687 3.194  
BUSY Mean 0.696 0.692 0.700 0.737 0.686 0.730 0.744 0.8081 
 Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
 StdDev 0.460 0.462 0.458 0.441 0.464 0.445 0.438  
TENURE Mean 12.677 12.844 12.510 11.969 12.866 11.780 12.190 0.4547 
 Median 14.000 14.000 14.000 12.000 14.000 12.000 13.000  
  StdDev 4.081 3.858 4.290 4.405 3.971 4.349 4.476   
Definitions:  Pre-Sanc period includes two years before and the year of the sanction:  Post-Sanc period includes the three years after the sanction. 
Sanc Auditor includes clients of audit firms affiliated with a sanctioned audit partner and non-sanc auditor includes clients of audit firms not involved 
in a sanction.  Audit firms included in the sample are inspected annually by the PCAOB. 








Panel B-2: MSA, State & Regional samples 




















LNAF Mean 14.093 14.029 14.153 13.813 14.142 
 Median 14.047 13.984 14.108 13.817 14.106 
 StdDev 1.079 1.078 1.076 1.039 1.078 
FI Mean 0.569 0.529 0.607 0.632 0.558 
 Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.495 0.499 0.489 0.483 0.497 
∆AF Mean 0.037 0.026 0.047 0.079 0.030 
 Median 0.027 0.011 0.036 0.050 0.022 
  StdDev 0.217 0.233 0.200 0.241 0.212 
       




















LNAF Mean 14.090 14.040 14.152 13.885 14.132 
 Median 14.107 14.064 14.170 13.865 14.162 
 StdDev 1.038 1.030 1.047 1.061 1.029 
FI Mean 0.568 0.531 0.614 0.624 0.556 
 Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.496 0.499 0.487 0.485 0.497 
∆AF Mean 0.039 0.032 0.047 0.072 0.032 
 Median 0.024 0.011 0.036 0.049 0.020 
  StdDev 0.226 0.240 0.207 0.233 0.224 
       




















LNAF Mean 14.212 14.131 14.274 13.882 14.257 
 Median 14.179 14.101 14.251 13.884 14.221 
 StdDev 1.192 1.201 1.183 1.258 1.176 
FI Mean 0.557 0.565 0.551 0.591 0.553 
 Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.497 0.496 0.497 0.492 0.497 
∆AF Mean 0.037 0.056 0.023 0.050 0.036 
 Median 0.020 0.025 0.015 0.030 0.018 
  StdDev 0.233 0.269 0.200 0.241 0.231 


























LNAF Mean 14.083 13.974 14.146 13.942 14.104 
 Median 14.055 13.947 14.113 13.927 14.075 
 StdDev 1.176 1.194 1.160 1.190 1.172 
FI Mean 0.564 0.606 0.540 0.615 0.557 
 Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.496 0.489 0.498 0.487 0.497 
∆AF Mean 0.050 0.104 0.018 0.059 0.048 
 Median 0.023 0.044 0.013 0.037 0.021 
 StdDev 0.280 0.347 0.226 0.263 0.282 
SANC_CY Mean 0.130 0.114 0.140 1.000 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.337 0.317 0.347 0.000 0.000 
POST Mean 0.633 0.000 1.000 0.680 0.625 
 Median 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.482 0.000 0.000 0.467 0.484 
CPA_ACM Mean 0.374 0.369 0.378 0.391 0.372 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.484 0.482 0.485 0.488 0.483 
SIZE Mean 6.923 6.699 7.053 6.613 6.969 
 Median 6.935 6.668 7.106 6.594 6.983 
 StdDev 2.096 2.058 2.108 2.207 2.075 
M_A Mean 0.207 0.121 0.256 0.292 0.194 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.405 0.327 0.437 0.455 0.395 
FOREIGN Mean 0.493 0.451 0.517 0.513 0.490 
 Median 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.500 0.498 0.500 0.500 0.500 
SEG Mean 1.379 1.553 1.278 1.295 1.392 
 Median 1.099 1.099 1.099 1.099 1.099 
 StdDev 0.884 0.811 0.909 0.835 0.891 
LEVEL3 Mean 0.196 0.081 0.263 0.250 0.188 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.397 0.273 0.440 0.433 0.391 
INTANG Mean 0.816 0.803 0.824 0.793 0.820 
 Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.387 0.397 0.381 0.405 0.384 
INVAR Mean 0.220 0.225 0.218 0.227 0.219 
 Median 0.188 0.191 0.186 0.197 0.187 
 StdDev 0.168 0.171 0.166 0.179 0.166 
GC Mean 0.028 0.023 0.031 0.031 0.028 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.166 0.149 0.174 0.174 0.164 
ICW Mean 0.059 0.079 0.047 0.058 0.059 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.235 0.270 0.212 0.235 0.236 
ROA Mean -0.008 0.001 -0.013 -0.034 -0.004 
 Median 0.037 0.044 0.032 0.031 0.037 
  StdDev 0.203 0.206 0.201 0.231 0.198 























LEVERAGE Mean 0.236 0.217 0.247 0.228 0.237 
 Median 0.199 0.177 0.212 0.178 0.203 
 StdDev 0.230 0.222 0.233 0.238 0.229 
LIT Mean 0.323 0.328 0.320 0.350 0.319 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.468 0.470 0.467 0.477 0.466 
LOSS Mean 0.287 0.254 0.306 0.339 0.279 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.452 0.435 0.461 0.473 0.449 
LIQUID Mean 2.580 2.669 2.528 2.752 2.554 
 Median 1.876 1.896 1.862 1.971 1.862 
 StdDev 2.386 2.479 2.329 2.588 2.353 
BUSY Mean 0.728 0.721 0.731 0.736 0.727 
 Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.445 0.448 0.443 0.441 0.446 
TENURE Mean 12.018 11.985 12.038 10.914 12.184 
 Median 13.000 13.000 13.000 11.000 13.000 
  StdDev 4.177 4.021 4.265 4.690 4.069 
 
Table 3, Panels C and D provide the descriptive statistics for the audit quality samples. 
Referring to the city (office) sample, |DACC| has a mean value of 5.5 percent, which is consistent 
with other studies including Reichelt and Wang (2010) and Reynolds and Francis (2000). 
|DACCd| has a mean value of approximately 2 percent. Consistent with Boone et al. (2015), 
approximately 5 percent of the city (office) sample client-year observations are restated. All 
other variables are similar to previous literature (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Becker et al. 1998; 
Boone et al. 2015; Frankel et al. 2002; Reynolds and Francis 2000). Most all client 
characteristics exhibit mean values similar to each other in each level of the analysis. 
In the difference of the means test for the city sample, there is no significant difference 
between the pre- and post-sanction periods for the sanctioned and non-sanctioned auditors for 
discretionary accruals (|DACC| and |DACCd|).  However, there is a significant difference in the 
means for RESTATE between the pre- and post-sanction periods for the non-sanctioned auditors, 
as well as a significant difference in the means for RESTATE in the post-sanction period between 





(Table 3 continued) 
Panel C: Discretionary Accruals Sample 






















PERIOD/                
SANC 




PERIOD/                
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=81) 
Test     
Diff                       
p-
value 
|DACC| Mean 0.055 0.057 0.053 0.056 0.055 0.058 0.051 0.4824 
 Median 0.038 0.043 0.034 0.040 0.037 0.045 0.036  
 StdDev 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.059 0.061 0.065 0.053  
DACCd Mean 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.017 0.024 0.027 0.4642 
 Median 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.011 0.019 0.018  
 StdDev 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.016 0.023  
SANC_CY Mean 0.241 0.259 0.224 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.0000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000  
 StdDev 0.428 0.439 0.418 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
POST_VIOLATION Mean 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.464 0.511 0.000 1.000 0.0000 
 Median 0.500 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000  
 StdDev 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.000  
CLIENT_INFLUENCE Mean 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.025 0.063 0.033 0.030 0.6449 
 Median 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.011 0.023 0.010 0.013  
 StdDev 0.139 0.145 0.134 0.033 0.158 0.064 0.038  
SHORT Mean 0.032 0.009 0.055 0.071 0.019 0.032 0.111 0.0463 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.175 0.093 0.228 0.258 0.136 0.176 0.316  
AUDIT_FEE Mean 14.153 14.097 14.209 14.165 14.149 14.068 14.310 0.1078 
 Median 14.173 14.150 14.197 14.121 14.190 13.951 14.171  
 StdDev 1.052 1.035 1.067 0.994 1.071 0.930 1.038  
NON_AUDITFEE Mean 11.325 11.376 11.274 11.931 11.132 11.651 12.054 0.3084 
 Median 12.038 11.965 12.117 12.209 11.970 11.968 12.255  
 StdDev 3.535 3.396 3.674 2.471 3.794 2.690 2.545  
EFFORT Mean 57.796 56.113 59.479 62.635 56.257 55.907 69.504 0.4060 
 Median 51.792 50.688 52.641 53.447 51.195 48.884 55.664  
  StdDev 33.035 25.940 38.823 49.251 25.705 26.079 64.613   


























PERIOD/                
SANC 




PERIOD/                
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=81) 
Test     
Diff                       
p-
value 
GROWTH Mean 0.082 0.108 0.057 0.093 0.079 0.125 0.049 0.0260 
 Median 0.051 0.064 0.037 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.051  
 StdDev 0.255 0.264 0.242 0.245 0.258 0.264 0.183  
MB Mean 0.809 0.802 0.815 0.823 0.804 0.740 0.940 0.6838 
 Median 0.761 0.733 0.776 0.681 0.778 0.606 0.733  
 StdDev 0.743 0.723 0.762 0.823 0.716 0.786 0.833  
BANKRUPTCY Mean 3.983 4.267 3.699 3.905 4.008 3.835 4.037 0.7016 
 Median 3.149 3.169 3.125 3.457 3.045 3.352 3.859  
 StdDev 5.043 4.575 5.463 3.546 5.436 3.269 3.647  
CFO Mean 0.070 0.071 0.069 0.055 0.075 0.060 0.055 0.8217 
 Median 0.087 0.085 0.088 0.082 0.091 0.085 0.084  
 StdDev 0.131 0.135 0.127 0.149 0.125 0.157 0.134  
LAG_ACCRUALS Mean -0.073 -0.082 -0.065 -0.088 -0.069 -0.100 -0.068 0.0251 
 Median -0.057 -0.060 -0.055 -0.068 -0.054 -0.076 -0.057  
  StdDev 0.097 0.109 0.082 0.101 0.095 0.112 0.074   
Definitions: Pre-Sanc period includes two years before and the year of the sanction.  Post-Sanc period includes the three years after the 
sanction. Sanc Auditor includes clients of audit firms affiliated with a sanctioned audit partner and non-sanc auditor includes clients of 
those audit firms not affiliated with a sanctioned audit partner.  Audit firms included in the sample are inspected annually by the PCAOB. 
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NON-
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NON-
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=312) 
Test     
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NON-
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=298) 
Test     





PERIOD/                
SANC




PERIOD/                
NON-
SANC 
AUDITOR    
(n=312) 
Test     
Diff                       
p-
value 
|DACC| Mean 0.055 0.057 0.6263 0.058 0.055 0.7131 0.051 0.057 0.3962 
 Median 0.039 0.035  0.045 0.039  0.036 0.035  
 StdDev 0.060 0.073  0.065 0.060  0.053 0.073  
DACCd Mean 0.024 0.023 0.7684 0.024 0.024 0.7498 0.027 0.023 0.2222 
 Median 0.017 0.017  0.019 0.017  0.018 0.017  
 StdDev 0.024 0.022  0.016 0.024  0.023 0.022  
SANC_CY Mean 0.000 0.000 0.0000 1.000 0.000 0.0000 1.000 0.000 0.0000 
 Median 0.000 0.000  1.000 0.000  1.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
POST Mean 0.000 1.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 1.000 1.000 0.0000 
 Median 0.000 1.000  0.000 0.000  1.000 1.000  
 StdDev 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
CLIENT_INFLUENCE Mean 0.063 0.061 0.8337 0.033 0.063 0.0079 0.030 0.061 0.0007 
 Median 0.024 0.025  0.010 0.024  0.013 0.025  
 StdDev 0.155 0.141  0.064 0.155  0.038 0.141  
SHORT Mean 0.000 0.042 0.0003 0.032 0.000 0.0832 0.111 0.042 0.0630 
 Median 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  
 StdDev 0.000 0.200  0.176 0.000  0.316 0.200  
AUDIT_FEE Mean 14.149 14.222 0.3881 14.068 14.149 0.4754 14.310 14.222 0.4993 
 Median 14.187 14.298  13.951 14.187  14.171 14.298  
 StdDev 1.049 1.047  0.930 1.049  1.038 1.047  
NON_AUDITFEE Mean 11.071 10.845 0.4778 11.651 11.071 0.1027 12.054 10.845 0.0011 
 Median 11.944 11.932  11.968 11.944  12.255 11.932  
 StdDev 3.810 4.065  2.690 3.810  2.545 4.065  
EFFORT Mean 56.086 56.110 0.9916 55.907 56.086 0.9552 69.504 56.110 0.0708 
 Median 50.249 51.508  48.884 50.249  55.664 51.508  
  StdDev 29.557 25.479   26.079 29.557   64.613 25.479   
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PERIOD/                
NON-
SANC 
AUDITOR        
(n=312) 
Test     
Diff                       
p-
value 
GROWTH Mean 0.094 0.051 0.0277 0.125 0.094 0.3092 0.049 0.051 0.9311 
 Median 0.066 0.033  0.052 0.066  0.051 0.033  
 StdDev 0.239 0.242  0.264 0.239  0.183 0.242  
MB Mean 0.833 0.772 0.3031 0.740 0.833 0.3033 0.940 0.772 0.1034 
 Median 0.766 0.759  0.606 0.766  0.733 0.759  
 StdDev 0.692 0.760  0.786 0.692  0.833 0.760  
BANKRUPTCY Mean 4.245 3.419 0.0467 3.835 4.245 0.3415 4.037 3.419 0.2300 
 Median 3.124 2.893  3.352 3.124  3.859 2.893  
 StdDev 4.656 5.564  3.269 4.656  3.647 5.564  
CFO Mean 0.075 0.073 0.8463 0.060 0.075 0.4098 0.055 0.073 0.2530 
 Median 0.093 0.091  0.085 0.093  0.084 0.091  
 StdDev 0.127 0.131  0.157 0.127  0.134 0.131  
LAG_ACCRUALS Mean -0.071 -0.064 0.3640 -0.100 -0.071 0.0274 -0.068 -0.064 0.7189 
 Median -0.053 -0.055  -0.076 -0.053  -0.057 -0.055  
  StdDev 0.100 0.083   0.112 0.100   0.074 0.083   



















Panel C-2: State & MSA samples 
    State  MSA  



































|DACC| Mean 0.051 0.052 0.050 0.052 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.051 0.053 0.051 
 Median 0.034 0.035 0.033 0.037 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.033 0.039 0.034 
 StdDev 0.058 0.059 0.057 0.056 0.059 0.058 0.056 0.060 0.054 0.058 
DACCd Mean 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.016 
 Median 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.010 
 StdDev 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 
SANC_CY Mean 0.173 0.168 0.181 1.000 0.000 0.162 0.178 0.147 1.000 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.379 0.374 0.385 0.000 0.000 0.368 0.383 0.354 0.000 0.000 
POST_VIOLATION Mean 0.421 0.000 1.000 0.439 0.418 0.516 0.000 1.000 0.467 0.525 
 Median 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.494 0.000 0.000 0.498 0.493 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 
CLIENT_INFLUENCE Mean 0.035 0.032 0.038 0.027 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.038 0.022 0.040 
 Median 0.017 0.016 0.020 0.012 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.011 0.020 
 StdDev 0.056 0.054 0.058 0.041 0.058 0.058 0.061 0.056 0.027 0.062 
SHORT Mean 0.026 0.005 0.055 0.061 0.018 0.031 0.010 0.050 0.089 0.019 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.158 0.068 0.227 0.240 0.134 0.172 0.099 0.218 0.285 0.138 
AUDIT_FEE Mean 14.269 14.212 14.346 14.167 14.290 14.261 14.184 14.334 14.152 14.282 
 Median 14.279 14.216 14.351 14.113 14.321 14.221 14.161 14.334 14.119 14.275 
 StdDev 1.023 1.004 1.046 0.958 1.036 1.124 1.102 1.141 1.005 1.145 
NON_AUDITFEE Mean 11.406 11.436 11.363 11.674 11.349 11.339 11.351 11.327 11.794 11.251 
 Median 12.243 12.206 12.319 12.235 12.248 12.201 12.140 12.328 12.206 12.199 
 StdDev 3.641 3.546 3.770 3.020 3.757 3.817 3.670 3.955 2.783 3.982 
EFFORT Mean 54.699 52.525 57.687 60.147 53.556 56.579 54.852 58.201 62.169 55.501 
 Median 49.519 48.043 51.895 51.876 48.983 50.957 49.924 52.354 53.101 50.646 
 StdDev 29.579 24.657 35.048 46.520 24.472 30.460 25.180 34.640 49.303 25.162 














































GROWTH Mean 0.084 0.108 0.051 0.086 0.083 0.079 0.098 0.062 0.091 0.077 
 Median 0.050 0.066 0.031 0.052 0.050 0.047 0.057 0.036 0.050 0.047 
 StdDev 0.228 0.236 0.212 0.225 0.229 0.229 0.233 0.223 0.234 0.228 
MB Mean 0.835 0.831 0.840 0.821 0.838 0.792 0.755 0.827 0.815 0.788 
 Median 0.779 0.784 0.777 0.709 0.792 0.733 0.703 0.776 0.680 0.759 
 StdDev 0.751 0.720 0.792 0.781 0.745 0.758 0.741 0.772 0.836 0.742 
BANKRUPTCY Mean 3.910 3.951 3.853 4.056 3.879 3.912 4.016 3.814 3.968 3.901 
 Median 3.126 3.154 3.091 3.468 3.057 3.088 3.137 3.019 3.473 2.998 
 StdDev 4.358 4.119 4.671 3.421 4.532 4.543 4.352 4.718 3.395 4.735 
CFO Mean 0.077 0.078 0.076 0.061 0.081 0.075 0.076 0.075 0.054 0.079 
 Median 0.092 0.094 0.089 0.085 0.094 0.089 0.091 0.088 0.082 0.091 
 StdDev 0.112 0.114 0.110 0.138 0.106 0.116 0.121 0.112 0.143 0.110 
LAG_ACCRUALS Mean -0.060 -0.064 -0.056 -0.080 -0.056 -0.064 -0.070 -0.059 -0.088 -0.060 
 Median -0.049 -0.052 -0.046 -0.062 -0.046 -0.052 -0.053 -0.050 -0.067 -0.049 
  StdDev 0.083 0.088 0.076 0.092 0.081 0.086 0.096 0.075 0.097 0.083 








Panel C-3: Regional sample 


















|DACC| Mean 0.054 0.055 0.053 0.059 0.053 
 Median 0.036 0.037 0.035 0.036 0.036 
 StdDev 0.060 0.061 0.060 0.072 0.058 
|DACCd| Mean 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.017 
 Median 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.010 
 StdDev 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.022 0.020 
SANC_CY Mean 0.112 0.112 0.113 1.000 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.000 0.000 
POST Mean 0.556 0.000 1.000 0.556 0.555 
 Median 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.497 0.000 0.000 0.497 0.497 
CLIENT_INFLUENCE Mean 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.012 
 Median 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 
 StdDev 0.034 0.033 0.035 0.023 0.035 
SHORT Mean 0.023 0.015 0.030 0.064 0.018 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.150 0.121 0.170 0.245 0.133 
AUDIT_FEE Mean 14.395 14.312 14.460 14.047 14.439 
 Median 14.348 14.267 14.431 14.040 14.391 
 StdDev 1.192 1.195 1.186 1.217 1.182 
NON_AUDITFEE Mean 11.672 11.668 11.675 11.205 11.731 
 Median 12.454 12.422 12.487 12.073 12.505 
 StdDev 3.594 3.486 3.678 3.895 3.550 
EFFORT Mean 58.684 58.941 58.478 55.052 59.144 
 Median 51.599 50.508 52.402 49.578 51.971 
 StdDev 41.301 49.062 33.846 37.396 41.753 
GROWTH Mean 0.084 0.110 0.063 0.103 0.081 
 Median 0.043 0.060 0.031 0.046 0.043 
 StdDev 0.244 0.255 0.233 0.273 0.240 
MB Mean 0.802 0.836 0.775 0.848 0.796 
 Median 0.773 0.789 0.756 0.734 0.776 
 StdDev 0.779 0.749 0.801 0.797 0.776 
BANKRUPTCY Mean 3.904 4.106 3.742 4.354 3.846 
 Median 3.105 3.207 3.027 3.296 3.088 
 StdDev 4.091 4.229 3.970 4.972 3.962 
CFO Mean 0.083 0.082 0.084 0.050 0.087 
 Median 0.092 0.093 0.091 0.082 0.093 
 StdDev 0.108 0.114 0.103 0.154 0.100 
LAG_ACCRUALS Mean -0.054 -0.052 -0.055 -0.064 -0.053 
 Median -0.047 -0.046 -0.048 -0.054 -0.046 
  StdDev 0.080 0.085 0.076 0.092 0.078 











Panel C-4: National (firm) sample 


















|DACC| Mean 0.071 0.073 0.069 0.073 0.070 
 Median 0.050 0.052 0.048 0.051 0.050 
 StdDev 0.070 0.071 0.069 0.073 0.069 
|DACCd| Mean 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.013 
 Median 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 StdDev 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 
SANC_CY Mean 0.151 0.134 0.164 1.000 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.358 0.340 0.370 0.000 0.000 
POST Mean 0.563 0.000 1.000 0.613 0.555 
 Median 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 StdDev 0.496 0.000 0.000 0.487 0.497 
CLIENT_INFLUENCE Mean 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 Median 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 StdDev 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
SHORT Mean 0.022 0.018 0.026 0.041 0.019 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 StdDev 0.148 0.133 0.159 0.199 0.137 
AUDIT_FEE Mean 14.240 14.173 14.292 14.162 14.254 
 Median 14.166 14.104 14.217 14.087 14.179 
 StdDev 1.101 1.107 1.093 1.083 1.104 
NON_AUDITFEE Mean 11.183 11.258 11.126 11.065 11.204 
 Median 12.191 12.170 12.206 12.090 12.206 
 StdDev 3.902 3.727 4.032 3.969 3.890 
EFFORT Mean 50.852 51.876 50.059 49.618 51.072 
 Median 44.349 44.547 44.190 43.828 44.405 
 StdDev 33.907 36.904 31.369 30.237 34.515 
GROWTH Mean 0.099 0.141 0.065 0.099 0.098 
 Median 0.053 0.076 0.038 0.056 0.052 
 StdDev 0.252 0.283 0.220 0.246 0.253 
MB Mean 4.905 4.895 4.913 4.840 4.917 
 Median 4.795 4.781 4.808 4.740 4.805 
 StdDev 1.721 1.694 1.741 1.686 1.727 
BANKRUPTCY Mean 3.941 4.349 3.626 3.914 3.946 
 Median 3.175 3.401 3.000 3.324 3.150 
 StdDev 3.770 4.000 3.549 3.645 3.791 
CFO Mean 0.101 0.105 0.099 0.094 0.103 
 Median 0.099 0.101 0.096 0.095 0.099 
 StdDev 0.090 0.094 0.086 0.089 0.090 
LAG_ACCRUALS Mean -0.063 -0.057 -0.067 -0.061 -0.063 
 Median -0.054 -0.051 -0.056 -0.052 -0.054 










Table 4, Panels A - D provide the Pearson and Spearman correlations for the variables in 
the models for all samples. Inspection of the correlations, suggests no multicollinearity problems 
in the multivariate analysis, with the exception of the following. In the MSA, state, regional, and 
national (firm) samples for the switch analysis, SANC_CY, SANC_PY, and the interaction 
variables are highly correlated. In the MSA, regional, and national (firm) samples for the audit 
quality analysis, AUDIT_FEE and SIZE are highly correlated. Finally, in the city (office) and 
state samples for the audit quality analysis, AUDIT_FEE (86.86), SIZE (70.88), and EFFORT 
(14.21) are highly correlated. This inference was confirmed by examining Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIFs), which did not exceed 5 for any of the explanatory variables in any of the 














Table 4: Pearson/Spearman Correlation Matrices 
Panel A: Switch Tests 
Panel A-1:  City (office) sample 
   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 
[1] SWITCH 1.00 -0.02 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
[2] SANC_CY -0.02 1.00 0.95 -0.04 0.05 0.61 0.63 0.40 0.43 0.03 0.06 -0.14 0.07 
[3] SANC_PY 0.10 0.95 1.00 -0.05 0.06 0.63 0.61 0.43 0.41 0.05 0.06 -0.13 0.06 
[4] POST 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.23 0.22 -0.06 -0.06 -0.11 -0.01 
[5] CPA_ACM 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.24 0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.09 
[6] SANC_PY*POST 0.06 0.61 0.63 0.33 0.03 1.00 0.97 0.68 0.65 0.01 -0.01 -0.19 0.05 
[7] SANC_CY*POST 0.01 0.63 0.61 0.33 0.02 0.97 1.00 0.64 0.67 0.01 -0.01 -0.19 0.06 
[8] CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST 0.08 0.40 0.43 0.23 0.25 0.68 0.64 1.00 0.95 0.02 -0.01 -0.12 0.05 
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST 0.02 0.43 0.41 0.22 0.24 0.65 0.67 0.95 1.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.12 0.06 
[10] GROWTH 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.26 -0.06 0.09 
[11] |DACC| -0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.26 1.00 0.00 0.32 
[12] MODOP -0.01 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 -0.19 -0.19 -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 1.00 -0.13 
[13] CASH -0.01 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.32 -0.13 1.00 
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. 
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 1,205 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
None of the variance inflation factors on any of the variables, with the exception of SANC_CY, SANC_PY and the interaction 
variables exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity. 
      
 Panel A-2: MSA sample 
   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]   
[1] SWITCH 1.00 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.03   
[2] SANC_CY 0.01 1.00 0.95 -0.05 0.06 0.63 0.65 0.42 0.45   
[3] SANC_PY 0.11 0.95 1.00 -0.05 0.07 0.65 0.63 0.45 0.43   
[4] POST 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 1.00 -0.02 0.27 0.26 0.18 0.18   
[5] CPA_ACM 0.01 0.06 0.07 -0.02 1.00 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.21   
[6] SANC_PY*POST 0.08 0.63 0.65 0.27 0.04 1.00 0.97 0.69 0.66   
[7] SANC_CY*POST 0.02 0.65 0.63 0.26 0.03 0.97 1.00 0.65 0.69   
[8] CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST 0.08 0.42 0.45 0.18 0.22 0.69 0.65 1.00 0.96   
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST 0.03 0.45 0.43 0.18 0.21 0.66 0.69 0.96 1.00     
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. 
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 1,762 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
None of the variance inflation factors on any of the variables, with the exception of SANC_CY, SANC_PY and the interaction variables 
exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity. 






 Panel A-3: State sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]    
[1] SWITCH 1.00 -0.01 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.01    
[2] SANC_CY -0.01 1.00 0.96 0.01 0.04 0.62 0.64 0.41 0.43    
[3] SANC_PY 0.09 0.96 1.00 0.01 0.04 0.64 0.62 0.43 0.41    
[4] POST 0.03 0.01 0.01 1.00 -0.02 0.33 0.32 0.22 0.22    
[5] CPA_ACM 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.02 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.22    
[6] SANC_PY*POST 0.07 0.62 0.64 0.33 0.02 1.00 0.97 0.67 0.65    
[7] SANC_CY*POST 0.01 0.64 0.62 0.32 0.02 0.97 1.00 0.64 0.67    
[8] CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST 0.06 0.41 0.43 0.22 0.23 0.67 0.64 1.00 0.96    
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST 0.01 0.43 0.41 0.22 0.22 0.65 0.67 0.96 1.00   
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. 
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 1,808 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
None of the variance inflation factors on any of the variables, with the exception of SANC_CY, SANC_PY and the interaction variables 
exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity. 
 
             
Panel A-4: Regional sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]  
[1] SWITCH 1.00 0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01  
[2] SANC_CY 0.05 1.00 0.95 0.01 -0.01 0.71 0.74 0.45 0.47  
[3] SANC_PY 0.05 0.95 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.74 0.72 0.47 0.46  
[4] POST 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.15  
[5] CPA_ACM -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.20 0.19  
[6] SANC_PY*POST 0.04 0.71 0.74 0.24 -0.01 1.00 0.97 0.64 0.62  
[7] SANC_CY*POST 0.03 0.74 0.72 0.24 -0.01 0.97 1.00 0.61 0.63  
[8] CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST 0.03 0.45 0.47 0.15 0.20 0.64 0.61 1.00 0.98  
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST 0.01 0.47 0.46 0.15 0.19 0.62 0.63 0.98 1.00   
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. 
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 5,826 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
None of the variance inflation factors on any of the variables, with the exception of SANC_CY, SANC_PY and interaction variables 
exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity. 
(Table 4 continued) 







(Table 4: Panel B-1 continued) 
  
Panel A-5: National (firm) sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 
[1] SWITCH 1.00 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.01 
[2] SANC_CY 0.03 1.00 0.95 0.04 0.01 0.77 0.81 0.47 0.49 0.00 0.02 -0.13 0.04 
[3] SANC_PY 0.04 0.95 1.00 0.04 0.01 0.81 0.78 0.49 0.47 0.00 0.01 -0.13 0.04 
[4] POST -0.01 0.04 0.04 1.00 0.01 0.24 0.24 0.14 0.14 -0.13 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 
[5] CPA_ACM -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.24 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
[6] SANC_PY*POST 0.04 0.77 0.81 0.24 0.01 1.00 0.96 0.60 0.58 -0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.01 
[7] SANC_CY*POST 0.01 0.81 0.78 0.24 0.01 0.96 1.00 0.58 0.61 -0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.01 
[8] CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST 0.03 0.47 0.49 0.14 0.25 0.60 0.58 1.00 0.96 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST 0.01 0.49 0.47 0.14 0.24 0.58 0.61 0.96 1.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.01 
[10] GROWTH 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 0.22 -0.01 0.11 
[11] |DACC| 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.22 1.00 0.01 0.28 
[12] MODOP 0.00 -0.13 -0.13 -0.09 0.02 -0.13 -0.13 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 1.00 -0.05 
[13] CASH 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.28 -0.05 1.00 
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal.  
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 27,979 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
None of the variance inflation factors on any of the variables, with the exception of SANC_CY and SANC_PY and the interaction 
variables exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity.   
              
Panel B: Audit Fee Tests 
Panel B-1:  City (office) sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 
[1] LNAF 1.00 0.03 0.05 -0.09 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
[2] FI 0.03 1.00 0.66 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.22 -0.08 -0.12 0.03 
[3] ∆LNAF 0.05 0.66 1.00 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.28 -0.02 -0.14 0.04 
[4] SANC_CY -0.09 0.09 0.11 1.00 -0.04 0.64 0.04 -0.01 0.42 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
[5] POST 0.05 0.10 0.04 -0.04 1.00 0.33 0.01 0.54 0.22 -0.07 -0.28 -0.02 -0.06 
[6] SANC_CY*POST -0.01 0.17 0.15 0.64 0.33 1.00 0.01 0.19 0.66 0.00 -0.14 -0.05 -0.05 
[7] CPA_ACM -0.06 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.60 0.24 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.01 
[8] CPA_ACM*POST -0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.54 0.19 0.60 1.00 0.40 -0.02 -0.21 -0.03 -0.03 
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST -0.04 0.11 0.09 0.42 0.22 0.66 0.24 0.40 1.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 
[10] ∆SIZE -0.01 0.22 0.28 0.04 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 1.00 0.02 -0.09 0.10 
[11] ∆SEG 0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.28 -0.14 -0.07 -0.21 -0.10 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.00 
[12] ∆CATA -0.01 -0.12 -0.14 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.00 1.00 -0.04 
[13] ∆FOREIGN 0.01 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 0.10 0.00 -0.04 1.00 
[14] ∆QUICK 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.29 0.01 0.38 -0.01 
[15] ∆LEV 0.04 0.07 0.10 -0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.24 -0.02 





(Table 4: Panel B-1 continued) 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 
[17] ∆LOSS 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.13 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 
[18] ∆GC -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.16 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
[19] ∆MODOP -0.03 0.08 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 
[20] BUSY -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 
[21] FOREIGN 0.46 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.13 
[22] GC -0.17 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.15 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 
[23] ICW 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.06 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
[24] INVAR 0.17 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.00 -0.07 0.01 0.05 0.01 
[25] LEVERAGE 0.31 -0.02 -0.01 -0.15 0.03 -0.09 -0.18 -0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
[26] INTANG 0.36 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02 
[27] LEVEL3 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02 
[28] LIQUID -0.38 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.12 -0.02 0.10 -0.04 
[29] LIT -0.22 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 
[30] LOSS -0.28 -0.07 -0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.23 -0.07 0.07 -0.02 
[31] MA 0.31 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.12 -0.04 -0.17 0.01 
[32] ROA 0.36 0.05 0.01 -0.07 -0.03 -0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.18 0.03 -0.05 0.02 
[33] SEG 0.25 -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.01 
[34] SIZE 0.87 0.05 0.03 -0.09 0.04 -0.03 -0.14 -0.06 -0.05 0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.01 
[35] TENURE 0.30 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.07 0.13 0.07 -0.01 
[36] ABNRML_FEEt-1 0.36 -0.26 -0.35 -0.10 0.01 -0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.08 
[37] ABNRML_FEE 0.41 0.02 0.10 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.15 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 
 
 
   [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] 
[1] LNAF 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.46 -0.17 0.04 0.17 0.31 0.36 
[2] FI -0.01 0.07 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
[3] ∆LNAF -0.02 0.10 -0.08 0.06 0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
[4] SANC_CY 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.15 -0.03 
[5] POST -0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 
[6] SANC_CY*POST -0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 
[7] CPA_ACM -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.09 -0.18 -0.03 
[8] CPA_ACM*POST -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.09 0.02 
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.07 
[10] ∆SIZE 0.29 -0.03 0.33 -0.13 -0.16 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.01 
[11] ∆SEG 0.01 -0.06 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
[12] ∆CATA 0.38 -0.24 0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
[13] ∆FOREIGN -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 
[14] ∆QUICK 1.00 -0.20 0.26 -0.08 -0.11 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 
[15] ∆LEV -0.20 1.00 -0.25 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.11 -0.03 -0.04 0.28 0.03 
[16] ∆ROA 0.26 -0.25 1.00 -0.45 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
[17] ∆LOSS -0.08 0.14 -0.45 1.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 





(Table 4: Panel B-1 continued) 
   [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] 
[19] ∆MODOP -0.04 0.09 -0.03 0.01 0.19 1.00 0.01 -0.04 0.11 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 
[20] BUSY -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 1.00 -0.16 0.01 0.02 -0.21 0.04 -0.11 
[21] FOREIGN 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.16 1.00 -0.14 -0.02 0.27 -0.07 0.40 
[22] GC -0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.54 0.11 0.01 -0.14 1.00 0.00 -0.09 0.03 -0.11 
[23] ICW 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.00 1.00 0.06 -0.01 0.02 
[24] INVAR 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.21 0.27 -0.09 0.06 1.00 -0.07 0.21 
[25] LEVERAGE -0.05 0.28 -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 1.00 0.07 
[26] INTANG -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.11 0.40 -0.11 0.02 0.21 0.07 1.00 
[27] LEVEL3 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 0.11 0.02 -0.05 -0.20 -0.05 0.09 
[28] LIQUID 0.21 -0.07 0.09 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.15 -0.02 -0.04 -0.22 -0.30 -0.25 
[29] LIT -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 0.07 0.01 -0.23 -0.18 -0.13 
[30] LOSS -0.09 0.08 -0.13 0.43 0.03 -0.01 0.09 -0.24 0.18 0.07 -0.20 0.03 -0.27 
[31] MA -0.03 0.11 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.29 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 0.25 
[32] ROA 0.07 -0.09 0.21 -0.16 -0.05 0.00 -0.12 0.35 -0.43 -0.03 0.32 -0.08 0.35 
[33] SEG 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.14 -0.05 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.15 
[34] SIZE 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.28 -0.24 -0.08 0.04 0.35 0.29 
[35] TENURE 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.20 -0.02 
[36] ABNRML_FEEt-1 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.11 
[37] ABNRML_FEE 0.00 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.21 0.13 0.12 
 
 
    [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] 
[1] LNAF 0.13 -0.38 -0.22 -0.28 0.31 0.36 0.25 0.87 0.30 0.36 0.41 
[2] FI 0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.13 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.26 0.02 
[3] ∆LNAF 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.35 0.10 
[4] SANC_CY 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.03 
[5] POST 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.13 -0.03 -0.11 0.04 -0.04 0.01 0.03 
[6] SANC_CY*POST 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.12 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 
[7] CPA_ACM -0.04 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.04 -0.14 -0.04 0.06 0.06 
[8] CPA_ACM*POST 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.04 
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.01 
[10] ∆SIZE 0.01 0.12 -0.02 -0.23 0.12 0.18 0.01 0.09 -0.07 -0.02 -0.15 
[11] ∆SEG -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.29 0.04 0.13 0.02 -0.03 
[12] ∆CATA 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.07 -0.17 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.04 
[13] ∆FOREIGN 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.06 
[14] ∆QUICK -0.02 0.21 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.00 
[15] ∆LEV 0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.11 -0.09 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03 
[16] ∆ROA 0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.13 -0.05 0.21 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 
[17] ∆LOSS -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.43 0.02 -0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.02 
[18] ∆GC -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 
[19] ∆MODOP -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 





    [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] 
[21] FOREIGN 0.11 -0.15 -0.14 -0.24 0.29 0.35 0.14 0.28 0.10 0.05 0.03 
[22] GC 0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.18 -0.07 -0.43 -0.05 -0.24 0.04 0.05 0.03 
[23] ICW -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 0.16 0.22 
[24] INVAR -0.20 -0.22 -0.23 -0.20 -0.02 0.32 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.21 
[25] LEVERAGE -0.05 -0.30 -0.18 0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.35 0.20 0.13 0.13 
[26] INTANG 0.09 -0.25 -0.13 -0.27 0.25 0.35 0.15 0.29 -0.02 0.11 0.12 
[27] LEVEL3 1.00 -0.03 0.14 -0.05 0.33 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 
[28] LIQUID -0.03 1.00 0.15 0.20 -0.12 -0.19 -0.17 -0.37 -0.06 -0.13 -0.17 
[29] LIT 0.14 0.15 1.00 0.31 -0.02 -0.29 -0.17 -0.24 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 
[30] LOSS -0.05 0.20 0.31 1.00 -0.15 -0.67 -0.19 -0.38 -0.13 0.02 0.00 
[31] MA 0.33 -0.12 -0.02 -0.15 1.00 0.16 0.09 0.26 0.05 0.04 0.08 
[32] ROA 0.03 -0.19 -0.29 -0.67 0.16 1.00 0.19 0.47 0.04 -0.07 -0.09 
[33] SEG 0.08 -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 0.09 0.19 1.00 0.24 0.13 0.01 -0.01 
[34] SIZE 0.15 -0.37 -0.24 -0.38 0.26 0.47 0.24 1.00 0.29 0.02 0.02 
[35] TENURE 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.13 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.29 1.00 0.08 0.10 
[36] ABNRML_FEEt-1 -0.07 -0.13 -0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.02 0.08 1.00 0.81 
[37] ABNRML_FEE -0.06 -0.17 -0.09 0.00 0.08 -0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.10 0.81 1.00 
This table displays the Pearson coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded  
coefficients are significant at the 5% level. The sample includes 1,242 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. None of 
the variance inflation factors on any of the variables exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to 
test for multicollinearity. 
 
Panel B-2: MSA sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]    
[1] LNAF 1.00 0.04 0.06 -0.11 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.05    
[2] FI 0.04 1.00 0.67 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.04 0.08    
[3] ∆LNAF 0.06 0.67 1.00 0.08 0.05 0.13 -0.01 0.02 0.08    
[4] SANC_CY -0.11 0.05 0.08 1.00 -0.04 0.65 0.05 0.00 0.44    
[5] POST 0.06 0.08 0.05 -0.04 1.00 0.26 -0.01 0.51 0.18    
[6] SANC_CY*POST -0.04 0.12 0.13 0.65 0.26 1.00 0.02 0.17 0.67    
[7] CPA_ACM -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.02 1.00 0.61 0.21    
[8] CPA_ACM*POST 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.51 0.17 0.61 1.00 0.35    
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST -0.05 0.08 0.08 0.44 0.18 0.67 0.21 0.35 1.00       
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level. The sample includes 1,804 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. None of the variance inflation factors on any of the 
variables exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity. 








Panel B-3: State sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]     
[1] LNAF 1.00 0.02 0.05 -0.09 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03     
[2] FI 0.02 1.00 0.65 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.08     
[3] ∆LNAF 0.05 0.65 1.00 0.07 0.03 0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.08     
[4] SANC_CY -0.09 0.05 0.07 1.00 0.01 0.64 0.03 0.02 0.42     
[5] POST 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.01 1.00 0.32 -0.02 0.54 0.21     
[6] SANC_CY*POST -0.02 0.11 0.11 0.64 0.32 1.00 0.01 0.19 0.66     
[7] CPA_ACM -0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 1.00 0.55 0.22     
[8] CPA_ACM*POST -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.54 0.19 0.55 1.00 0.39     
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST -0.03 0.08 0.08 0.42 0.21 0.66 0.22 0.39 1.00     
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level. The sample includes 1,858 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. None of the variance inflation factors on any of the 
variables exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity.    
 
Panel B-4: Regional sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]      
[1] LNAF 1.00 0.01 0.02 -0.10 0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.02     
[2] FI 0.01 1.00 0.64 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.03     
[3] ∆LNAF 0.02 0.64 1.00 0.02 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.02     
[4] SANC_CY -0.10 0.03 0.02 1.00 0.01 0.74 -0.01 -0.01 0.46     
[5] POST 0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 1.00 0.24 0.00 0.50 0.15     
[6] SANC_CY*POST -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.74 0.24 1.00 -0.02 0.10 0.62     
[7] CPA_ACM 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 1.00 0.65 0.19     
[8] CPA_ACM*POST 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.50 0.10 0.65 1.00 0.29     
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.46 0.15 0.62 0.19 0.29 1.00      
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients are  
significant at the 5% level. The sample includes 6,023 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. None of the variance inflation factors on any of the 
variables exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity.     















(Table 4: Panel B-5 continued) 
Panel B-5: National (firm) sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 
[1] LNAF 1.00 0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 
[2] FI 0.04 1.00 0.63 0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.19 0.00 -0.07 0.01 
[3] ∆LNAF 0.06 0.63 1.00 0.01 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.31 0.04 -0.09 0.03 
[4] SANC_CY -0.05 0.04 0.01 1.00 0.04 0.81 0.01 0.02 0.49 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
[5] POST 0.07 -0.06 -0.15 0.04 1.00 0.24 0.01 0.43 0.14 -0.16 -0.27 0.00 -0.04 
[6] SANC_CY*POST 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.81 0.24 1.00 0.01 0.11 0.60 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 
[7] CPA_ACM 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.72 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 
[8] CPA_ACM*POST 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.43 0.11 0.72 1.00 0.34 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.49 0.14 0.60 0.24 0.34 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
[10] ∆SIZE 0.01 0.19 0.31 0.01 -0.16 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 1.00 0.08 -0.09 0.04 
[11] ∆SEG -0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.27 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 -0.01 0.08 1.00 -0.01 0.02 
[12] ∆CATA -0.02 -0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 1.00 -0.02 
[13] ∆FOREIGN -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.02 1.00 
[14] ∆QUICK 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.16 -0.01 0.40 -0.01 
[15] ∆LEV 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.13 -0.01 
[16] ∆ROA 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.23 0.01 0.04 0.00 
[17] ∆LOSS 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 
[18] ∆GC -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
[19] ∆MODOP -0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.14 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 
[20] BUSY 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 
[21] FOREIGN 0.32 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.17 
[22] GC -0.17 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 
[23] ICW -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
[24] INVAR -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.11 0.07 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01 
[25] LEVERAGE 0.17 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 
[26] INTANG 0.33 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
[27] LEVEL3 0.15 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.22 0.07 -0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 
[28] LIQUID -0.33 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02 
[29] LIT -0.16 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 
[30] LOSS -0.25 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.22 -0.02 0.02 0.00 
[31] MA 0.19 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.13 -0.12 -0.12 0.00 
[32] ROA 0.30 0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.21 0.01 -0.05 0.01 
[33] SEG 0.14 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.15 -0.05 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.34 0.01 0.00 
[34] SIZE 0.84 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.08 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 
[35] TENURE 0.29 0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 
[36] ABNRML_FEEt-1 0.41 -0.23 -0.31 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.04 







(Table 4: Panel B-5 continued) 
    [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] 
[1] LNAF 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.32 -0.17 -0.02 -0.01 0.17 0.33 
[2] FI -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.01 
[3] ∆LNAF -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
[4] SANC_CY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
[5] POST 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.14 0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.03 
[6] SANC_CY*POST -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
[7] CPA_ACM 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.11 -0.05 0.05 
[8] CPA_ACM*POST 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.04 
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.01 
[10] ∆SIZE 0.16 0.00 0.23 -0.09 -0.11 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.14 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 0.04 
[11] ∆SEG -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 
[12] ∆CATA 0.40 -0.13 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.02 
[13] ∆FOREIGN -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.17 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
[14] ∆QUICK 1.00 -0.14 0.18 -0.06 -0.11 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00 
[15] ∆LEV -0.14 1.00 -0.22 0.15 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.02 -0.03 0.27 0.00 
[16] ∆ROA 0.18 -0.22 1.00 -0.43 -0.16 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.01 
[17] ∆LOSS -0.06 0.15 -0.43 1.00 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 
[18] ∆GC -0.11 0.10 -0.16 0.06 1.00 0.16 0.00 -0.01 0.48 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.02 
[19] ∆MODOP -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.16 1.00 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
[20] BUSY 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.21 0.13 -0.05 
[21] FOREIGN 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 1.00 -0.09 0.00 0.24 -0.11 0.27 
[22] GC -0.06 0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.48 0.09 0.03 -0.09 1.00 0.12 -0.06 0.13 -0.14 
[23] ICW -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.12 1.00 0.03 0.02 -0.01 
[24] INVAR 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.21 0.24 -0.06 0.03 1.00 -0.18 0.16 
[25] LEVERAGE -0.03 0.27 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.13 -0.11 0.13 0.02 -0.18 1.00 0.04 
[26] INTANG 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.27 -0.14 -0.01 0.16 0.04 1.00 
[27] LEVEL3 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.13 0.05 0.02 
[28] LIQUID 0.23 -0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.33 -0.16 
[29] LIT -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.15 0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.20 -0.01 
[30] LOSS -0.09 0.14 -0.19 0.46 0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.24 0.12 -0.09 0.08 -0.15 
[31] MA -0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.21 
[32] ROA 0.11 -0.16 0.32 -0.15 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 0.15 -0.42 -0.11 0.15 -0.09 0.23 
[33] SEG 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.09 -0.02 0.14 
[34] SIZE 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.12 -0.22 -0.11 -0.17 0.24 0.23 
[35] TENURE 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.13 -0.13 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 
[36] ABNRML_FEEt-1 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.09 








    [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] 
[1] LNAF 0.15 -0.33 -0.16 -0.25 0.19 0.30 0.14 0.84 0.29 0.41 0.46 
[2] FI 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.03 -0.23 0.04 
[3] ∆LNAF -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.31 0.13 
[4] SANC_CY 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.08 -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 0.00 
[5] POST 0.22 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.16 -0.03 -0.15 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
[6] SANC_CY*POST 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 
[7] CPA_ACM -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
[8] CPA_ACM*POST 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 
[9] CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
[10] ∆SIZE -0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.22 0.13 0.21 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.08 
[11] ∆SEG -0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.12 0.01 0.34 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 
[12] ∆CATA -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.02 -0.12 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.02 
[13] ∆FOREIGN -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.05 
[14] ∆QUICK -0.01 0.23 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 
[15] ∆LEV 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.14 0.08 -0.16 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
[16] ∆ROA 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.19 -0.02 0.32 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
[17] ∆LOSS 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.03 -0.15 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.05 
[18] ∆GC 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 
[19] ∆MODOP -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 
[20] BUSY 0.04 -0.03 -0.15 0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
[21] FOREIGN 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.08 0.19 0.15 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.01 -0.01 
[22] GC 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.24 -0.06 -0.42 -0.06 -0.22 -0.13 0.03 0.01 
[23] ICW -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.12 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 -0.11 -0.13 0.08 0.13 
[24] INVAR -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.15 0.09 -0.17 -0.01 0.05 0.06 
[25] LEVERAGE 0.05 -0.33 -0.20 0.08 0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.24 -0.01 0.04 0.04 
[26] INTANG 0.02 -0.16 -0.01 -0.15 0.21 0.23 0.14 0.23 0.04 0.09 0.09 
[27] LEVEL3 1.00 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.17 -0.03 -0.01 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.03 
[28] LIQUID -0.05 1.00 0.18 0.14 -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.36 -0.07 -0.11 -0.12 
[29] LIT 0.00 0.18 1.00 0.15 0.01 -0.18 -0.09 -0.25 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
[30] LOSS 0.01 0.14 0.15 1.00 -0.05 -0.63 -0.11 -0.37 -0.21 0.04 0.01 
[31] MA 0.17 -0.06 0.01 -0.05 1.00 0.08 -0.02 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.06 
[32] ROA -0.03 -0.13 -0.18 -0.63 0.08 1.00 0.11 0.42 0.18 -0.07 -0.10 
[33] SEG -0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.02 0.11 1.00 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.01 
[34] SIZE 0.17 -0.36 -0.25 -0.37 0.14 0.42 0.11 1.00 0.32 0.04 0.03 
[35] TENURE 0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.21 0.02 0.18 0.10 0.32 1.00 0.03 0.03 
[36] ABNRML_FEEt-1 0.03 -0.11 -0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.03 1.00 0.84 
[37] ABNRML_FEE 0.03 -0.12 -0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.10 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.84 1.00 






This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the  
diagonal. Bolded coefficients are significant at the 5% level. The sample includes 29,265 observations. Variables are defined 
in Appendix A. None of the variance inflation factors on any of the variables exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 
recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity. 
 
 
Panel C: Discretionary Accruals Tests 
Panel C-1:  City (office) sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
[1] |DACC| 1.00 0.36 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.08 -0.23 -0.11 0.06 0.16 0.04 -0.14 -0.30 -0.10 
[2] |DACCd| 0.36 1.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.16 -0.43 -0.28 0.14 -0.04 0.16 -0.19 -0.40 -0.22 
[3] SANC_CY -0.01 0.04 1.00 -0.04 0.63 -0.09 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 
[4] POST 0.01 0.00 -0.04 1.00 0.34 -0.01 0.14 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 
[5] SANC_CY*POST -0.02 0.04 0.63 0.34 1.00 -0.06 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.12 -0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.01 
[6] CLIENT_INFLUENCE 0.11 0.19 -0.09 -0.01 -0.06 1.00 0.04 -0.10 -0.24 -0.04 0.09 -0.09 -0.11 -0.24 -0.10 
[7] SHORT 0.08 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.04 1.00 -0.20 -0.12 -0.08 -0.02 -0.12 0.01 -0.14 0.07 
[8] AUDIT_FEE -0.23 -0.43 0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.10 -0.20 1.00 0.50 0.34 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 0.32 0.13 
[9] NON_AUDITFEE -0.11 -0.28 0.10 -0.02 0.08 -0.24 -0.12 0.50 1.00 0.09 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.17 0.14 
[10] EFFORT 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.08 0.34 0.09 1.00 -0.14 0.00 -0.17 -0.02 -0.03 
[11] GROWTH 0.16 -0.04 0.03 -0.11 -0.04 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.14 1.00 0.20 0.19 0.11 -0.02 
[12] MB 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.27 0.05 -0.14 
[13] BANKRUPTCY -0.14 -0.19 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.11 0.01 -0.10 -0.04 -0.17 0.19 0.27 1.00 0.46 0.06 
[14] CFO -0.30 -0.40 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.24 -0.14 0.32 0.17 -0.02 0.11 0.05 0.46 1.00 0.15 
[15] LAG_ACCRUALS -0.10 -0.22 -0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.10 0.07 0.13 0.14 -0.03 -0.02 -0.14 0.06 0.15 1.00 
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients 
are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 696 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Variance inflation factors do not exceed 
5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity, with the exception of AUDIT_FEE, EFFORT, and SIZE 
(SIZE not shown). 








Panel C-2: MSA sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
[1] |DACC| 1.00 0.39 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
[2] |DACCd| 0.39 1.00 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
[3] SANC_CY 0.00 0.05 1.00 -0.04 0.65 
[4] POST 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 1.00 0.27 
[5] SANC_CY*POST -0.01 0.05 0.65 0.27 1.00 
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal  
and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients 
are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 1,045 observations. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. Variance inflation factors do not exceed 
5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test 




Panel C-3: State sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
[1] |DACC| 1.00 0.37 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
[2] |DACCd| 0.37 1.00 0.05 0.01 0.04 
[3] SANC_CY -0.01 0.05 1.00 0.00 0.63 
[4] POST 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.32 
[5] SANC_CY*POST -0.02 0.04 0.63 0.32 1.00 
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal  
and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients 
are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 1,130 observations. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. Variance inflation factors do not exceed 
5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test 




Panel C-4: Regional sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
[1] |DACC| 1.00 0.35 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
[2] |DACCd| 0.35 1.00 0.04 -0.01 0.03 
[3] SANC_CY 0.02 0.04 1.00 0.01 0.74 
[4] POST -0.02 -0.01 0.01 1.00 0.23 
[5] SANC_CY*POST -0.01 0.03 0.74 0.23 1.00 
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal  
and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients 
are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 3,627 observations. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. Variance inflation factors do not exceed 
5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test 







(Table 4: Panel D-1 continued) 
Panel C-5: National (firm) sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
[1] |DACC| 1.00 0.32 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.18 -0.10 0.07 0.15 0.11 -0.02 -0.18 -0.09 
[2] |DACCd| 0.32 1.00 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.37 -0.24 0.10 0.02 0.08 -0.05 -0.37 -0.07 
[3] SANC_CY 0.01 0.05 1.00 0.05 0.82 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.01 
[4] POST -0.03 -0.01 0.05 1.00 0.24 0.02 0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.07 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 
[5] SANC_CY*POST -0.02 0.02 0.82 0.24 1.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 
[6] CLIENT_INFLUENCE 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.09 0.01 0.17 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 0.00 
[7] SHORT 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.21 1.00 -0.13 -0.10 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 0.00 
[8] AUDIT_FEE -0.18 -0.37 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.09 -0.13 1.00 0.50 0.46 -0.02 0.05 -0.15 0.16 0.05 
[9] NON_AUDITFEE -0.10 -0.24 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.10 0.50 1.00 0.16 0.02 0.09 -0.06 0.12 0.05 
[10] EFFORT 0.07 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.17 -0.02 0.46 0.16 1.00 -0.07 0.09 -0.10 -0.15 0.00 
[11] GROWTH 0.15 0.02 0.01 -0.15 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 1.00 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.01 
[12] MB 0.11 0.08 0.02 -0.07 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.16 1.00 0.27 0.11 -0.06 
[13] BANKRUPTCY -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.10 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.15 -0.06 -0.10 0.16 0.27 1.00 0.36 0.09 
[14] CFO -0.18 -0.37 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.06 0.16 0.12 -0.15 0.13 0.11 0.36 1.00 0.02 
[15] LAG_ACCRUALS -0.09 -0.07 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.09 0.02 1.00 
 This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients 
are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 16,257 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Variance inflation factors do not exceed 
5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity, with the exception of AUDIT_FEE and SIZE 
(SIZE not shown). 
 
Panel D: Pearson/Spearman Correlation Matrix for Restatement Test 
Panel D-1:  City (office) sample 
   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
[1] RESTATE 1.00 0.09 -0.10 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.18 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 
[2] SANC_CY 0.09 1.00 -0.05 0.63 -0.11 -0.03 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.09 
[3] POST -0.10 -0.05 1.00 0.31 0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.07 
[4] SANC_CY*POST 0.04 0.63 0.31 1.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.09 0.10 0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.04 -0.06 0.01 
[5] CLIENT_INFLUENCE 0.04 -0.11 0.02 -0.07 1.00 0.26 -0.04 -0.24 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.09 -0.12 0.02 
[6] SHORT -0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.26 1.00 -0.13 -0.16 -0.10 0.00 -0.12 0.05 -0.05 0.07 
[7] AUDIT_FEE 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.09 -0.04 -0.13 1.00 0.51 0.43 0.01 -0.06 -0.12 0.32 0.10 
[8] NON_AUDITFEE -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.10 -0.24 -0.16 0.51 1.00 0.13 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.16 0.09 
[9] EFFORT 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.10 0.43 0.13 1.00 -0.14 -0.03 -0.23 -0.03 -0.04 
[10] GROWTH 0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.14 1.00 0.23 0.29 0.05 -0.03 
[11] MB -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.09 -0.14 -0.12 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.23 1.00 0.29 -0.04 -0.15 





(Table 4: Panel D-3 continued) 
   [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
[12] BANKRUPTCY -0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.09 0.05 -0.12 -0.03 -0.23 0.29 0.29 1.00 0.29 0.04 
[13] CFO -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 -0.12 -0.05 0.32 0.16 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.29 1.00 0.06 
[14] LAG_ACCRUALS 0.00 -0.09 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.15 0.04 0.06 1.00 
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients 
are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 870 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Variance inflation factors do not exceed 
5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity, with the exception of AUDIT_FEE, EFFORT, and 
SIZE (SIZE not shown). 
 
 
Panel D-2: MSA, State & Regional samples 
    MSA   State   Regional 
    [1] [2] [3] [4]   [1] [2] [3] [4]   [1] [2] [3] [4] 
[1] RESTATE 1.00 0.08 -0.11 0.03  1.00 0.08 -0.10 0.03  1.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.01 
[2] SANC_CY 0.08 1.00 -0.05 0.63  0.08 1.00 -0.05 0.63  0.00 1.00 0.01 0.71 
[3] POST -0.11 -0.05 1.00 0.30  -0.10 -0.05 1.00 0.29  -0.09 0.01 1.00 0.28 
[4] SANC_CY*POST 0.03 0.63 0.30 1.00   0.03 0.63 0.29 1.00   -0.01 0.71 0.28 1.00 
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients are 
significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 906 observations in the MSA sample, 986 observations in the state sample and 3,168 observations in the 
regional sample. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Variance inflation factors do not exceed 5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy 
(1992) to test for multicollinearity, with the exception of the following: AUDIT_FEE and SIZE (neither shown) in the MSA sample and regional samples and 
AUDIT_FEE, EFFORT, SIZE, and ROA (none shown) in the state sample. 
 
Panel D-3: National (firm) sample 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
[1] RESTATE 1.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.13 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 
[2] SANC_CY 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.80 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 
[3] POST -0.08 0.06 1.00 0.26 -0.01 0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.16 -0.11 -0.10 -0.03 -0.06 
[4] SANC_CY*POST -0.01 0.80 0.26 1.00 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 
[5] CLIENT_INFLUENCE 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 0.17 -0.12 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00 
[6] SHORT 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.17 1.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.00 
[7] AUDIT_FEE -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.12 -0.10 1.00 0.48 0.49 -0.03 0.04 -0.16 0.15 0.06 
[8] NON_AUDITFEE 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.09 0.48 1.00 0.16 0.02 0.08 -0.06 0.12 0.06 
[9] EFFORT 0.13 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.49 0.16 1.00 -0.08 0.10 -0.09 -0.15 0.00 
[10] GROWTH 0.01 0.00 -0.16 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 1.00 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.00 





































    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] 
[12] BANKRUPTCY -0.04 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.06 -0.09 0.17 0.30 1.00 0.32 0.09 
[13] CFO -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.15 0.12 -0.15 0.16 0.13 0.32 1.00 0.00 
[14] LAG_ACCRUALS -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.09 0.00 1.00 
This table displays the Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation coefficients above the diagonal. Bolded coefficients 
are significant at the 5 percent level. The sample includes 19,517 observations. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Variance inflation factors do not exceed 
5, which is below the threshold of 10 recommended by Kennedy (1992) to test for multicollinearity, with the exception of AUDIT_FEE and 








5.2 Auditor Switches 
 Table 5, Panels A-1 through A-5 present logit regression results for the auditor 
switch(loss) and auditor switch(gain) analyses. The control variables in the city (office) sample 
are generally not significant, with the exception of GROWTH, |DACC|, MODOP, TENURE, and 
CASH. In the city (office), MSA and state samples, for the client gain analysis, the coefficient on 
SANC_CY is negative and significant (p < 0.05), indicating that in the pre-sanction period a 
switch to a sanctioned auditor was less likely than a switch to a non-sanctioned auditor. The 
variables of interest SANC_PY*POST (SANC_CY*POST) are not significant for any of the 
samples indicating that the sanctions against the audit partners didn’t influence clients to switch 
away from nor did the sanctions deter clients from switching to the audit firms affiliated with the 
sanctioned partners after the date the sanction was made public. In fact, in all samples, 
coefficients on the interaction variables SANC_PY*POST and SANC_CY*POST are insignificant 
indicating that the PCAOB sanction is perceived to have no informational value. Based on the 
results of this analysis, I do not find support for H1. Furthermore, the results of Table 5 show 
that having a CPA_ACM does not make a difference in regards to client losses or gains as the 
coefficients on CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST (CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST) at all levels are not 





Table 5: Auditor Switch Analysis 
Panel A: Switch Sample 
Panel A-1: City (office) Sample 
  Exp.   Loss   Gain   Loss   Gain   
Variable Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   
Intercept ? β0 1.498 0.284  1.523 0.095 * 1.508 0.269  2.594 0.049 ** 
SANC_PY/SANC_CY ? δ1 0.687 0.332  -0.764 0.002 *** 0.719 0.316  -1.646 <.0001 *** 
POST ? δ2 -0.704 0.531  0.510 0.183  -0.650 0.555  -1.134 0.225  
SANC_PY*POST/SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.375 0.696  0.231 0.736  -0.480 0.429  0.051 0.967  
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.112 0.467  0.152 0.444  -0.096 0.690  -0.136 0.543  
CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST ? δ5       1.371 0.229     
CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST ? δ5          0.643 0.368  
GROWTH + β1 0.688 0.005 *** 0.603 0.043 ** 0.726 0.002 *** 0.562 0.051 * 
|DACC| + β2 -4.236 0.015 ** -4.934 0.046 ** -4.036 0.015 ** -4.471 0.036 ** 
INVAR + β3 1.442 0.518  1.051 0.583  1.494 0.495  1.863 0.522  
GC + β4 2.248 0.124  2.047 0.307  2.193 0.107  1.799 0.331  
MODOP + β5 1.086 0.006 *** 0.836 0.028 ** 1.052 0.010 ** 1.029 0.018 ** 
ICW + β6 0.466 0.446  0.603 0.335  0.428 0.495  0.603 0.314  
TENURE ? β7 -0.366 <.0001 *** -0.385 <.0001 *** -0.363 <.0001 *** -0.372 <.0001 *** 
ROA - β8 -0.851 0.448  -0.687 0.674  -0.920 0.417  -0.839 0.556  
LOSS + β9 0.288 0.506  0.284 0.533  0.284 0.520  0.243 0.614  
LEVERAGE + β10 -1.775 0.315  -0.901 0.598  -1.839 0.300  -1.331 0.453  
∆LEV + β11 -1.470 0.643  -1.441 0.647  -1.368 0.676  -2.253 0.513  
CASH - β12 -2.124 0.009 *** -2.194 0.001 *** -2.048 0.010 ** -1.818 0.046 ** 
SIZE - β13 -0.021 0.887  -0.222 0.103  -0.023 0.872  -0.180 0.227  
∆SIZE + β14 -1.393 0.114  -1.107 0.128  -1.471 0.102  -1.200 0.100  
M_A + β15 -0.063 0.893  -0.119 0.684  -0.084 0.849  -0.307 0.558  
ABNRML_FEE + β16 0.119 0.817  0.089 0.845  0.101 0.845  -0.033 0.947  
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R2    0.1244   0.1154   0.1255   0.1266  
N       1,205     1,205     1,205     1,205   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The switching model is estimated by maximum likelihood as a logit regression. The dependent variable is SWITCH, which is equal to 1 if the client switched 
auditors and 0 otherwise. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. 









The model for the loss sample is: 
SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_PYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_PYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                     β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 +  
                     β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + 
                     YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    
The model for the gain sample is: 
SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                    β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + 
                    β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + 
                    YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t 
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST(CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST) are added to both models. See Appendix B for 
variable definitions. 



























Panel A-2: MSA Sample 
  Exp.   Loss   Gain   Loss   Gain   
Variable Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   
Intercept ? β0 0.649 0.681  1.290 0.438  0.698 0.655  1.290 0.435  
SANC_PY/SANC_CY ? δ1 0.901 0.153  -0.757 0.003 *** 0.932 0.146  -0.757 0.003 *** 
POST ? δ2 -0.465 0.575  -0.666 0.377  -0.423 0.604  -0.651 0.390  
SANC_PY*POST/SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.277 0.763  0.576 0.589  -0.261 0.756  0.284 0.837  
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.024 0.896  0.008 0.966  -0.111 0.648  -0.036 0.869  
CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST ? δ5       0.933 0.330     
CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST ? δ5          0.489 0.380  
GROWTH + β1 0.677 0.001 *** 0.616 0.010 ** 0.670 0.001 *** 0.618 0.009 *** 
|DACC| + β2 -3.267 0.002 *** -3.458 0.006 *** -3.065 0.003 *** -3.380 0.006 *** 
INVAR + β3 1.076 0.469  0.580 0.760  1.136 0.439  0.627 0.734  
GC + β4 1.385 0.152  1.136 0.248  1.379 0.141  1.137 0.247  
MODOP + β5 0.760 0.073 * 0.743 0.058 * 0.734 0.099 * 0.735 0.062 * 
ICW + β6 0.297 0.545  0.518 0.277  0.288 0.564  0.511 0.283  
TENURE ? β7 -0.292 <.0001 *** -0.296 <.0001 *** -0.291 <.0001 *** -0.295 <.0001 *** 
ROA - β8 0.293 0.755  0.339 0.749  0.316 0.728  0.343 0.743  
LOSS + β9 0.582 0.046 ** 0.559 0.042 ** 0.585 0.050 * 0.554 0.045 ** 
LEVERAGE + β10 -1.407 0.256  -1.120 0.341  -1.490 0.219  -1.146 0.327  
∆LEV + β11 -2.930 0.011 ** -3.231 0.010 ** -2.895 0.012 ** -3.196 0.011 ** 
CASH - β12 -1.929 0.001 *** -1.790 0.002 *** -1.898 0.001 *** -1.763 0.002 *** 
SIZE - β13 -0.075 0.658  -0.143 0.388  -0.075 0.660  -0.144 0.389  
∆SIZE + β14 -0.930 0.011 ** -0.828 0.008 *** -0.966 0.005 *** -0.847 0.005 *** 
M_A + β15 -0.167 0.606  -0.286 0.395  -0.164 0.604  -0.282 0.398  
ABNRML_FEE + β16 0.085 0.684  -0.033 0.892  0.078 0.690  -0.029 0.904  
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R2    0.0946   0.0914   0.0952   0.0915  
N       1,762     1,762     1,762     1,762   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The switching model is estimated by maximum likelihood as a logit regression. The dependent variable is SWITCH, which is equal to 1 if the client switched 
auditors and 0 otherwise. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
The model for the loss sample is: 
SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_PYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_PYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                     β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 +  
                     β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + 
                     YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    





The model for the gain sample is: 
SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                    β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + 
                    β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + 
                    YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t 
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST(CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST) are added to both models. See Appendix B for 
variable definitions. 
































Panel A-3: State Sample 
  Exp.   Loss   Gain   Loss   Gain   
Variable Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   
Intercept ? β0 1.791 0.207  2.607 0.064 * 1.775 0.211  2.574 0.071 * 
SANC_PY/SANC_CY ? δ1 0.629 0.290  -1.092 0.008 *** 0.627 0.293  -1.087 0.008 *** 
POST ? δ2 -0.063 0.934  -0.213 0.760  -0.064 0.932  -0.214 0.760  
SANC_PY*POST/SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.518 0.553  0.498 0.582  0.577 0.419  0.720 0.514  
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.013 0.926  -0.019 0.898  0.030 0.896  0.025 0.865  
CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST ? δ5       -0.106 0.919     
CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST ? δ5          -0.401 0.441  
GROWTH + β1 0.644 0.008 *** 0.585 0.025 ** 0.644 0.008 *** 0.579 0.027 ** 
|DACC| + β2 -0.888 0.459  -0.903 0.488  -0.909 0.488  -0.970 0.458  
INVAR + β3 -0.167 0.928  -0.580 0.772  -0.172 0.927  -0.606 0.762  
GC + β4 -12.362 <.0001 *** -13.011 <.0001 *** -12.391 <.0001 *** -13.040 <.0001 *** 
MODOP + β5 0.592 0.109  0.585 0.081 * 0.595 0.116  0.591 0.078 * 
ICW + β6 0.263 0.678  0.309 0.598  0.263 0.676  0.312 0.591  
TENURE ? β7 -0.347 <.0001 *** -0.359 <.0001 *** -0.348 <.0001 *** -0.359 <.0001 *** 
ROA - β8 0.470 0.713  0.396 0.788  0.471 0.713  0.404 0.784  
LOSS + β9 0.556 0.109  0.493 0.148  0.555 0.108  0.499 0.138  
LEVERAGE + β10 -0.623 0.668  -0.161 0.902  -0.612 0.667  -0.145 0.911  
∆LEV + β11 -1.639 0.420  -2.417 0.200  -1.635 0.418  -2.433 0.199  
CASH - β12 -2.244 0.008 *** -1.965 0.014 ** -2.240 0.008 *** -1.975 0.013 ** 
SIZE - β13 -0.115 0.367  -0.210 0.087 * -0.114 0.364  -0.207 0.094 * 
∆SIZE + β14 -0.948 0.128  -0.838 0.140  -0.950 0.123  -0.837 0.141  
M_A + β15 0.123 0.792  0.012 0.979  0.123 0.793  0.009 0.986  
ABNRML_FEE + β16 0.309 0.366  0.248 0.407  0.307 0.362  0.243 0.416  
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R2    0.0991   0.0980   0.0991   0.0981  
N       1,808     1,808     1,808     1,808   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The switching model is estimated by maximum likelihood as a logit regression. The dependent variable is SWITCH, which is equal to 1 if the client switched 
auditors and 0 otherwise. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
The model for the loss sample is: 
SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_PYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_PYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                     β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 +  
                     β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + 
                     YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    





SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                    β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + 
                    β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + 
                    YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t 
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST(CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST) are added to both models. See Appendix B for 
variable definitions. 

































Panel A-4: Regional Sample 
  Exp.   Loss   Gain   Loss   Gain   
Variable Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   
Intercept ? β0 0.705 0.178  0.677 0.313  0.762 0.114  0.648 0.348  
SANC_PY/SANC_CY ? δ1 -0.208 0.795  -0.068 0.810  -0.202 0.801  -0.072 0.797  
POST ? δ2 0.044 0.919  0.144 0.605  0.052 0.903  0.139 0.616  
SANC_PY*POST/SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.064 0.914  -0.323 0.584  -0.097 0.872  -0.202 0.693  
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.032 0.697  0.024 0.791  -0.006 0.959  0.051 0.533  
CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST ? δ5       0.385 0.508     
CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST ? δ5          -0.329 0.357  
GROWTH + β1 0.064 0.784  0.072 0.748  0.068 0.770  0.067 0.766  
|DACC| + β2 0.259 0.698  0.250 0.719  0.272 0.684  0.253 0.715  
INVAR + β3 -0.509 0.120  -0.539 0.119  -0.520 0.106  -0.534 0.126  
GC + β4 0.083 0.769  0.116 0.691  0.078 0.780  0.111 0.704  
MODOP + β5 0.507 <.0001 *** 0.496 <.0001 *** 0.503 <.0001 *** 0.500 0.002 *** 
ICW + β6 0.682 <.0001 *** 0.679 <.0001 *** 0.682 <.0001 *** 0.674 <.0001 *** 
TENURE ? β7 -0.349 <.0001 *** -0.352 <.0001 *** -0.349 <.0001 *** -0.353 <.0001 *** 
ROA - β8 0.265 0.530  0.288 0.480  0.271 0.524  0.283 0.489  
LOSS + β9 0.115 0.598  0.114 0.592  0.115 0.602  0.116 0.582  
LEVERAGE + β10 -0.055 0.840  -0.056 0.842  -0.053 0.847  -0.059 0.832  
∆LEV + β11 -1.474 0.089 * -1.468 0.084 * -1.465 0.089 * -1.481 0.082 * 
CASH - β12 -0.283 0.586  -0.277 0.600  -0.304 0.551  -0.264 0.624  
SIZE - β13 -0.012 0.829  -0.012 0.821  -0.012 0.827  -0.011 0.831  
∆SIZE + β14 -0.372 0.268  -0.380 0.261  -0.361 0.278  -0.386 0.262  
M_A + β15 -0.027 0.865  -0.044 0.757  -0.030 0.841  -0.046 0.750  
ABNRML_FEE + β16 0.151 0.329  0.151 0.380  0.149 0.329  0.152 0.382  
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R2    0.0831   0.0833   0.0832   0.0834  
N       5,826     5,826     5,826     5,826   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The switching model is estimated by maximum likelihood as a logit regression. The dependent variable is SWITCH, which is equal to 1 if the client switched 
auditors and 0 otherwise. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. 








The model for the loss sample is: 
SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_PYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_PYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                     β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 +  
                     β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + 
                     YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    
 
The model for the gain sample is: 
SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                    β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + 
                    β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + 
                    YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t 
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST(CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST) are added to both models. See Appendix B for 
variable definitions. 



























Panel A-5: National (firm) Sample 
  Exp.   Loss   Gain   Loss   Gain   
Variable Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   Coef. 
P-
Value   
Intercept ? β0 -0.288 0.681  -0.289 0.602  -0.287 0.681  -0.275 0.624  
SANC_PY/SANC_CY ? δ1 -0.419 0.593  -0.088 0.595  -0.419 0.594  -0.087 0.599  
POST ? δ2 -0.233 0.497  -0.044 0.862  -0.233 0.497  -0.043 0.863  
SANC_PY*POST/SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.780 0.108  -0.034 0.943  0.771 0.133  -0.132 0.746  
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.002 0.978  0.008 0.888  -0.002 0.983  -0.017 0.789  
CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST ? δ5       0.023 0.919     
CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST ? δ5          0.232 0.272  
GROWTH + β1 -0.087 0.264  -0.090 0.265  -0.087 0.266  -0.090 0.268  
|DACC| + β2 0.448 0.307  0.474 0.282  0.448 0.308  0.468 0.287  
INVAR + β3 -0.159 0.462  -0.172 0.419  -0.159 0.461  -0.171 0.421  
GC + β4 -0.041 0.804  -0.032 0.867  -0.041 0.804  -0.031 0.873  
MODOP + β5 0.259 0.007 *** 0.254 0.012 ** 0.259 0.007 *** 0.254 0.012 ** 
ICW + β6 0.671 <.0001 *** 0.660 <.0001 *** 0.671 <.0001 *** 0.659 <.0001 *** 
TENURE ? β7 -0.342 <.0001 *** -0.344 <.0001 *** -0.341 <.0001 *** -0.344 <.0001 *** 
ROA - β8 0.039 0.842  0.051 0.796  0.039 0.840  0.054 0.786  
LOSS + β9 0.205 0.050 * 0.204 0.041 ** 0.206 0.049 ** 0.204 0.040 ** 
LEVERAGE + β10 -0.442 0.002 *** -0.444 0.002 *** -0.442 0.002 *** -0.445 0.002 *** 
∆LEV + β11 -0.555 0.265  -0.560 0.262  -0.555 0.265  -0.564 0.259  
CASH - β12 -0.370 0.083 * -0.374 0.076 * -0.370 0.083 * -0.371 0.077 * 
SIZE - β13 0.003 0.926  0.002 0.951  0.003 0.926  0.002 0.954  
∆SIZE + β14 0.211 0.201  0.211 0.206  0.211 0.202  0.211 0.207  
M_A + β15 -0.044 0.720  -0.042 0.743  -0.044 0.722  -0.042 0.738  
ABNRML_FEE + β16 0.235 0.002 *** 0.238 0.003 *** 0.236 0.002 *** 0.239 0.003 *** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R2    0.0749   0.0743   0.0749   0.0743  
N       27,979     27,979     27,979     27,979   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The switching model is estimated by maximum likelihood as a logit regression. The dependent variable is SWITCH, which is equal to 1 if the client switched 
auditors and 0 otherwise. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
The model for the loss sample is: 
SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_PYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_PYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                     β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 +  
                     β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + 
                     SIC2_FE + YEAR_FE + Ɛi,t    





The model for the gain sample is: 
SWITCHi,t = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + 
                    β1GROWTHi,t-1 + β2|DACC|i,t-1 + β3INVARi,t-1 + β4GCi,t-1 + β5MODOPi,t-1 + β6ICWi,t-1 + β7TENUREi,t-1 + β8ROAi,t-1 + 
                    β9LOSSi,t-1 + β10LEVERAGEi,t-1 +  β11ΔLEVi,t-1 + β12CASHi,t-1 + β13SIZEi,t-1  +  β14ΔSIZEi,t-1 + β15M_Ai,t-1 + β16ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + 
                    SIC2_FE + YEAR_FE + Ɛi,t 




















5.3 Audit Fees 
Regression results for all samples for the audit fee tests are presented in Table 6, Panels 
A – C. Column 1 provides results without the CPA_ACM interaction variables and Column 2 
provides results with the CPA_ACM interaction variables. Additionally, as in Boone et al. 
(2015), Panel D provides a series of tests that analyze economic significance for the change in 
audit fees and fee increase models. Also shown, are the tests of economic significance for the 
same models with the CPA_ACM interaction variables included.  
For all tests (∆AF, LNAF, and FI), the control variables are generally significant with 
signs consistent with prior research and in accordance with economic intuition (Boone et al. 
2015; Johnson 2015).    ABNRML_FEEt-1, the control for fee pressure in the ∆AF analysis, loads 
with a negative and strongly significant coefficient for all samples. This suggests that companies 
with above (below) normal audit fees tend to receive fee reductions (increases) the following 
year. Referring to Column 1 in the ∆AF and LNAF tests, the coefficient on SANC_CY is negative 
and significant (p < 0.01) in the regional sample (∆AF and LNAF tests) and negative and 
significant (p < 0.10) in the MSA sample (LNAF test only) indicating that sanctioned auditors in 
these samples, during the pre-sanction period experienced fee reductions relative to non-
sanctioned auditors. However, this result is not consistent in any of the other samples nor in the 
FI test. With the addition of the CPA_ACM interaction variables, the coefficient on POST is 
positive and significant in the state sample (column 2) for the ∆AF and LNAF tests, indicating 
that fee growth rates increased among non-sanctioned audit firms during the post-sanction 
period. However, this result is not consistent with any of the other samples nor with the FI 
analysis. At the national (firm) level in the ∆AF and FI tests, the coefficients on POST are 
negative and significant, with and without the CPA_ACM interaction variables, indicating that at 





sanction period. Coefficients are also negative and statistically significant on the city (office) 
sample (LNAF test) and the regional sample (FI test). However, these results are not consistent 
across all samples and/or all tests. 
The coefficient on SANC_CY*POST is positive and significant for the city (office), MSA, 
and regional sample for all tests indicating that sanctioned auditors fee growth rates, relative to 
non-sanctioned auditors, increased after the sanction was disclosed by the PCAOB. Furthermore, 
the coefficient on SANC_CY*POST is positive and statistically significant for the state and 
national (firm) samples in the LNAF and FI tests. Turning to Column 2 and the addition of the 
CPA_ACM interaction variables, there appears to be no association between the change in audit 
fees after a PCAOB disciplinary order has been made public and having a CPA serve on the 
audit committee as the CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY is not significant for any of the samples in 















Table 6: Audit Fee Analysis 
Panel A:  Change in Audit Fee Analysis 
Panel A-1: City (office) and MSA samples 
      City (office) Sample MSA Sample 
      1 2 1 2 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   
Intercept ? β0 0.179 <.0001 *** 0.174 <.0001 *** 0.169 <.0001 *** 0.164 <.0001 *** 
SANC_CY ? δ1 0.003 0.926  0.002 0.935  -0.003 0.887  -0.004 0.864  
POST ? δ2 0.015 0.523  0.025 0.468  0.008 0.572  0.012 0.500  
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.071 0.024 ** 0.079 0.006 *** 0.063 0.076 * 0.077 0.018 ** 
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.014 0.012 ** 0.026 0.169  0.011 0.378  0.017 0.227  
CPA_ACM*POST ? δ5    -0.021 0.434     -0.008 0.605  
CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY ? δ6    -0.019 0.327     -0.028 0.170  
∆SIZE + β1 0.286 <.0001 *** 0.286 <.0001 *** 0.268 <.0001 *** 0.268 <.0001 *** 
∆FOREIGN + β2 0.073 0.064 * 0.072 0.061 * 0.063 0.043 ** 0.063 0.043 ** 
∆GC + β3 0.092 0.140  0.093 0.143  0.053 0.113  0.054 0.111  
∆MODOP + β4 0.032 0.039 ** 0.032 0.040 ** 0.034 0.002 *** 0.033 0.002 *** 
∆LOSS + β5 0.022 0.013 ** 0.022 0.017 ** 0.025 0.010 ** 0.025 0.012 ** 
∆ROA - β6 -0.199 0.012 ** -0.199 0.013 ** -0.197 0.005 *** -0.197 0.005 *** 
∆LEV + β7 0.105 0.302  0.104 0.313  0.080 0.211  0.079 0.222  
∆SEG + β8 0.023 0.314  0.022 0.315  0.029 0.128  0.029 0.124  
∆QUICK - β9 0.001 0.906  0.001 0.900  0.000 0.993  0.000 0.986  
∆CATA + β10 -0.191 0.022 ** -0.194 0.022 ** -0.240 0.002 *** -0.241 0.002 *** 
ABNRML_FEEt-1 - β11 -0.191 <.0001 *** -0.191 <.0001 *** -0.152 <.0001 *** -0.152 <.0001 *** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2    0.2727   0.2724   0.2518   0.2517  
N       1,242     1,242     1,804     1,804   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The change in audit fee is estimated as an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is ∆AF. ∆ represents a change in a variable relative to its 
value in the previous year. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
The model for the change in audit fee analysis is: 
∆AF = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + β1∆SIZEi,t + β2∆FOREIGNi,t + β3∆GCi,t  +β4∆MODOPi,t   + β5∆LOSSi,t + 
β6∆ROAi,t + β7∆LEVi,t + β8∆SEGi,t +  β9∆QUICKi,t  + β10∆CATAi,t  + β11∆ABNRML_FEEi,t-1   + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST(CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST) are added to the model. See Appendix B for variable 
descriptions. 





Panel A-2:  State and regional samples 
      State Sample Regional Sample 
      1 2 1 2 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   
Intercept ? β0 0.178 <.0001 *** 0.173 0.000 *** 0.212 <.0001 *** 0.213 <.0001 *** 
SANC_CY ? δ1 0.004 0.802  0.004 0.795  -0.022 <.0001 *** -0.022 <.0001 *** 
POST ? δ2 0.022 0.162  0.038 0.056 * -0.010 0.157  -0.013 0.071 * 
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.046 0.150  0.039 0.281  0.044 <.0001 *** 0.043 0.005 *** 
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.013 0.109  0.028 0.032 ** 0.002 0.711  -0.002 0.821  
CPA_ACM*POST ? δ5    -0.036 0.004 ***    0.006 0.365  
CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY ? δ6    0.015 0.416     0.003 0.806  
∆SIZE + β1 0.291 <.0001 *** 0.290 0.000 *** 0.295 <.0001 *** 0.295 <.0001 *** 
∆FOREIGN + β2 0.064 0.132  0.063 0.139  0.056 <.0001 *** 0.056 <.0001 *** 
∆GC + β3 0.035 0.307  0.034 0.332  -0.001 0.987  0.000 0.990  
∆MODOP + β4 0.019 0.053 * 0.019 0.054 * 0.035 <.0001 *** 0.035 <.0001 *** 
∆LOSS + β5 0.025 0.013 ** 0.025 0.013 ** 0.024 0.003 *** 0.024 0.003 *** 
∆ROA - β6 -0.157 0.025 ** -0.156 0.025 ** -0.117 0.001 *** -0.117 0.001 *** 
∆LEV + β7 0.195 0.061 * 0.200 0.057 * 0.086 0.064 * 0.085 0.065 * 
∆SEG + β8 0.022 0.129  0.021 0.153  0.009 0.319  0.009 0.312  
∆QUICK - β9 -0.008 0.081 * -0.007 0.090 * -0.007 0.026 ** -0.007 0.026 ** 
∆CATA + β10 -0.233 <.0001 *** -0.242 0.000 *** -0.180 0.003 *** -0.180 0.003 *** 
ABNRML_FEEt-1 - β11 -0.165 <.0001 *** -0.165 0.000 *** -0.158 <.0001 *** -0.158 <.0001 *** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2    0.2654   0.2892   0.2457   0.2413  
N       1,858     1,858     6,023     6,023   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The change in audit fee is estimated as an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is ∆AF. ∆ represents a change in a variable relative to its 
value in the previous year. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
The model for the change in audit fee analysis is: 
∆AF = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + β1∆SIZEi,t + β2∆FOREIGNi,t + β3∆GCi,t  +β4∆MODOPi,t   + β5∆LOSSi,t + 
β6∆ROAi,t + β7∆LEVi,t + β8∆SEGi,t +  β9∆QUICKi,t  + β10∆CATAi,t  + β11∆ABNRML_FEEi,t-1  + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST(CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST) are added to the model. See Appendix B for variable 
descriptions. 








Panel A-3:  National (firm) sample 
      National (firm) Sample 
      1 2 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   
Intercept ? β0 0.184 <.0001 *** 0.188 <.0001 *** 
SANC_CY ? δ1 0.007 0.282  0.008 0.249  
POST ? δ2 -0.034 0.059 * -0.041 0.008 *** 
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.004 0.609  -0.001 0.832  
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.003 0.424  -0.010 0.241  
CPA_ACM*POST ? δ5    0.020 0.018  
CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY ? δ6    0.012 0.307  
∆SIZE + β1 0.345 <.0001 *** 0.344 <.0001 *** 
∆FOREIGN + β2 0.045 <.0001 *** 0.045 <.0001 *** 
∆GC + β3 0.032 0.013 ** 0.033 0.012 ** 
∆MODOP + β4 0.017 0.001 *** 0.017 0.001 *** 
∆LOSS + β5 0.029 <.0001 *** 0.029 <.0001 *** 
∆ROA - β6 -0.149 <.0001 *** -0.149 <.0001 *** 
∆LEV + β7 0.048 0.002 *** 0.048 0.002 *** 
∆SEG + β8 0.009 0.083 * 0.009 0.075 * 
∆QUICK - β9 -0.007 <.0001 *** -0.007 <.0001 *** 
∆CATA + β10 -0.090 0.002 *** -0.090 0.002 *** 
ABNRML_FEEt-1 - β11 -0.165 <.0001 *** -0.165 <.0001 *** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2    0.2435   0.2435  
N       29,265     29,265   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The change in audit fee is estimated as an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is ∆AF. ∆ represents a change in a variable relative to its 
value in the previous year. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
The model for the change in audit fee analysis is: 
∆AF = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + β1∆SIZEi,t + β2∆FOREIGNi,t + β3∆GCi,t  +β4∆MODOPi,t   + β5∆LOSSi,t + 
β6∆ROAi,t + β7∆LEVi,t + β8∆SEGi,t + β9∆QUICKi,t  + β10∆CATAi,t  + β11∆ABNRML_FEEi,t-1   + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*SANC_PY*POST(CPA_ACM*SANC_CY*POST) are added to the model. See Appendix B for variable 
descriptions. 








Panel B: LNAF Analysis 
Panel B-1: City (office) and MSA samples 
     City (office)  MSA  
      1 2 1 2 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   
Intercept ? β0 9.963 <.0001 *** 9.960 <.0001 *** 10.017 <.0001 *** 10.009 <.0001 *** 
SANC_CY ? δ1 -0.144 0.106  -0.144 0.105  -0.156 0.076 * -0.157 0.076 * 
POST ? δ2 -0.071 0.020 ** -0.071 0.021 ** -0.063 0.101  -0.054 0.173  
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.141 0.039 ** 0.156 0.017 ** 0.137 0.029 ** 0.165 0.009 *** 
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.072 0.005 *** 0.075 0.004 *** 0.094 0.015 ** 0.109 0.005 *** 
CPA_ACM*POST ? δ5    -0.028 0.476     -0.020 0.485  
CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY ? δ6    -0.016 0.788     -0.057 0.329  
SIZE + β1 0.505 <.0001 *** 0.505 <.0001 *** 0.523 <.0001 *** 0.523 <.0001 *** 
M_A + β2 0.045 0.115  0.045 0.112  0.015 0.547  0.016 0.533  
FOREIGN + β3 0.318 <.0001 *** 0.318 <.0001 *** 0.281 <.0001 *** 0.281 <.0001 *** 
SEG + β4 -0.008 0.649  -0.008 0.652  -0.005 0.831  -0.006 0.828  
LEVEL3 + β5 -0.055 0.125  -0.055 0.123  0.002 0.958  0.001 0.971  
INTANG + β6 0.149 0.223  0.147 0.232  0.127 0.184  0.126 0.197  
INVAR + β7 0.905 <.0001 *** 0.905 <.0001 *** 0.740 0.002 *** 0.738 0.003 *** 
GC + β8 0.099 0.504  0.099 0.504  0.105 0.339  0.106 0.330  
ICW - β9 0.415 <.0001 *** 0.414 <.0001 *** 0.399 <.0001 *** 0.397 <.0001 *** 
ROA + β10 -0.765 <.0001 *** -0.765 <.0001 *** -0.749 <.0001 *** -0.748 <.0001 *** 
LEVERAGE + β11 0.121 0.545  0.122 0.540  -0.014 0.895  -0.013 0.905  
LIT + β12 -0.152 0.014 ** -0.152 0.013 ** -0.210 0.051 * -0.211 0.050 ** 
LOSS - β13 0.040 0.143  0.040 0.141  0.080 0.002 *** 0.081 0.002 *** 
LIQUID + β14 -0.010 0.437  -0.010 0.437  -0.021 0.076 * -0.021 0.077 * 
BUSY + β15 0.092 0.111  0.091 0.109  0.100 0.069 * 0.099 0.065 * 
TENURE ? β16 0.014 0.073 * 0.014 0.072 * 0.009 0.114  0.009 0.110  
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2    0.8744   0.8743   0.8699   0.8699  
N       1,242     1,242     1,804     1,804   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The log of audit fees (LNAF) is estimated as an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is the log of audit fees (LNAF). Standard errors control 
for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects.  








The model for the log of audit fees analysis is: 
LNAF = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + β1SIZEi,t + β2M_Ai,t + β3FOREIGNi,t + β4SEGi,t + β5LEVEL3i,t + 
β6INTANGi,t   + β7INVARi,t + β8GCi,t + β9ICWi,t + β10ROAi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12LITi,t  + β13LOSSi,t + β14LIQUIDi,t  +β15BUSYi,t  + β16TENUREi,t  + YEAR_FE + 
SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t   
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*POST and CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY are added to the model. 
See Appendix B for variable descriptions. 






































Panel B-2: State and regional samples 
      State  Regional  
      1 2 1 2 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   
Intercept ? β0 10.032 <.0001 *** 10.023 <.0001 *** 10.038 <.0001 *** 10.038 <.0001 *** 
SANC_CY ? δ1 -0.080 0.303  -0.080 0.302  -0.087 <.0001 *** -0.087 <.0001 *** 
POST ? δ2 0.043 0.150  0.069 0.063 * -0.009 0.760  -0.010 0.804  
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.065 0.093 * 0.057 0.276  0.095 <.0001 *** 0.100 <.0001 *** 
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.078 0.005 *** 0.102 0.001 *** 0.058 0.018 ** 0.058 0.020 ** 
CPA_ACM*POST ? δ5    -0.056 0.103     0.001 0.969  
CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY ? δ6    0.020 0.819     -0.011 0.790  
SIZE + β1 0.517 <.0001 *** 0.517 <.0001 *** 0.539 <.0001 *** 0.539 <.0001 *** 
M_A + β2 0.042 0.155  0.044 0.141  0.008 0.685  0.008 0.683  
FOREIGN + β3 0.267 0.001 *** 0.267 0.001 *** 0.278 <.0001 *** 0.278 <.0001 *** 
SEG + β4 0.017 0.598  0.017 0.600  0.032 0.028 ** 0.032 0.027 ** 
LEVEL3 + β5 0.000 0.998  -0.001 0.978  0.027 0.190  0.027 0.187  
INTANG + β6 0.109 0.127  0.112 0.130  0.160 0.006 *** 0.160 0.006 *** 
INVAR + β7 0.902 <.0001 *** 0.898 <.0001 *** 0.642 <.0001 *** 0.642 <.0001 *** 
GC + β8 -0.056 0.493  -0.055 0.499  0.007 0.915  0.007 0.915  
ICW - β9 0.397 <.0001 *** 0.396 <.0001 *** 0.264 <.0001 *** 0.264 <.0001 *** 
ROA + β10 -0.727 <.0001 *** -0.728 <.0001 *** -0.625 <.0001 *** -0.625 <.0001 *** 
LEVERAGE + β11 0.002 0.984  0.002 0.983  0.012 0.866  0.012 0.865  
LIT + β12 -0.025 0.783  -0.026 0.776  -0.087 0.150  -0.087 0.149  
LOSS - β13 0.062 0.054 * 0.063 0.056 * 0.084 0.002 *** 0.084 0.002 *** 
LIQUID + β14 -0.017 0.193  -0.017 0.193  -0.015 0.060 * -0.015 0.063 * 
BUSY + β15 0.087 0.069 * 0.087 0.061 * 0.096 0.001 *** 0.096 0.001 *** 
TENURE ? β16 0.011 0.205  0.011 0.196  0.003 0.432  0.003 0.433  
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2    0.8531   0.8530   0.8667   0.8667  
N       1,858     1,858     6,023     6,023   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The log of audit fees (LNAF) is estimated as an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is the log of audit fees (LNAF). Standard errors control 
for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects.  







The model for the log of audit fees analysis is: 
LNAF = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t  + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + β1SIZEi,t + β2M_Ai,t + β3FOREIGNi,t +  β4SEGi,t + β5LEVEL3i,t + 
β6INTANGi,t   + β7INVARi,t+  β8GCi,t + β9ICWi,t + β10ROAi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t +  β12LITi,t  + β13LOSSi,t + β14LIQUIDi,t  +β15BUSYi,t  + β16TENUREi,t  + YEAR_FE 
+ SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t   
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*POST and CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY are added to the model. 
See Appendix B for variable descriptions. 





































Panel B-3: National (firm) sample 
      National (firm)  
      1 2 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef. P-value   Coef. P-value   
Intercept ? β0 9.779 <.0001 *** 9.774 <.0001 *** 
SANC_CY ? δ1 0.025 0.361  0.025 0.369  
POST ? δ2 0.014 0.813  0.021 0.737  
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 -0.015 0.172  -0.008 0.452  
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.070 <.0001 *** 0.084 <.0001 *** 
CPA_ACM*POST ? δ5    -0.019 0.045  
CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY ? δ6    -0.016 0.303  
SIZE + β1 0.520 <.0001 *** 0.520 <.0001 *** 
M_A + β2 0.052 <.0001 *** 0.053 <.0001 *** 
FOREIGN + β3 0.285 <.0001 *** 0.285 <.0001 *** 
SEG + β4 0.034 <.0001 *** 0.034 <.0001 *** 
LEVEL3 + β5 0.047 <.0001 *** 0.047 <.0001 *** 
INTANG + β6 0.145 <.0001 *** 0.145 <.0001 *** 
INVAR + β7 0.606 <.0001 *** 0.606 <.0001 *** 
GC + β8 0.080 0.173  0.080 0.176  
ICW - β9 0.280 <.0001 *** 0.280 <.0001 *** 
ROA + β10 -0.543 <.0001 *** -0.544 <.0001 *** 
LEVERAGE + β11 -0.070 0.220  -0.069 0.222  
LIT + β12 -0.021 0.371  -0.022 0.366  
LOSS - β13 0.096 <.0001 *** 0.096 <.0001 *** 
LIQUID + β14 -0.018 <.0001 *** -0.018 <.0001 *** 
BUSY + β15 -0.005 0.846  -0.005 0.842  
TENURE ? β16 0.007 0.007 *** 0.007 0.007 *** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2    0.8107   0.8107  
N       29,265     29,265   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The log of audit fees (LNAF) is estimated as an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is the log of audit fees (LNAF). Standard errors control 
for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects.  






The model for the log of audit fees analysis is: 
LNAF = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t  + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + β1SIZEi,t + β2M_Ai,t + β3FOREIGNi,t +  β4SEGi,t + β5LEVEL3i,t + 
β6INTANGi,t   + β7INVARi,t+  β8GCi,t + β9ICWi,t + β10ROAi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t +  β12LITi,t  + β13LOSSi,t + β14LIQUIDi,t  +β15BUSYi,t  + β16TENUREi,t  + YEAR_FE 
+ SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t   
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*POST and CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY are added to the model. 
See Appendix B for variable descriptions. 





































(Table 6 continued) 
 
Panel C: Fee Increase Analysis 
Panel C-1: City (office) and MSA samples 
      City (office)  MSA  
      1 2 1 2 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   
Intercept ? β0 0.070 0.904  0.026 0.964  0.171 0.712  0.164 0.727  
SANC_CY ? δ1 0.045 0.888  0.044 0.887  0.012 0.974  0.011 0.977  
POST ? δ2 0.215 0.301  0.346 0.172  0.049 0.743  0.082 0.585  
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.837 0.001 *** 0.788 0.014 ** 0.792 0.003 *** 0.756 0.014 ** 
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.093 0.323  0.224 0.069 * -0.022 0.776  0.010 0.875  
CPA_ACM*POST ? δ5    -0.284 0.149     -0.074 0.633  
CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY ? δ6    0.096 0.798     0.082 0.825  
SIZE + β1 0.081 0.217  0.081 0.214  0.029 0.551  0.029 0.550  
M_A + β2 0.628 <.0001 *** 0.631 0.000 *** 0.612 <.0001 *** 0.613 <.0001 *** 
FOREIGN + β3 -0.285 0.006 *** -0.279 0.006 *** -0.195 0.010 *** -0.193 0.013 ** 
SEG + β4 -0.104 0.126  -0.107 0.120  -0.105 0.103  -0.105 0.106  
LEVEL3 + β5 0.126 0.018 ** 0.123 0.034 ** 0.098 0.280  0.099 0.282  
INTANG + β6 -0.292 0.006 *** -0.272 0.023 ** -0.220 0.082 * -0.214 0.097 * 
INVAR + β7 -0.295 0.634  -0.307 0.626  -0.298 0.506  -0.303 0.497  
GC + β8 -0.823 0.136  -0.810 0.149  -0.382 0.119  -0.382 0.123  
ICW - β9 0.455 0.086 * 0.455 0.090 * 0.153 0.634  0.153 0.635  
ROA + β10 0.260 0.698  0.264 0.695  0.453 0.282  0.452 0.286  
LEVERAGE + β11 -0.382 0.382  -0.396 0.384  -0.120 0.620  -0.123 0.620  
LIT + β12 0.197 0.502  0.202 0.471  0.520 <.0001 *** 0.519 <.0001 *** 
LOSS - β13 -0.275 0.032 ** -0.269 0.047 ** -0.382 0.002 *** -0.381 0.003 *** 
LIQUID + β14 -0.003 0.920  -0.003 0.923  0.006 0.821  0.006 0.817  
BUSY + β15 0.082 0.631  0.087 0.618  0.061 0.722  0.062 0.720  
TENURE + β16 -0.032 0.177  -0.032 0.177  -0.011 0.562  -0.011 0.565  
ABNRML_FEE ? β17 0.161 0.558  0.159 0.570  0.134 0.231  0.134 0.237  
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes  0.159 0.57   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R2    0.1312   0.1312   0.111   0.111  
N       1,242     1,242     1,804     1,804   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
Fee increase is estimated by maximum likelihood as a logit regression. The dependent variable is fee increase (FI) which is 1 if there was a fee increase from one 






The model for the fee increase analysis is: 
FI = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + β1SIZEi,t + β2M_Ai,t + β3FOREIGNi,t + β4SEGi,t + β5LEVEL3i,t + β6INTANGi,t   + 
β7INVARi,t + β8GCi,t + β9ICWi,t + β10ROAi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12LITi,t  + β13LOSSi,t + β14LIQUIDi,t  + β15BUSYi,t  + β16TENUREi,t  + β17ABNRML_FEEi,t  
YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*POST and CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY are added to the model. 
See Appendix B for variable descriptions. 






































Panel C-2: State and regional samples 
      State  Regional  
      1 2 1 2 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   
Intercept ? β0 0.139 0.843  0.098 0.888  0.397 0.540  0.408 0.525  
SANC_CY ? δ1 0.050 0.872  0.051 0.868  0.032 0.795  0.031 0.799  
POST ? δ2 0.093 0.492  0.261 0.126  -0.103 0.024 ** -0.129 0.019 ** 
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.557 0.037 ** 0.439 0.118  0.217 0.035 ** 0.225 0.031 ** 
CPA_ACM ? δ4 0.102 0.160  0.239 0.011 ** -0.005 0.927  -0.034 0.538  
CPA_ACM*POST ? δ5    -0.365 <.0001 ***    0.055 0.483  
CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY ? δ6    0.280 0.085 *    -0.017 0.884  
SIZE + β1 -0.011 0.812  -0.011 0.801  -0.034 0.182  -0.034 0.183  
M_A + β2 0.606 <.0001 *** 0.620 0.000 *** 0.499 <.0001 *** 0.498 <.0001 *** 
FOREIGN + β3 -0.106 0.500  -0.105 0.503  -0.100 0.306  -0.101 0.303  
SEG + β4 -0.057 0.299  -0.058 0.314  -0.036 0.297  -0.036 0.295  
LEVEL3 + β5 0.141 0.175  0.137 0.197  0.076 0.049 ** 0.075 0.049 ** 
INTANG + β6 -0.170 0.286  -0.148 0.357  -0.055 0.562  -0.055 0.561  
INVAR + β7 -0.390 0.383  -0.413 0.363  -0.349 0.014 ** -0.349 0.014 ** 
GC + β8 -0.147 0.630  -0.144 0.643  -0.120 0.332  -0.117 0.339  
ICW - β9 0.353 0.193  0.352 0.205  0.413 <.0001 *** 0.414 <.0001 *** 
ROA + β10 0.159 0.788  0.144 0.809  0.522 0.001 *** 0.522 0.001 *** 
LEVERAGE + β11 -0.151 0.477  -0.157 0.459  -0.297 0.003 *** -0.297 0.003 *** 
LIT + β12 0.427 <.0001 *** 0.421 0.000 *** 0.322 0.002 *** 0.322 0.002 *** 
LOSS - β13 -0.422 0.001 *** -0.419 0.002 *** -0.167 0.039 ** -0.168 0.038 ** 
LIQUID + β14 -0.004 0.849  -0.004 0.831  -0.001 0.944  -0.001 0.954  
BUSY + β15 -0.075 0.684  -0.072 0.696  -0.006 0.930  -0.006 0.927  
TENURE + β16 -0.014 0.430  -0.014 0.457  0.013 0.220  0.013 0.224  
ABNRML_FEE ? β17 0.052 0.726  0.045 0.759  0.026 0.742  0.026 0.742  
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R2    0.101   0.101   0.067   0.067  
N       1,858     1,858     6,023     6,023   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
Fee increase is estimated by maximum likelihood as a logit regression. The dependent variable is fee increase (FI) which is 1 if there was a fee increase from one 
year to the next and 0 otherwise. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects.  
The model for the fee increase analysis is:   





FI = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + β1SIZEi,t + β2M_Ai,t + β3FOREIGNi,t + β4SEGi,t + β5LEVEL3i,t + β6INTANGi,t   + 
β7INVARi,t + β8GCi,t + β9ICWi,t + β10ROAi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12LITi,t  + β13LOSSi,t + β14LIQUIDi,t  + β15BUSYi,t  + β16TENUREi,t  + β17ABNRML_FEEi,t  + 
YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*POST and CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY are added to the model. 
See Appendix B for variable descriptions. 

































Panel C-3: National (firm) sample 
      National (firm)  
      1 2 
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   
Intercept ? β0 0.549 0.008 *** 0.592 0.004 *** 
SANC_CY ? δ1 -0.008 0.874  -0.004 0.931  
POST ? δ2 -0.319 0.001 *** -0.384 <.0001 *** 
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.194 0.046 ** 0.167 0.060 * 
CPA_ACM ? δ4 -0.049 <.0001 *** -0.173 <.0001 *** 
CPA_ACM*POST ? δ5    0.192 0.032  
CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY ? δ6    0.056 0.433  
SIZE + β1 0.007 0.434  0.007 0.437  
M_A + β2 0.445 <.0001 *** 0.442 <.0001 *** 
FOREIGN + β3 -0.055 0.160  -0.057 0.151  
SEG + β4 -0.021 0.139  -0.022 0.145  
LEVEL3 + β5 -0.006 0.830  -0.004 0.896  
INTANG + β6 -0.074 0.048 ** -0.072 0.057 * 
INVAR + β7 -0.159 0.260  -0.159 0.256  
GC + β8 -0.090 0.248  -0.086 0.272  
ICW - β9 0.316 <.0001 *** 0.319 <.0001 *** 
ROA + β10 0.227 <.0001 *** 0.231 <.0001 *** 
LEVERAGE + β11 -0.278 <.0001 *** -0.280 <.0001 *** 
LIT + β12 0.129 0.008 *** 0.131 <.0001 *** 
LOSS - β13 -0.167 <.0001 *** -0.166 <.0001 *** 
LIQUID + β14 0.002 0.508  0.002 0.503  
BUSY + β15 -0.041 0.327  -0.040 0.342  
TENURE + β16 0.010 0.081 * 0.010 0.082 * 
ABNRML_FEE ? β17 0.137 <.0001 *** 0.138 <.0001 *** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes  
R2    0.05   0.05  
N       29,265     29,265   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
Fee increase is estimated by maximum likelihood as a logit regression. The dependent variable is fee increase (FI) which is 1 if there was a fee increase from one 
year to the next and 0 otherwise. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects.  








The model for the fee increase analysis is: 
FI = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + δ4CPA_ACMi,t  + β1SIZEi,t + β2M_Ai,t + β3FOREIGNi,t + β4SEGi,t + β5LEVEL3i,t + β6INTANGi,t   + 
β7INVARi,t + β8GCi,t + β9ICWi,t + β10ROAi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12LITi,t  + β13LOSSi,t + β14LIQUIDi,t  + β15BUSYi,t  + β16TENUREi,t  + β17ABNRML_FEEi,t  
YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    
To test Hypothesis 4, the interactive variables CPA_ACM*POST and CPA_ACM*POST*SANC_CY are added to the FI model. 
See Appendix B for variable descriptions. 















Based on my analysis of the effect of the public disclosure on audit fees, I do not find 
support for H2 as audit fees increased rather than decreased after the PCAOB disciplinary order 
was made public. In regards to H3, it appears there is no association between changes in audit 
fees and having a CPA on the audit committee. 
Table 6, Panel D provides results of tests for the city (office) sample that analyze 
economic significance for both hypotheses 2 and 3. Examination of the change in audit fees 
analysis shows that during the pre-sanction period, non-sanctioned auditors increased audit fees 
by 17.9 percent (0.179, p < 0.01) and sanctioned auditors increased fees by 18.2 percent (0.182, 
p < 0.01). However, the 0.3 percent difference in audit fee changes is statistically insignificant (p 
> 0.10). In the post-sanction period, non-sanctioned auditors increased audit fees by 19.5 percent 
(0.195, p < 0.01), sanctioned auditors increased fees by 26.8 percent (0.268, p < 0.01) and the 
difference of 7.3 percent is statistically significant (0.073, p < 0.01). In the third row, I show the 
change across time. Annual audit fee changes for non-sanctioned auditors did not significantly 
increase in the post-sanction period (1.5 percent; p > 0.10). However, annual audit fees for 
sanctioned auditors increased by 8.6 percent (p < 0.01). The difference in these two differences 
of 7.1 percent is statistically significant (0.071, p < 0.05). The results suggest that the increase in 
audit fees in the post-sanction period was significantly greater for sanctioned auditors relative to 
non-sanctioned auditors. The 7.1 percent incremental increase in audit fees is likely due to the 
PCAOB sanctions against the audit partners accused of committing ethical violations. It is 
feasible to conclude that the sanctioned audit firms increased audit fees after the PCAOB 
sanction was made public in order to provide additional training for auditors to improve audit 






The fee increase analysis shows that in the pre-sanction period, sanctioned auditors 
increased audit fees for 7 percent of clients and sanctioned auditors increased audit fees for 11.5 
percent of clients. The difference is not statistically significant (p > 0.10). In the post-sanction 
period, non-sanctioned auditors increased audit fees for 28.5 percent of the clients and 
sanctioned auditors increased audit fees for 100 percent of clients. The difference is statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). Comparing the two periods, non-sanctioned auditors increased audit fees 
for 21.5 percent of clients, although this increase is statistically insignificant (p > 0.10). 
Sanctioned auditors increased audit fees for 100 percent of clients, which is statistically 
significant (p < 0.01). The difference in differences is statistically significant (p < 0.01).  
Panel D of Table 6, examines the change in audit fees control for a CPA on the audit committee. 
During the pre-sanction period, non-sanctioned auditors with a CPA_ACM increased audit fees 
by 20 percent (0.200, p < 0.01) and sanctioned auditors with a CPA_ACM increased audit fees 
by 20.2 percent (0.202, p < 0.01).  However, the 0.2 percent difference in audit fee changes is not 
significant (0.002, p > 0.10).  In the post-sanction period, non-sanctioned auditors with a 
CPA_ACM increased audit fees by 22.5 percent (0.225, p < 0.01), sanctioned auditors with a 
CPA_ACM increased audit fees by 26.7 percent (.0267, p < 0.01) and the difference of 4.2 
percent is statistically significant (0.042, p < 0.10).  Comparing the two periods, annual audit fee 
changes for non-sanctioned auditors increased by 2.5 percent, but this increase is not statistically 
significant (p > 0.10).  Annual audit fee changes for sanctioned auditors increased by 6.5 percent 
(p < 0.05).  However, the difference in differences of 4 percent is not statistically significant (p > 
0.10) and indicates that having a CPA_ACM is not associated with the changes in audit fees. 
Examination of results for audit fee increases, FI, that also test whether having a CPA_ACM 





with a CPA_ACM increased audit fees for 25 percent of clients (0.250, p > 0.10) and sanctioned 
auditors with a CPA_ACM increased audit fees for 29.4 percent of clients (0.294, p > 0.10). 
These increases are not statistically significant and neither is the 4.4 percent difference (p > 
0.10). In the post-sanction period, non-sanctioned auditors increased audit fees for 59.5 percent 
of clients (0.595, p > 0.10) and sanctioned auditors increased audit fees for 100 percent of clients 
(1.240, p > 0.10). Again, these increases are not statistically significant (p > 0.10), while the 
difference of 64.4 percent in clients with fee increases in the post sanction period is statistically 
significant (0.644, p < 0.01). Comparing the two periods, audit fee increases of clients for non-
sanctioned auditors (sanctioned auditors) increased by 34.6 percent (94.6 percent) and the 
increases are statistically significant (p < 0.10) and (p < 0.01), respectfully. The difference in 
differences of 60 percent is also statistically significant (p < 0.10) at the city (office) level in the 
FI test. However, in the multivariate analysis, there is no significant difference in having a 
CPA_ACM. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude from the difference in differences analysis that 












(Table 6 continued) 
































All coefficients in Panel D refer to regression results presented in column 1 of Table 6, Panels A and C. 





    Change in Audit Fees Analysis  
Period Description 
Non-
Sanctioned   Sanctioned   Diff.  
Pre-Sanction Change in logged audit fee 0.179 *** 0.182 *** 0.003  
 Measured by β0  β0 + δ1  δ1  
Post-Sanction Change in logged audit fee 0.195 *** 0.268 *** 0.073 *** 
 Measured by β0 + δ2  β0 + δ1 + δ2 + δ3   δ1 + δ3  
        
Change Change in logged audit fee 0.015  0.086 *** 0.071 ** 
 Measured by δ2   δ2 + δ3  δ3  
        
  Fee Increase Analysis  
Period Description 
Non-
Sanctioned   Sanctioned   Diff.  
Pre-Sanction Fee Increase 0.070  0.115  0.045  
 Measured by β0  β0 + δ1  δ1  
Post-Sanction Fee Increase 0.285  1.167  0.883 *** 
 Measured by β0 + δ2  β0 + δ1 + δ2 + δ3   δ1 + δ3  
        
Change Fee Increase 0.215  1.053 *** 0.837 *** 
 Measured by δ2   δ2 + δ3  δ3  
        





    Change in Audit Fees Analysis (including CPA Member)  
Period Description 
Non-
Sanctioned   Sanctioned   Diff.  
Pre-
Sanction Change in logged audit fee 0.200 *** 0.202 *** 0.002  
 Measured by β0 + δ4  β0 + δ1 + δ4  δ1   
Post-
Sanction Change in logged audit fee 0.225 *** 0.267 *** 0.042 * 
 Measured by β0 + δ2 + δ4  β0 + δ1 + δ2 + δ3 + δ4 + δ5 + δ6   δ1 + δ3 + δ5 + δ6  
        
Change Change in logged audit fee 0.025  0.065 ** 0.040  
 Measured by δ2    δ2 + δ3 + δ5 + δ6    δ3 + δ5 + δ6  
        
  Fee Increase Analysis (including CPA Member)  
Period Description 
Non-
Sanctioned   Sanctioned   Diff.  
Pre-
Sanction Fee Increase 0.250  0.294  0.044  
 Measured by β0 + δ4  β0 + δ1 + δ4  δ1   
Post-
Sanction Fee Increase 0.595  1.240  0.644 *** 
 Measured by β0 + δ2 + δ4  β0 + δ1 + δ2 + δ3 + δ4 + δ5 + δ6   δ1 + δ3 + δ5 + δ6  
        
Change Fee Increase 0.346 * 0.946 *** 0.600 * 
 Measured by δ2    δ2 + δ3 + δ5 + δ6    δ3 + δ5 + δ6  
        
                







In further analysis of economic significance using the log of audit fees test (LNAF), I 
employ the calculation as described in Craswell et al. (1995) to determine the magnitude of the 
change in audit fees between sanctioned and non-sanctioned auditors in the pre-and post-sanction 
periods. For the city (office) sample, I find a 15 percent increase in audit fees for sanctioned 
auditors as compared to non-sanctioned auditors in the post-sanction period. When the 
CPA_ACM interactions are added there is a 17 percent increase in audit fees. At the MSA level, 
there is a 15 percent and an 18 percent increase, respectively; for the state sample, a 7 percent 
and 6 percent increase; for the regional sample, a 10 percent and an 11 percent increase; and, for 
the national (firm) sample, a 7 percent and 9 percent increase. For all samples, with the exception 
of the state sample, there appears to be a larger increase in audit fees if there is a CPA_ACM.  
However, multivariate tests indicate that having a CPA_ACM does not make a significant 
difference in audit fees. 
5.4 Audit Quality 
Regression results for all samples for the audit quality models are presented in Table 7, 
Panels A – C. For the discretionary accruals analysis, SANC_CY*POST is the variable of interest 
and is not statistically significant (p > 0.10) in either test. The results reported in Panels A and B 
for Table 7 provide no evidence to suggest that audit firms affiliated with sanctioned audit 
partners provided audit quality significantly different from that of other annually inspected audit 
firms in the post-PCAOB sanction period. Based on discretionary accruals tests, H4 is not 
supported. 
The restatement analysis is presented in Table 7, Panel C. The coefficient on the variable 
of interest, SANC_CY*POST, is not significant for any of the samples, with the exception of the 
regional and national (firm) samples. In regards to the regional and national (firm) levels, there 





period as compared to the pre-sanction period. However, without consistent results at the other 
sample levels, it is difficult to conclude an association between higher restatements and 
sanctioned auditors. The coefficient on SANC_CY is positive and significant for the city (office), 
MSA, and state samples suggesting that restatements are higher for sanctioned auditors than for 
non-sanctioned auditors, in the pre-sanction period. There is no change during the post-sanction 
period, indicating that sanctioned firms had poorer audit quality than non-sanctioned firms and 
the sanction did not help to improve audit quality.  The results of the restatement analysis are not 
consistent with the discretionary accruals analysis. Therefore, there does not appear to be support 
for a change in audit quality after the PCAOB sanction was made public and thus there is no 
support for H4.  Additional analysis is provided in Panel D and supports the results of the 
regression analyses in that there appears to be no significant change in audit quality between the 











Table 7: Audit Quality Analysis 
Panel A:  |DACC| Analysis 
Panel A-1: City (office), MSA and State samples 





  Coef P-
value 
  Coef. P-
value 
  








































NONAUDIT_FEE + β4 0.002 0.025 ** 0.001 0.237 
 
0.001 0.057 * 
EFFORT - β5 0.000 0.179 
 
0.000 0.071 * 0.000 0.024 ** 


















GROWTH + β9 0.081 0.004 *** 0.067 0.008 *** 0.072 0.001 *** 












FOREIGN - β12 0.001 0.931 
 
-0.012 0.062 * -0.006 0.436 
 






INVAR - β14 -0.058 0.007 *** -0.041 0.135 
 
-0.040 0.041 ** 












GC - β17 0.154 0.010 *** 0.080 0.006 *** 0.087 <.000 *** 




0.006 0.002 *** 


















YEAR FIXED EFFECT 























N       696     1,045     1,130   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. The model is estimated as an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals |DACC| as in Kothari et al. 2005. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes 
industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. See Appendix B for variable descriptions. The model for the abnormal accruals analysis is: 
|DACC| = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + β1CLIENT_INFLUENCEi,t + β2SHORTi,t + β3AUDIT_FEEi,t + β4NONAUDIT_FEEi,t + 
β5EFFORTi,t + β6SIZEi,t   + β7SEGi,t+  β8LOSSi,t + β9GROWTHi,t + β10MBi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t +  β12FOREIGNi,t  + β13M_Ai,t +β14INVARi,t  + β15ROAi,t  + 
β16BANKRUPTCYi,t  + β17GCi,t  + β18ICWi,t + β19CFOi,t + β20LAG_ACCRUALS + β21LITi,t + YEAR_FE +  SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    





Panel A-2: Regional and National (firm) samples 
      Regional   National (firm)   
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   
Intercept ? β0 0.041 0.105  0.075 <.0001 *** 
SANC_CY ? δ1 -0.001 0.923  0.002 0.444  
POST ? δ2 0.001 0.705  0.000 0.937  
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 -0.001 0.812  -0.004 0.130  
CLIENT_INFLUENCE ? β1 0.099 0.070 * 0.074 0.669  
SHORT + β2 0.004 0.511  -0.002 0.582  
AUDIT_FEE + β3 0.004 0.218  0.000 0.903  
NONAUDIT_FEE + β4 0.000 0.357  0.000 0.762  
EFFORT - β5 0.000 0.979  0.000 0.784  
SIZE - β6 -0.007 <.0001 *** -0.003 <.0001 *** 
SEG ? β7 0.000 0.657  -0.001 <.0001 *** 
LOSS - β8 0.011 0.056 * 0.007 <.0001 *** 
GROWTH + β9 0.053 <.0001 *** 0.041 <.0001 *** 
MB + β10 0.008 0.020 ** 0.008 <.0001 *** 
LEVERAGE + β11 -0.034 <.0001 *** -0.024 <.0001 *** 
FOREIGN - β12 -0.010 0.003 *** -0.006 <.0001 *** 
M_A - β13 -0.004 0.072 * -0.005 <.0001 *** 
INVAR - β14 0.008 0.476  0.021 <.0001 *** 
ROA - β15 0.014 0.584  -0.089 <.0001 *** 
BANKRUPTCY - β16 0.000 0.499  -0.001 0.003 *** 
GC - β17 0.058 0.009 *** 0.038 <.0001 *** 
ICW - β18 0.003 0.320  0.007 0.003 *** 
CFO - β19 -0.090 0.062 * 0.026 0.246  
LAG_ACCRUALS - β20 -0.007 0.702  -0.017 0.012 ** 
LIT + β21 0.001 0.844  0.004 0.064 * 
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT   Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2    0.1937   0.1798  
N       3,627     16,257   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. The model is estimated as an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals |DACC| as in Kothari et al. 2005. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes 
industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. See Appendix B for variable descriptions.  







The model for the abnormal accruals analysis is: 
|DACC| = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + β1CLIENT_INFLUENCEi,t + β2SHORTi,t + β3AUDIT_FEEi,t + β4NONAUDIT_FEEi,t + 
β5EFFORTi,t + β6SIZEi,t   + β7SEGi,t+  β8LOSSi,t + β9GROWTHi,t + β10MBi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t +  β12FOREIGNi,t  + β13M_Ai,t +β14INVARi,t  + β15ROAi,t  + 
β16BANKRUPTCYi,t  + β17GCi,t  + β18ICWi,t + β19CFOi,t + β20LAG_ACCRUALS + β21LITi,t + YEAR_FE +  SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    


































Panel B: |DACCd| Analysis 
Panel B-1: City (office), MSA, and State samples 
       City (office)   MSA   State   
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
value   Coef 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   
Intercept ? β0 0.114 0.005 *** 0.040 0.192  0.081 0.046 ** 
SANC_CY ? δ1 0.002 0.479  0.002 0.145  0.003 0.296  
POST ? δ2 -0.002 0.454  -0.001 0.540  0.001 0.524  
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 -0.003 0.345  -0.003 0.190  -0.003 0.151  
CLIENT_INFLUENCE ? β1 -0.003 0.670  0.012 0.274  0.022 0.118  
SHORT + β2 0.004 0.415  0.004 0.524  0.005 0.398  
AUDIT_FEE + β3 -0.009 0.023 ** -0.001 0.828  -0.005 0.250  
NONAUDIT_FEE + β4 0.001 0.003 *** 0.000 0.014 ** 0.000 0.270  
EFFORT - β5 0.000 <.0001 *** 0.000 0.017 ** 0.000 0.001 *** 
SIZE - β6 0.002 0.394  -0.002 0.381  0.000 0.914  
SEG ? β7 -0.002 0.160  -0.002 0.011 ** -0.002 0.004 *** 
LOSS - β8 0.004 0.050 * 0.007 0.018 ** 0.006 0.002 *** 
GROWTH + β9 0.005 0.131  0.003 0.224  0.004 0.050 ** 
MB + β10 0.002 0.358  0.003 0.031 ** 0.003 0.046 ** 
LEVERAGE + β11 -0.034 <.0001 *** -0.030 0.000 *** -0.029 <.0001 *** 
FOREIGN - β12 -0.003 0.423  -0.007 0.000 *** -0.006 0.011 ** 
M_A - β13 -0.002 0.167  -0.002 0.096 * -0.001 0.265  
INVAR - β14 0.008 0.560  0.009 0.413  0.005 0.646  
ROA - β15 0.004 0.841  0.003 0.826  0.010 0.358  
BANKRUPTCY - β16 -0.001 0.036 ** -0.001 0.018 ** -0.001 0.003 *** 
GC - β17 0.042 0.055 * 0.016 0.004 *** 0.015 0.007 *** 
ICW - β18 -0.002 0.461  -0.002 0.314  -0.003 0.246  
CFO - β19 -0.002 0.918  0.004 0.736  -0.001 0.903  
LAG_ACCRUALS - β20 -0.008 0.409  -0.007 0.137  -0.005 0.421  
LIT + β21 -0.001 0.738  -0.001 0.528  0.002 0.546  
YEAR FIXED    Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2    0.3231   0.3147   0.2906  
N       696     1,045     1,130   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively.The model is estimated as an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent 
variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals as in Dechow and Dichev 2002. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes 
industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. See Appendix B for variable descriptions. 









The model for the abnormal accruals analysis is: 
|DACCd| = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t +  δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + β1CLIENT_INFLUENCEi,t + β2SHORTi,t + β3AUDIT_FEEi,t +  
β4NONAUDIT_FEEi,t + β5EFFORTi,t + β6SIZEi,t   + β7SEGi,t + β8LOSSi,t + β9GROWTHi,t + β10MBi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12FOREIGNi,t  + β13M_Ai,t  + β14INVARi,t  
+ β15ROAi,t  + β16BANKRUPTCYi,t  + β17GCi,t  + β18ICWi,t + β19CFOi,t + β20LAG_ACCRUALS + β21LITi,t + YEAR_FE +  SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    

































Panel B-2: Regional and National (firm) samples 
      Regional   National (firm)   
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. 
P-
value   
Intercept ? β0 0.003 0.746  0.024 <.0001 *** 
SANC_CY ? δ1 0.000 0.997  0.001 0.304  
POST ? δ2 0.000 0.670  0.000 0.395  
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.000 0.808  0.000 0.801  
CLIENT_INFLUENCE ? β1 0.021 0.321  -0.009 0.892  
SHORT + β2 -0.001 0.765  0.000 0.951  
AUDIT_FEE + β3 0.002 0.121  0.000 0.443  
NONAUDIT_FEE + β4 0.000 0.605  0.000 0.386  
EFFORT - β5 0.000 0.830  0.000 0.500  
SIZE - β6 -0.004 <.0001 *** -0.002 <.0001 *** 
SEG ? β7 -0.001 0.031 ** 0.000 0.005 *** 
LOSS - β8 0.005 0.001 *** 0.005 <.0001 *** 
GROWTH + β9 0.000 0.896  0.003 <.0001 *** 
MB + β10 0.002 0.095 * 0.002 <.0001 *** 
LEVERAGE + β11 -0.013 0.001 *** -0.010 <.0001 *** 
FOREIGN - β12 -0.003 0.080 * -0.003 <.0001 *** 
M_A - β13 -0.001 0.209  -0.001 0.012 ** 
INVAR - β14 0.016 0.110  0.014 <.0001 *** 
ROA - β15 0.004 0.676  -0.006 0.064 * 
BANKRUPTCY - β16 -0.001 0.001 *** 0.000 <.0001 *** 
GC - β17 0.006 0.462  0.003 0.044 ** 
ICW - β18 0.000 0.915  0.002 0.001 *** 
CFO - β19 -0.011 0.074 * -0.011 <.0001 *** 
LAG_ACCRUALS - β20 0.003 0.415  -0.002 0.283  
LIT + β21 0.007 0.001 *** 0.004 <.0001 *** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT   Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2    0.2363   0.2173  
N       3,627     16,257   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The model is estimated as an ordinary least squares regression. The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals as in Dechow and Dichev 
2002. Standard errors control for clustering by auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. See Appendix B for variable 
descriptions. The model for the abnormal accruals analysis is: 
|DACCd| = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + β1CLIENT_INFLUENCEi,t + β2SHORTi,t + β3AUDIT_FEEi,t +  
β4NONAUDIT_FEEi,t + β5EFFORTi,t + β6SIZEi,t   + β7SEGi,t + β8LOSSi,t + β9GROWTHi,t + β10MBi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12FOREIGNi,t  + β13M_Ai,t +β14INVARi,t  
+ β15ROAi,t  + β16BANKRUPTCYi,t  + β17GCi,t  + β18ICWi,t + β19CFOi,t + β20LAG_ACCRUALS + β21LIT + YEAR_FE +  SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    






Panel C: Restatement Analysis 
Panel C-1: City (office), MSA, and State samples 
 
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood as a logit regression. The dependent variable is RESTATE, which equals 1 if the client subsequently restates the 
current-year financial statements due to an accounting rule application error (excluding clerical errors), and 0 otherwise. Standard errors control for clustering by 
auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. See Appendix B for variable descriptions. 
The model for the abnormal accruals analysis is: 
RESTATE = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + β1CLIENT_INFLUENCEi,t + β2SHORTi,t + β3AUDIT_FEEi,t + 
 β4NONAUDIT_FEEi,t + β5EFFORTi,t + β6SIZEi,t   + β7SEGi,t+ β8LOSSi,t + β9GROWTHi,t + β10MBi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12FOREIGNi,t  + β13M_Ai,t +β14INVARi,t  
+ β15ROAi,t  + β16BANKRUPTCYi,t  + β17GCi,t  + β18ICWi,t + β19CFOi,t + β20LAG_ACCRUALS + β21LITi,t + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    
(Table 7 continued) 
       City (office)   MSA   State   
Variable Exp. Param. Coef. P-   Coef P-   Coef. P-   
Intercept ? β0 -23.893 0.199  -28.492 0.148  -17.081 0.406  
SANC_CY ? δ1 2.028 <.0001 *** 1.752 0.003 *** 1.747 0.001 *** 
POST ? δ2 -1.501 0.230  -1.801 0.282  -1.062 0.259  
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 -1.174 0.369  -0.228 0.847  -0.543 0.356  
CLIENT_INFLUENCE ? β1 5.269 0.075 * 0.629 0.808  2.512 0.252  
SHORT + β2 -14.845 <.0001 *** -13.781 <.0001 *** -12.839 <.0001 *** 
AUDIT_FEE + β3 0.608 0.727  1.254 0.503  0.260 0.892  
NONAUDIT_FEE + β4 0.163 0.276  0.084 0.437  0.032 0.668  
EFFORT - β5 0.005 0.841  -0.006 0.811  0.022 0.464  
SIZE - β6 -0.787 0.375  -1.101 0.235  -0.653 0.524  
SEG ? β7 -0.853 0.001 *** -0.921 <.0001 *** -0.610 0.008 *** 
LOSS - β8 1.572 0.007 *** 1.423 <.0001 *** 0.703 0.058 * 
GROWTH + β9 0.799 0.213  0.639 0.377  0.120 0.892  
MB + β10 -1.008 0.032 ** -1.240 0.005 *** -1.331 <.0001 *** 
LEVERAGE + β11 6.644 0.012 ** 6.695 0.008 *** 4.440 0.251  
FOREIGN - β12 -1.307 0.202  -0.914 0.377  -0.401 0.562  
M_A - β13 1.009 0.321  1.016 0.322  0.743 0.310  
INVAR - β14 8.918 <.0001 *** 8.433 <.0001 *** 2.931 0.331  
ROA - β15 5.519 0.122  6.268 0.059 * 2.892 0.339  
BANKRUPTCY - β16 -0.051 0.304  -0.024 0.626  0.027 0.514  
GC + β17 -15.170 <.0001 *** -11.080 <.0001 *** -12.790 <.0001 *** 
ICW + β18 4.968 <.0001 *** 4.321 <.0001 *** 3.565 <.0001 *** 
CFO - β19 0.929 0.768  -2.076 0.722  -1.030 0.764  
LAG_ACCRUALS - β20 -0.368 0.895  1.646 0.602  -1.021 0.731  
LIT + β21 2.738 <.0001 *** 2.701 0.002 *** 1.339 0.403  
YEAR FIXED EFFECT   Yes   Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R2    0.2166   0.2145   0.1905  
N    870   906   986  





Panel C-2: Regional and National (firm) sample 
      Regional   National (firm)   
Variable 
Exp. 
Sign Param. Coef. 
P-
value   Coef. P-value   
Intercept ? β0 -0.839 0.905  -3.477 0.264  
SANC_CY ? δ1 -0.050 0.800  -0.009 0.977  
POST ? δ2 -0.226 0.299  0.124 0.751  
SANC_CY*POST ? δ3 0.678 0.002 *** 0.553 <.0001 *** 
CLIENT_INFLUENCE ? β1 0.580 0.861  -28.784 0.193  
SHORT + β2 -1.060 0.449  0.164 0.395  
AUDIT_FEE + β3 -0.337 0.614  0.086 0.799  
NONAUDIT_FEE + β4 0.076 0.295  0.043 <.0001 *** 
EFFORT - β5 0.006 0.516  0.008 0.213  
SIZE - β6 0.225 0.488  -0.207 0.232  
SEG ? β7 -0.591 <.0001 *** -0.043 0.240  
LOSS - β8 0.253 0.431  0.132 0.350  
GROWTH + β9 0.179 0.658  0.203 0.289  
MB + β10 -0.210 0.123  -0.178 0.005 *** 
LEVERAGE + β11 0.617 0.440  1.447 <.0001 *** 
FOREIGN - β12 -0.046 0.872  -0.350 <.0001 *** 
M_A - β13 -0.287 0.527  0.109 0.168  
INVAR - β14 1.731 0.003 *** 0.160 0.696  
ROA - β15 0.284 0.854  -0.642 0.325  
BANKRUPTCY - β16 -0.046 0.025 ** -0.016 0.101  
GC + β17 -1.206 <.0001 *** -0.389 0.179  
ICW + β18 3.264 <.0001 *** 2.630 <.0001 *** 
CFO - β19 -1.857 0.149  0.559 0.230  
LAG_ACCRUALS - β20 -1.403 0.285  -0.213 0.592  
LIT + β21 1.074 0.013 ** 0.638 <.0001 *** 
YEAR FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes  
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECT    Yes   Yes  
R2    0.1255   0.0797  
N    3,168   19,517  
Number of Big R restatements in sample       153     853   
*, **, *** Denote significance at p < 0.1., p < 0.05, and p < 0.01, respectively. 
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood as a logit regression. The dependent variable is RESTATE, which equals 1 if the client subsequently restates the 
current-year financial statements due to an accounting rule application error (excluding clerical errors), and 0 otherwise. Standard errors control for clustering by 
auditor. The model includes industry (SIC2) fixed effects and year fixed effects. See Appendix B for variable descriptions. 









The model for the abnormal accruals analysis is: 
RESTATE = β0 + δ1SANC_CYi,t + δ2POSTi,t + δ3SANC_CYi,t*POSTi,t  + β1CLIENT_INFLUENCEi,t + β2SHORTi,t + β3AUDIT_FEEi,t + β4NONAUDIT_FEEi,t + 
β5EFFORTi,t + β6SIZEi,t   + β7SEGi,t + β8LOSSi,t + β9GROWTHi,t + β10MBi,t + β11LEVERAGEi,t + β12FOREIGNi,t  + β13M_Ai,t +β14INVARi,t  + β15ROAi,t  + 
β16BANKRUPTCYi,t  + β17GCi,t  + β18ICWi,t + β19CFOi,t + β20LAG_ACCRUALS + β21LIT + YEAR_FE + SIC2_FE + Ɛi,t    





Panel D:  Difference-in-Differences Analysis       
City Sample        
    |DACC| Analysis   
Period Description 
Non-
Sanctioned   Sanctioned   Diff.   
Pre-Sanction Discretionary Accruals |DACC| 0.085  0.076  -0.008  
 Measured by β0  β0 + δ1  δ1  
Post-Sanction Discretionary Accruals |DACC| 0.083  0.084  0.001 * 
 Measured by β0 + δ2  β0 + δ1 + δ2 + δ3   δ1 + δ3  
        
Change Discretionary Accruals |DACC| -0.002  0.008  0.009  
 Measured by δ2   δ2 + δ3  δ3  
        
  |DACCd| Analysis   
Period Description 
Non-
Sanctioned   Sanctioned   Diff.   
Pre-Sanction Discretionary Accruals |DACCd| 0.114 *** 0.116  0.002  
 Measured by β0  β0 + δ1  δ1  
Post-Sanction Discretionary Accruals |DACCd| 0.112  0.111  -0.001  
 Measured by β0 + δ2  β0 + δ1 + δ2 + δ3   δ1 + δ3  
        
Change Discretionary Accruals |DACCd| -0.002  -0.005  -0.003  
 Measured by δ2   δ2 + δ3  δ3  
        
  Restatement Analysis   
Period Description 
Non-
Sanctioned   Sanctioned   Diff.   
Pre-Sanction Restatements -23.893  -21.866 *** 2.028 *** 
 Measured by β0  β0 + δ1  δ1  
Post-Sanction Restatements -25.394  -24.540  0.854  
 Measured by β0 + δ2  β0 + δ1 + δ2 + δ3   δ1 + δ3  
        
Change Restatements -1.501  -2.675  -1.174  
 Measured by δ2   δ2 + δ3  δ3  
















 In my dissertation, I examine whether ethical violations committed by audit partners and 
the resulting public release of the PCAOB disciplinary order imposed real costs on the affiliated 
audit firms. I test my hypothesis using auditor switches, audit fees, and audit quality. I also 
examine whether having a CPA member on the audit committee makes a difference in the 
outcome related to auditor switches and audit fees. I find that at the city (office), MSA, and state 
levels there is some indication that in the pre-sanction period, clients were less likely to switch to 
a sanctioned auditor as compared to switches among other annually inspected audit firms. 
However, in all samples, it appears that the PCAOB sanction had no informational value to 
decision makers in that there is no association between the public release of the PCAOB 
disciplinary order and client losses or client gains in the post-sanction period. Furthermore, there 
appears to be no association between client losses and gains and having a CPA_ACM. 
In regards to audit fees, my analysis suggests an increase in audit fees in the post-sanction 
period. This result is indicative of the audit firm’s increased efforts to address the issues related 
to the auditor sanctions, may be a response to increased sanction risk or an increase in 
professional liability insurance premiums. Furthermore, I find that having a CPA-ACM does not 
have a significant effect on this outcome. 
I was unable to consistently detect a difference in audit quality between sanctioned 
auditors and non-sanctioned auditors in either the pre-sanction or post-sanction periods. In the 
discretionary accruals and restatements analysis, I find no change in audit quality after the 
disclosure of the PCAOB sanction, with the exception of regional and national (firm) samples in 





is difficult to conclude that the increase in restatements in the post-sanction period is associated 
with the public disclosure of the PCAOB disciplinary order. 
 Overall, my results indicate that there does not appear to be an associated cost to audit 
firms related to the public disclosure of PCAOB sanctions against an unethical audit partner. 
Based on my results, it appears that clients do not consider an ethical violation against an audit 
partner as grounds to dismiss their auditor nor demand lower audit fees. My results may be 
affected by the fact that clients, at least at the city (office), MSA and state levels react to the 
ethical violation before it is made public. This was seen in the case of BDO in which all clients 
of the Philadelphia office switched auditors before the sanction was made public. My results may 
also be associated with the fact that sanctions analyzed are against partners that are no longer 
with the affiliated audit firm at the time the sanction is made public and this may be enough 
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APPENDIX. PRIOR RESEARCH RELATING TO THE PCAOB INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 
 
Name of Article Author Date Where What's it About 
Research 
on….. 
When the PCAOB 
talks, who listens?  
Evidence from 
stakeholder reaction to 
GAAP-deficient 
PCAOB inspection 
reports of small 
auditors 
Abbot et al. 2013 Auditing:  A Journal of Practice and Theory Results suggest that clients of 
GAAP-deficient, triennially 
inspected auditors were more 
likely to dismiss these auditors in 
favor of triennially inspected 
auditors that were not GAAP 
deficient. Found greater agency 
conflicts, the presence of an 
independent and expert audit 
committee, and outside block-
holdings magnified the effect. 
Inspections 
A summary of 10 years 
of PCAOB research:  
What have we learned? 
Abernathy, John L., 
Michael Barnes and 
Chad Stefaniak 
2013 Journal of Accounting Literature Reviews existing literature on the 
PCAOB's four functions- 
registration, standard-setting, 
inspections and enforcement. 
Analyze research concerning 
PCAOB enforcement actions to 
determine how markets have 
responded to sanctions against 








Acito et al. 2013 Working paper Find that measure of relative 
exposure to deficient auditing is 
positively related to auditor 
changes, but is not related to 
changes in audit fees. 
Inspections 
Perceptions of factors 
affecting audit quality 




Fearnley, S. and 
Tony Hines 




Provides evidence on the 
preparers' and auditors' perceptions 
of the factors affecting audit 







Name of Article Author Date Where What's it About 
Research 
on….. 
PCAOB inspections of 
international audit 
firms:  Initial evidence 
Bishop et al. 2013 International Journal of Auditing Found just over half of inspection 
reports identified audit 
deficiencies, and two-thirds cited 
quality control defects. Deficiency 
firms were smaller, but had more 
issuer clients than no-deficiency 
firms, reflecting possible over 
extension into the issuer market. 
Found no significant rate of audit 
deficiencies or quality control 
defects based on whether the 
PCAOB acted alone or cooperated 
with a local regulator in 
conducting the inspection, or 
based on the home country's legal 
tradition. 
Inspections 
A note on the effect of 
PCAOB inspections on 
the audit quality 
of triennial CPA firms 
Blankley, A., Hong, 
Keejae P., Kerr, D. 
and Casper Wiggins 
2014 Research in Accounting Regulation This note reports the results of a 
study conducted regarding 
PCAOB inspections of triennial 
CPA firms. The purpose was to 
see if there was any evidence that 
inspections contributed to 
improved audit quality. It was 
found that small firms did not 
correct staffing deficiencies, which 
were related to previous audit 
deficiencies determined by the 
PCAOB. However, deficient firms 
did increase their audit fees 
significantly more following their 
first inspections than non-deficient 
firms. This result is consistent with 
applying greater audit effort after 
the inspection. Interestingly, this 







Name of Article Author Date Where What's it About 
Research 
on….. 






Blankley, A., Kerr, 
D. and Casper 
Wiggins 
2012 Research in Accounting Regulation Evaluate the letters provided by 
triennial audit firms (100 or fewer 
issuer clients) to 
the PCAOB in response to their 
inspections. The response letters 
provide insight into what 
the firms themselves think about 
the value of the inspection and the 
results of the inspections. 
Inspections 
Did the 2007 PCAOB 
Disciplinary Order 
against Deloitte 
Impose Actual Costs 
on the Firm or Improve 
Its Audit Quality? 
Boone et al. 2015 The Accounting Review Censure associated with a decrease 
in Deloitte's ability to retain clients 
and attract new clients, and a 
decrease in Deloitte's audit fee 
growth rates. However, no 
evidence to suggests that Deloitte's 
audit quality was different from 
that of the other Big 4 firms. 
Enforcements 
PCAOB Inspections of 
Smaller CPA firms:  
The Perspective of 
Inspected Firms 
Brian Daugherty and 
Wayne Tervo 
2010 Accounting Horizons Solicit perceptions of the PCAOB 
inspection process from the 
leadership of triennial firms 
receiving their initial inspection. 
Inspections 
Enforcement Actions 
and Auditor Changes 
Brocard, M., Franke, 
Benedikt and Dennis 
Voeller 
2015 University of Mannheim Examines relation between 
erroneous financial statements 
uncovered by enforcement actions 






Name of Article Author Date Where What's it About 
Research 
on….. 
Does the PCAOB's 
Quality Control 
Remediation Process 





2014 Working Paper Provide evidence that the release 
of Part II report discloses new 
relevant information about a firm's 
disregard for maintaining an 
effective quality control system. 
Find that QCC firms have lower 
audit quality in terms of 
restatements after the PCAOB 
release of inspection findings that 
those firms that address their 
criticisms. Suggests that the 
release of Part II indicates a 
disregard or an inability to address 
the identified weaknesses, which 
results in continued audit quality 
issues. Find that a release of Part II 
foreshadows a change in auditors, 
either due to dismissal or 
resignation. Find a majority of 
restatements for clients of QCC 
firms are discovered by a 
successor auditor of higher quality 
after the client has changed 
auditors. Conclude that for 
triennial firms, Part II signals audit 
quality and the two-part reporting 
process leads to improved 
financial statement reliability. 
Inspections 
KPMG's PCAOB 
Inspection Report is 
Out and It's Not Good 
Caleb Newquist 2015 going concern:  
http://goingconcern.com/post/kpmgs-pcaob-
inspection-report-out-and-its-not-good 
28 deficient audits of 52 - 
deficiency rate of 54 percent - up 
from a year ago, when deficiency 










and SEC hobble 
America's audit 
watchdog 
Charles Levron 2015 http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-
report/usa-accounting-PCAOB/ 
James Schnurr, chief accountant at 
the SEC said "the PCAOB was 
moving too slowly to address 
auditing failures that in recent 
years had shaken public 
confidence in those firms."    
Schnurr had direct authority over 
the PCAOB - a regulator that had 
derailed his C-suite ambitions at 
Deloitte & Touche. A string of 
damning PCAOB critiques of 








2012 Accounting Horizons Found a significant, downward 
trend in the number of deficiencies 







voluntary client losses 
Daugherty et al. 2011 International Journal of Auditing Found deficiency reports were 
associated with triennially 
inspected auditors being 
involuntarily dismissed by their 
clients, and companies that 
dismissed triennially inspected 
auditors were more likely to hire 
triennially inspected auditors 
without deficiency reports. Also, 
deficiency reports were associated 
with triennially inspected auditors 
voluntarily resigning from their 
publicly traded clients, and ceasing 
to be registered with the PCAOB. 
Inspections 
Client stock market 
reaction to PCAOB 
sanctions against a Big 
4 auditor 
Dee et al. 2011 Contemporary Accounting Research All Big 4 clients experienced 
negative returns during the event 
window, but the returns for 












Proceedings Be Made 
Public?  Evidence from 
Sanctions against a Big 
4 Auditor 
Dee et al. 2012 Current Issues in Auditing Conclude that investors find 
information about PCAOB 
sanctions against audit firms to be 
relevant in assessing audit quality 
and use that information in setting 
stock prices for audit firms' clients. 
Enforcements 
How should the 
auditors be audited?  
Comparing the 
PCAOB inspections 
with the AICPA peer 
reviews 
DeFond 2010 Journal of Accounting and Economics DeFond analyzes the 
investigations of the PCAOB 
inspections by Lennox and Pittman 
(2009). 
Inspections 
One in Three Audits 
Fail, PCAOB Chief 
Auditor Says 
Chasan, Emily 2014 The Wall Street Journal More than one in three audits so 
deficient, auditors shouldn't have 
signed off - Martin Baumann, 
chief auditor of the PCAOB. 
Boards inspections are find 
problems - at both large and small 
audit firms - stemming from 
ineffective supervision, ineffective 
quality reviews and monitoring, a 
lack of professional skepticism, 
and inappropriate tone at the top of 
the audit firm 
Inspections 
PCAOB Enforcements:  




2009 Current Issues in Auditing Firms disciplined by PCAOB had 
longer reviews and more identified 
deficiencies, tended to be smaller 
and less financially sound audit 




associated with a 
change in reporting 
decisions of triennially 
inspected audit firms? 
Gramling et al. 2011 Auditing:  A Journal of Practice and Theory Analysis generally indicated that 
firms with PCAOB deficiencies 
were more likely to issue going 
concern opinions for financially 
distressed clients subsequent to 
their PCAOB inspection than prior 










reports and audit 
quality 
Gunny and Zhang 2012 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Found PCAOB inspections were 
associated with lower audit quality 
when reports were seriously 
deficient. Found clients of 
triennially inspected auditors that 
receive a deficient or seriously 
deficient report were associated 
with significantly higher abnormal 
accruals and clients of auditors that 
received a seriously deficient 
report were associated with a 
greater propensity to restate. 
Inspections 
PCAOB inspections of 
smaller CPA firms:  
Initial evidence from 
inspection reports. 
Hermanson et al. 2007 Accounting Horizons Found 60 percent of inspected 
firms had audit deficiencies. Firms 
with audit deficiencies were 
smaller, had larger number of 
issuer clients, and were growing 
more rapidly than firms without 
deficiencies, suggesting an over 
extension into the issuer client 





mechanisms:  An 
examination of internal 




2013 Accounting Horizons Analyzed differences between 
large firm partner perceptions of 
PCAOB inspection and Internal 
Quality Review processes. Found 
that partners believed both 
impacted professional reputation, 
but partners perceived that 
PCAOB inspections increased 
their firms' litigation risk more so 
than did IQRs. 
Inspections 
Audit fees, PCAOB 
sanctions, sanction 
risk, sanction risk 
premiums, and public 
policy: Theoretical 
framework and a call 
for research 
Huber 2013 Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public 
Policy 
Risk of sanctions by PCAOB may 
be passed on to audit clients in the 
form of higher audit fees. Calls for 










changing focus of 
inspections 
Ken Tysiac 2016 Journal of Accountancy Select audits for inspection on a 
broader basis rather than areas of 
high risk. Random selection. 
Increasing focus of inspection on 
firm's quality control system while 
potentially decreasing the number 
of audits inspected. Progress at 
smaller firms is more challenging 
to gauge because a different group 
of firms is inspected each year 
over a three year-cycle, and new 
firms join the group while others 
cease performing work that would 




affect auditor reporting 
decisions? 
Lamoreaux 2013 Working Paper:  University of Arizona Found audit firms in jurisdictions 
that are subject to PCAOB 
inspection process tended to issue 
more going concern opinions and 
report more material weaknesses 
in internal controls. 
Inspections 
An account analysis of 
PCAOB inspection 
reports for triennially 
inspected audit firms 
Landis et al. 2011 Journal of Business & Economics Research Majority of deficiencies be area 
were identified as inadequate 
procedures associated with certain 
accounts. Nearly 90 percent of the 
examined deficiencies by failure 
type were due to inadequate tests 
or documentation on the part of the 
auditor. 
Inspections 
Auditing the auditors:  
Evidence on the recent 
reforms to the external 
monitoring of audit 
firms. 
Lennox and Pittman 2010 Journal of Accounting Economics PCAOB inspections have not been 
perceived as influencing audit 
quality or client retention. 
However, new standards have 
caused some audit firms to exit the 
market. Taken as a whole, it is 
inconclusive if the PCAOB has 






Name of Article Author Date Where What's it About 
Research 
on….. 





Messier et al. 2010 Auditing:  A Journal of Practice and Theory Less than 30 percent of the 
sanctions in sample were levied 
against Big 4/Big 5 audit firms. 
Most identified deficiencies related 
to lack of due professional care on 
the part of the reviewer - lack of 
professional skepticism. Other 
deficiencies included incomplete 
or inaccurate financial information 
or a lack of conformity with 
GAAP. 
Enforcements 
Investor reactions to 
PCAOB inspections 
reports 
Offermans and Peek 2011 Working Paper:  Erasmus University Found statistically and 
economically significant market 
response to the issuances 
inspection reports. Found that at 
least part of the market response to 
the publication of PCAOB 
inspection reports can be attributed 
to revisions in investors' beliefs 







Name of Article Author Date Where What's it About 
Research 
on….. 
The impact of PCAOB 
regulatory actions and 
engagement risk on 




2016 Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Find that when the focus 
of the PCAOB inspection process 
is balanced, auditors’ reliance on 
the IAF is not impacted by 
engagement risk. However, when 
the 
PCAOB inspection process is 
focused on effectiveness, the 
auditors 
rely more on the IAF when 
engagement risk is low than when 
it is 
high. Thus, if the goal of Auditing 
Standard No. 5 (AS5) is to have 
external auditors be more sensitive 
to the risk of the tests to be 
performed, then the PCAOB’s 
efficiency focus for inspections did 
not have the intended effect. 
Inspections 
A case study on the 
first PCAOB 
inspection report 
issued to a Big-4 firm 
that included public 
disclosure of the firm's 
quality control 
criticism - Deloitte & 
Touche LLP 
Roybark 2013 Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public 
Policy 
Deloitte experienced a greater 
number of auditor changes and 
dismissals in the 13-month period 




PCAOB Inspections:  
Impact on Information 
Asymmetry over Time 
Vanstraelen, Ann, 




Working paper Examines whether and how the 
publication of PCAOB inspection 
reports of triennially inspected 
audit firms changes the dynamics 
of client-company information 










Earnings Quality in the 
European Union:  Does 
the Establishment of 
powerful Enforcement 
Mechanisms make a 
Difference? 
Varraber, Michael  2015 Department of Accounting and Auditing, 
University of Graz  Universitaetsstrasse 
15/F1, 8010 Graz, Austria 
Examines the relationship between 
the strength of the national 
accounting enforcement in 
European countries and earnings 
quality or the degree of earnings 
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